Contested historical interpretations and the narrative of the Angolan-South Africa War 1987-1988 - a military outcome? by Beck, Stephen James
1 
“Contested Historical Interpretations and the Narrative of 
the Angolan-South Africa War 1987-1988 - A military 
outcome?” 
by  
Stephen James Beck 
December 2018 
Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts in the Faculty of History at Stellenbosch University 
Supervisor: Prof. Bill Nasson 
Declaration
By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is 
my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise 
stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any 
third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining 
any qualification.
December 2018
Copyright © 2018 Stellenbosch University
All rights reserved
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3 
Beck, Stephen, Contested Historical Interpretations and the Narrative of the Angolan-South Africa 
War 1987-1988 - A military outcome?, Master of Arts (History), January 2018, Univeristy of 
Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, Western Cape. 
Abstract 
    The end of the 1980s brought abought great changes throughout the world, the end of the 
Cold War – globally, as well as the end of apartheid in South Africa. For South Africans these two 
events can be seen in the narratives which surround the Angolan Border/Civil War, as it 
contained all the elements of a Cold War struggle and is heralded by some as a turning point 
towards the end of apartheid. The outcomes of this conflict are hotly contested, each side 
claiming a victory for themselves. The Cuban, ANC, and MPLA narrative would have us believe 
that the SADF was defeated through military might. And the SADF narrative argues that they 
were not defeated in Angola. This thesis will look at those claims, and judge them on their merit, 
but will ultimately find that all the major players in this conflict emerged heads held high, and 
the only losers were the Angolan people. 
    Die einde van die 1980’s het wêreldwyd groot veranderinge meegebring: op globale skaal die 
einde van die Koue Oorlog, asook die einde van apartheid in Suid-Afrika. Suid-Afrikaners kan 
hierdie twee gebeurtenisse terugvind in die narratiewe oor die Angolese Grens- en 
Burgeroorlog. Hierdie oorlog bevat al die elemente van ’n Koue Oorlog-stryd en word deur 
sommige kommentators erken as ’n draaipunt wat gelei het tot die einde van apartheid. Die 
uitkomste van hierdie konflik word hewig betwis, want albei kante eis vir hulself oorwinning 
op. Die Kubaanse, ANC- en MPLA-narratief wil ons laat glo dat die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag 
(SAW) deur militêre mag verslaan is. En die SAW-narratief voer aan dat hulle nie in Angola 
verslaan is nie. Hierdie tesis sal hierdie aansprake bekyk en in terme van hul eie waarde 
beoordeel, maar sal uiteindelik tot die slotsom kom dat al die belangrikste deelnemers aan 
hierdie konflik daaruit getree het met hul koppe omhoog, en dat die enigste verloorders die 
Angolese bevolking was. 
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Introduction
    Towards the end of the era of Independence in Africa, the continent became vulnerable to the 
politics of the world stage. The unaligned third world states1 were ripe for the extension of the 
Cold War and Africa provided a ‘battleground’ that was safely away from both the Soviet Union 
and the United States of America. The former colonies of Portugal are a prime example of this, 
due to Portugal’s sluggish attitude towards relinquishing control over its colonies in Africa. As 
such, independence movements formed in colonies like Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and 
Angola. As a Western ally of Portugal, the United States could not capitalise on an emerging 
vacuum by courting the emerging leaderships, and instead the Soviet Union was able to gain a 
foothold in ex-Portuguese colonies. These shifts in alignment created tensions for the 
powerhouse of the continent, apartheid South Africa, which felt threatened by the ‘communist 
menace’ on its doorstep.  
1Third world meaning: The group of developing nations, especially of Asia and Africa, which did 
not align themselves with the policies of either the U.S. or the former Soviet Union. 
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    In Angola specifically, The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (hereafter the 
MPLA) created an issue for the South African government, as it was ‘communist-aligned’, as well 
as harbouring, and sympathising with the independence movement of South West Africa, the 
South West Africa People's Organization (hereafter SWAPO). Between the period of Angola 
losing its colony status in 1975, through to 1989, South Africa intervened militarily on behalf of 
the opposition to the MPLA, first the National Liberation Front of Angola (hereafter FNLA), and 
later The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (hereafter UNITA). Towards the 
end of the 1980s, the South Africans drastically escalated their intervention as a result of a 
People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (hereafter FAPLA) offensive on the UNITA 
stronghold of Mavinga, the results of which have long been subject to debate by observers. The 
South African intervention only ended in 1989, after tripartite talks between the MPLA, Cuba, 
and South Africa which coursed throughout 1988. This dissertation has been written in order to 
try to bring together and to compare the varying narratives which have been created around the 
events of 1987-1988, in which the SADF (South African Defence Force) and UNITA fought 
against the MPLA and its Cuban allies. Through this comparison of narratives there has also 
been the emergence of a further and distinctly different formulation, one which promotes the 
militaristic aspects of 1987-1988 over diplomatic and political ones. This ‘battle-centric’ 
narrative is present in both of what might be termed pro-SADF and anti-SADF literature, and 
detracts from a full understanding of the complex forces that allowed both the beginning and 
the end of this conflict. To this end, this study concludes that a currently emerging broad 
narrative should take centre stage, and should focus more on the political, economic and 
diplomatic aspects of this war, but which ought not to ignore the military aspects either. 
    The conflict between Angola and South Africa, known as the Border War, has become a 
growing field of historical interest and debate, especially over the last few years and is 
becoming more relevant today than ever. Strikingly labelled “The Forgotten War” by Gary 
Baines, The Angolan-South African border conflict has not been a major part of the public 
national consciousness until more recently, when the African National Congress (hereafter ANC) 
highlighted the importance of remembering the border war battle of Cuito Cuanavale. For 
instance, a set of newspaper articles written in 2007 and 2008 respectively, commemorated the 
border war and focused on the Angolan and Cuban lives lost. In an article published by the Mail 
and Guardian in 2007, Piero Gleijeses was perhaps the first to draw the ire of past SADF 
servicemen when he depicted ‘the battle of Cuito Cuanavale’ as a great defeat for the SADF.2 The 
experiences of these veterans did not match the narrative put forward in this type of article, nor 
of those propounded by the Cuban and current post-apartheid South African governments.  
2 Gleijeses http://mg.co.za/article/2007-07-11-cuito-cuanavale-revisited 
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    This version of a great South Africa defeat at Cuito was later reinforced by South African 
President Jacob Zuma’s presence, alongside a parliamentary delegation, at the laying of the 
foundation stone to a monument to “the Cuito Cuanavale battle, in honour of heroes fallen 
during this epic period”.3 From June the 21st to July the 3rd of 2015, South Africa played host to 
“the Cuban five” who, amongst other things, visited the monument to Cuban soldiers who had 
fought in Angola in Pretoria’s  Freedom Park. Accordingly, Angola and what has become 
identified as a pivotal Battle for Cuito Cuanavale has becoming steadily a more and more 
relevant political factor in public discourse around the regional ‘politics of liberation’ and 
independence. A consequence of this is that growing numbers of SADF veterans have come to 
feel their lived history, and that their uniformed past is being overwritten or otherwise 
distorted. The Rhodes University historian, Gary Baines, has addressed this notion in his recent 
book, South Africa’s ‘Border War’: contested narratives and conflicting memories4, which focuses 
strongly on the power of memory. Baines suggests that for the SADF veterans, their ‘war 
narrative’ is inextricably intertwined with their own sense of identity, thus making any attack 
on this narrative also an attack on their identity.5 For such a group, the apparent imposition of 
the ANC’s official version of Angolan-South African events is therefore an offence against the 
personal experiences of its affected constituents, and represents an attack on the proper 
understanding of the history of the country in the closing decades of the past century.  
     This ‘attack’ or attempt to construct a particularly partisan ‘new’ history is best shown by the 
changes made to the schools’ Nation Senior Certificate curriculum. In 2013, the South African 
government altered its education system to accommodate CAPS (Curriculum Assessment Policy 
Statements) and the topic of Angola was added to the Cold War section of the History 
matriculation syllabus.6. The current generation of school matriculants and future matriculants 
are unlikely to have a parent who might have served in the border war, and as such their 
primary interaction or knowledge of this part of South Africa’s history is most likely to come 
from the school syllabus. To its credit, the school syllabus has adopted an open interpretative 
stance on Angola, acknowledging that there are differing narratives. At the same time, though, 
this historical latitude is also subject to the publisher of the textbooks which are not 
standardised across the platform.7  
3 http://www.portalangop.co.ao/angola/en_us/noticias/politica/2008/2/12/Parliament-Speaker-Lays-
Foundation-Stone-for-Monument-Cuito-Cuanavale-Battle,89a10149-d82c-4736-b598-
d7502c56f20c.html 
4 This recently published book is not available in South African bookshops, as such this study has used the 
Kindle version available from Amazon.com and citations use the location format in place of page numbers. 
5 Baines loc 337 
6 National Curriculum Statement (NCS):Further Education and Training Phase Grades 10-12 . pp. 26 
7 Oxford in search of History pg110-111. Used by Parel Vallei Hoer-Skool Somerset West 
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    Such considerations aside, the apparent core emphasis on the ‘battle of Cuito Cuanavale’ is an 
issue which is central to the thrust of this thesis, as the perspective provided implies that the 
narrative of SADF defeat is the correct one, in addition to placing an over-emphasis on the 
battle-centric viewpoint which detracts from all other narratives. The limitations of such an 
approach towards understanding of the past are made even more important in light of 
statements in more recent years by Basic Education Minister Angie Motshekga who has 
suggested that history should be made a compulsory Matriculation subject in South African 
public schools.8 By way of a critical response to this, the present study will focus on the position 
of varying authors, and on varying works that may have the ability to influence the stance taken 
by the average reader. Much of the literature supporting the importance of the ‘battle of Cuito 
Cuanavale’ has been written by people of considerable influence, or whose influence is shown 
by the consistent citation of their works in justification of their narrative interpretations.       
    As such, this work seeks to lay out and to compare narratives presented by the SADF 
supporters, and by those who believe that the ‘battle for Cuito Cuanavale’ was an important 
turning point in the history of Southern Africa. It will first explore the narrative presented by 
the SADF, and will seek to demonstrate that the secondary sources used are consistent with the 
information found within the SADF primary documents gathered from the South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF) Military Intelligence Archive. In this construction of events and 
outcomes, the Republic’s forces prevailed. Then, the thesis will go on to examine the narratives 
of influential authors who have claimed that the SADF was defeated at the ‘battle of Cuito 
Cuanavale’ and that this defeat had far-reaching effects on the fortunes of the apartheid order 
and on the entire future of Southern Africa.  
    In the final chapter, this study will address both narratives, consider how they work together, 
and look at how the sources have been created and utilised to achieve a desired effect. It will 
argue that the narrative emphasising the ‘battle of Cuito Cuanavale’ factor is seriously lacking in 
both sources and reasoning, while representations of the SADF narrative contain a good level of 
detail, and reasonable argumentation, largely countering the arguments made by ‘anti-SADF’ 
authors, such as Horace Campbell – a writer whom we will encounter in due course. The work 
will conclude on a note highly critical of the fixation on military aspects of the border war by 
both sides, and in favour of a more balanced war narrative, one which was teased out by the 
scholarly journalist, Leopold Scholtz, and which was furthered in another direction by the 
academic historian, Gary Baines, in his latest book. A fixation on the narrow story of military 
victories or defeats serves as a reductionist element which actually detracts from the real 
8 http://mg.co.za/article/2014-07-16-education-dept-looks-to-history-to-fix-sas-pride 
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significance of this conflict to the history of Southern Africa, as well as detracting from the 
experiences of those soldiers who fought there in the service of their country’s ruling interests. 
Methodology 
    This section serves the purpose of alleviating the need for a text over-burdened by constant 
footnotes, and seeks to answer issues that are not immediately relevant to the material found 
throughout. The present study has used a selection of sources, primary and secondary, in the 
explanation of the narratives surrounding the topic of the Angolan border war. The primary 
sources used in this paper are taken directly from the South African National Defence Force 
Military Intelligence archive in Pretoria. All of the documents contained within are accessible to 
any member of the public under the Freedom of information Act, subject to declassification. This 
means that when we access documents from this source we must approach them with a degree 
of scepticism. The documents available to the public might only be so because they do not 
contain information that might incriminate a specific person, or reveal what the keepers of 
records might consider to be a state secret.  A more conspiratorial mind might suggest that the 
documents available are there to underpin a specific narrative, that the arguments formulated 
by this thesis (which are reliant on the primary sources) were engineered by the archivists to 
make the SADF narrative appear ‘factual’ or accurate or true.  
    To address this, we need to bear in mind that there has obviously been a change of power 
within South Africa’s military structures; the SANDF is as different to the SADF, as the SADF was 
different to the earlier UDF or Union Defence Force. On balance, it is improbable that, as an 
organisation, the SANDF has been systematically doctoring or “covering up” the full 
documentary record of the SADF. Indeed, a specific primary source used predominantly in this 
study presented an interesting conflict of an accidental kind during its writing. It appeared that 
the author, Helmoed Romer-Heitman, was quoting verbatim from a SADF highly confidential 
document in his book, War in Angola, published in December 1990, despite the fact that the 
document was only declassified in 2008.  
    After making peresonal contact with Mr Romer-Heitman, he made it clear that he had been 
present at the time of its compilation by Commandant van Moltke.9 This, arguably, lends extra 
authenticity to War in Angola, as its author was able to quote official figures and operational 
Instructions to which other contemporary authors had no access. In the Preface, Romer-
Heitman references the “notes” provided to him by van Moltke, so this documentation was not 
something that was hidden, despite its evidently confidential nature. The essence of Helmoed 
9 It is also due to Mr Heitman that I have the name of the author. 
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Romer-Heitman’s book is that it was also directed and influenced by officers and other 
individuals who were part of the events described; their interviews and ‘fact checking’ are in 
fact acknowledged as an important aspect of the work. Notwithstanding its author’s known 
close association with the Republic’s defence establishment, both in the apartheid era and in the 
post-apartheid period, there can be little doubt over his close and knowledgeable links with the 
primary material. The historical importance of this is underlined by the absence of parts 2 and 
possibly 3 of an official work of fundamental importance to this aspect of the Angolan conflict, 
The Concise History of Operation Moduler, which did not feature within the archival J. F. Huyser 
collection alongside phase 1.10 Given this absence, it made sense to look to the 
comprehensiveness of Helmoed Romer-Heitman’s detailed account for establishing a 
reasonably credible narrative, as he has had access to the apparently unsifted notes which 
comprised the documents that are lacking. 
Addressing the secondary sources, I have not, of course, used all the available literature 
written by SADF supporters. There are numerous personal accounts of the war, but these 
mostly ‘individual experience’ histories do not engage with the broader picture narratives as do 
those examples that are included in this discussion. Many of these sources also present strongly 
partial arguments; upon reading some of the work by General Jannie Geldenhuys, for instance, it 
became immediately apparent that his accounts are triumphalist in tone, and do not 
acknowledge any of the SADF failings or shortcomings addressed within more authoritative 
accounts by authors like Romer-Heitman and Fred Bridgland. The need to include consideration 
of Romer-Heitman and of Bridgland is, of course, fairly self-evident, as almost all literature on 
the experience of the SADF in Angola includes a reference to one or both of these authors. Their 
books remain the foundation of writing about the SADF perspective on the Angolan border war.  
The reasoning behind selecting the series of articles which support the idea of the war 
undergoing a turning point at Cuito Cuanavale is not because of their – arguably – indifferent 
quality, but rather because each article or author has a sphere of influence. The questionable 
quality of their analysis and factual checking is precisely why they matter - not simply to a 
counter-argument perspective, but because since publication they have come to represent an 
established certainty or wisdom for many readers. The level of importance of these sources is 
perhaps best highlighted by their widespread use by even established professional scholars. 
Accordingly, it was both a surprise and a delight to discover that all of the sources addressed in 
10 It is always possible that they are elsewhere in the archive, but finding them will require intimate 
knowledge of the archive or luck.  My visit was also poorly timed and coincided with the archivist in 
charge of visitors last day of work. 
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chapter 4 also feature in Gary Baines’s very recent book of 2014. This not only highlights the 
influence of this secondary material, but also its continuing contemporary relevance. 
  The approach I have taken towards the events portrayed is one of weighing up the sides and 
attempting to make a statement about the events that unfurled around the conflict between 
1987-1989. I do this by approaching the different narratives and stating their cases. In the ‘case’ 
of the SADF narrative, there is much more content to cover, so I have devoted more time and 
effort in trying to establish the full picture provided. Equally, however, I have had to limit the 
scale of information included, as literature on the SADF includes a great deal of minutiae. In the 
‘case’ of the counter-narratives, there is far less to go on, and so they are restricted to a single 
chapter. I hope that in this respect I have not weakened their fundamental arguments, as for a 
full understanding of the complexities of these contending narratives we need to understand the 
arguments fully. After outlining the cases of the authors, or at least how I have interpreted them, 
I then weighed up what looks to have been the more likely or historically persuasive contention. 
The question posed is not one of was there a victor, as it is arguable that there was no one side 
that clearly won any aspect of the Angolan conflict. Rather, the question I hope to be able to 
answer in the pages which follow is whether the narratives under examination are accurate in 
the attempt to pose the Angolan conflict as a series of military victories and defeats, or is the 
alternative narrative of peace talks, negotiations and jockeying politics, truer to the 
circumstances of those turbulent years. 
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Literature Review         
    As this thesis is based on written literature, there is less value in addressing in depth its 
content here, than in devoting this section to a brief consideration of general trends and issues 
within various aspects of the overall writings on the Angolan ‘Border War’. This will include 
authors from both sides covered in the study, and will attempt to classify the different types of 
literature into different categories.  
    This literature review starts by briefly looking at the type of secondary source which has not 
been utilised, due to its clearly biased or misleading nature, showing a lack of awareness of the 
potential merits of other viewpoints. Some of these sources can be seen as being of a fringe 
variety, such as the writings of Stuart Sterzel, but others are more mainstream in standing. The 
best examples of the mainstream sources are works such as those by General Jannie 
Geldenhuys, which are clearly biased and even contain inexplicably extraneous rugby 
information. Such works weaken what might otherwise be a clear and sober narrative by 
putting forward their own triumphalist version of events. In the case of the explicitly pro-SADF 
perspective, there are a large number of authors who have written according to different 
motivations – each should be considered individually for their own value - and those that 
display a shared consistency can be seen as comprising a common narrative. As such, we need 
to understand the kind of literature which does not make it into the pro-SADF narrative that this 
study explores. 
   One way of approaching this is to use a recent paper by Stuart Sterzel as an example of the 
kind of source which is an ‘outlier’ from the larger narrative - it shares many of the same 
assumptions, but differs sufficiently to be inconsistent with the established picture. There are a 
few key points to bear in mind in regard to Sterzel’s position. The only source of his South Africa 
and the Angolan War is Academia.edu, a tool for sharing papers. Also of note is that although 
writing history, this author is not a professional scholar with links to the academy. Nonetheless, 
Sterzel is frequently cited and has contributed to news websites like www.iol.co.za, using his 
personal experiences and inside knowledge from his period as a “recce”, a member of South 
Africa’s Special Forces. As a consequence, it is natural to expect bias, or a leaning in favour of the 
SADF and especially its Special Forces operations in Angola.  
   South Africa and the Angolan War is in itself highly comprehensive at first glance, and it is also 
ambitious in its goal to debunk the ‘myths’ surrounding the SADF’s role in the Angolan war. A 
first and obvious issue is that Sterzel’s work fails to disentangle the complexities of the Cold 
War links. There is virtually an obsession with the involvement of the USSR, going so far as to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
14 
 
negate much of the individual Angolan and Cuban agency in the Southern African upheaval, and 
representing the actions of Cuba and the MPLA as merely those of Soviet proxies. This argument 
has been strongly critiqued by Piero Gleijeses in an article published in the Journal of Cold War 
Studies.1 Sterzel’s assumptions about the puppet-master role of the USSR are made apparent 
early in his study, as he classifies the ‘participants’ as being ‘On the USSR side’ and ‘On the South 
African and UNITA side’.2 Incidentally, It is interesting to note that the latter side is not 
characterised as the ‘American side’, given that this author has emphasised the Angolan war as 
wholly part of the context of the Cold War.  
    Sterzel has also made numerous findings which conflict with the ‘factual’ reports of events 
provided by other detailed ‘pro-SADF’ sources, such as an apparent tactical moment when the 
SADF is asserted to have trapped enemy FAPLA troops in an area of fighting terrain at Cuito 
Cuanavale which became known as the Tumpo ‘pocket’3.   
   This is a representation of Cuito Canavale events which is not to be found in any other pro-
SADF literature, and among more authoritative versions of the Angolan conflict, such as that 
presented by Fred Bridgland, whose coverage of the same period does not suggest that the 
SADF was in a position to have trapped the FAPLA forces at that point. Still, Sterzel has spent a 
great deal of effort in debunking the “mythology” around the ‘battle of Cuito Cuanavale’, and has 
also identified authors like Ronnie Kasrils and Horace Campbell as being influential in 
conveying interpretations which are alleged to amount to a form of ‘disinformation’. Overall, 
Sterzel’s study is not one to be ignored, even though it is difficult to evaluate its accuracy as a 
whole, given the large range of unverified claims. Added to this is the writer’s obvious and 
extreme pro- South Africa bias, such as exculpating its government over the ‘crime of apartheid’ 
by laying blame upon the hostile presures exerted by other world powers. Furthermore, 
Sterzel’s ‘direct’ observations accounts are not consistent with other contemporary accounts 
provided by SADF officers in works such as those by Fred Bridgland. These are the kinds of 
considerations which influenced the decision on what kind of sources were to be used for the 
pro-SADF narratives in this investigation. There needs to be a working consistency between the 
secondary sources before primary sources are even examined. In essence, then, Sterzel’s article 
represents what might be categorised as the fringe narrative of the SADF. For the ‘anti-SADF’ 
equivalent of this, we would require a similar perspective from a Cuban or FAPLA soldier, 
neither of which appear to be available in an accessible English translation at the present time. 
                                                             
1 Gleijeses. Moscow’s Proxy 
2 Sterzel, Stuart. "South Africa and the Angolan War." (2014). 
https://www.academia.edu/15584636/Paper_South_Africa_and_the_Angolan_War. 21 Oct. 2015 pp.9-10 
3 Usually referred to as the Tumpo Triangle 
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    Having designated the type of historical source that this work has sought to skirt in 
establishing the SADF narrative, we now look at the type of source that this study deems more 
useful. To this end, there are two pivotal books which feature in almost all research done 
hitherto on the Angolan war: War in Angola by Helmoed Romer-Heitman, and The War for Africa 
by Fred Bridgland. Both Romer-Heitman and Bridgland were key reporters during the Angolan 
war, and it was Fred Bridgland who is widely credited with having first brought the ‘Bush war’ 
to public knowledge. It is this very nature of their field roles that make their narratives so 
compelling. Both appear to be looking for a good story in a journalistic sense, and in the case of 
Bridgland, his perspectives show that he felt no allegiance to the SADF. Yet his version of events 
fits in line with the SADF narrative of victory in Angola.  
    Both Romer- Heitman and Bridgland have based their books on interviews done with officers 
in the SADF, but Bridgland’s book relies considerably more on those interviews. In the chapters 
dealing with battles, Bridgland provides the reader with a first person account, which really 
shows a great attention to detail and even provides a strong social history flavour. These 
accounts do tend to paint the SADF in a very triumphalist manner, as these chapters are 
informed by a specific officer who focuses on the bravery of his men and/or fellow officers. 
Aside from the direct re-telling of events, Bridgland also provides a good top-down view of the 
events from an SADF perspective, and this we must assume results from his interviews with 
Generals like Jannie Geldenhuys, as well as SADF field commanders who were apprised of the 
situation that faced the SADF. While the level of detail and use of sources by Bridgland makes 
his book very valuable to any study on Angola, it is, however, slight on basic academic features.4  
The lack of footnotes means that when he adopts a more general tone, and is providing us with 
the top-down view of events in Angola, we do not know where the information is specifically 
coming from. This is a drawback, as when Bridgland mentions that he has also based some of his 
writing on interviews with Cuban ex-general Del Pino – for, without referencing, we can only 
speculate which sections have been influenced by the Del Pino source.  
    What is most interesting about Bridgland (which he shares with Romer- Heitman) is that he 
does not claim an outright victory for the SADF. Romer-Heitman, for his part, treads a fine line 
in providing General Geldenhuys’s reasoning behind why in his view the SADF had achieved 
victory in Angola, and isuggesting that it was the apartheid government’s studied silence that 
allowed contrary claims of an SADF defeat to become rife. Bridgland himself states that the 
notion of victory in Angola in general is a complex one, and proposes that asking about who won 
is possibly the wrong question. Here, Fred Bridgland could be said to have been ahead of his 
own time, in putting forward a narrative suggesting that there were actually few losers who 
                                                             
4 Not being an academic, Bridgland is not required to adhere to these conventions. 
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emerged from the negotiations; looking at each major element, the South Africans, the Cubans, 
and the United States, he concluded that all of these groups emerged victorious in some way or 
another. What makes this notable is that given that Bridgland’s work was mostly based on 
interviews with officers and soldiers, one might have expected a more one-dimensional 
narrative to have been the result. Instead, at an interpretative level, Bridgland shows a level of 
even-handed balance and detachment in his writings which was uncommon until scholars like 
Leopold Scholtz began seriously researching the nature of the Angolan war in the 2000s and 
onwards. 
    Helmoed Romer-Heitman’s study is notable in different ways from Bridgland, and that stems 
from the proximity this author had to the inner circle of the SADF. Very specific details 
presented in the classified document, The Concise History of Operation Moduler, are also 
mentioned in Romer- Heitman’s book, War in Angola. When questioned about this, Romer-
Heitman informed me that his book was produced through a combination of interviews and 
access to an initial draft of the SADF document, The Concise History of Operation Moduler, as 
compiled by Commandant van Moltke. According to Romer-Heitman, this was permitted on the 
basis that he was allowed to read only the draft document - as such, there are unreferenced 
parts of Romer-Heitman’s book which directly relate to sections of this ‘in-house’ SADF 
document.  
    This inside track provides us with a valuable source, as Romer-Heitman’s empirical accounts 
of the Angolan military experience  do not appear to be overly exaggerated or partisan. He sets 
out to achieve this by providing the reader with a straightforward chronological approach to the 
Angolan War. In this account, Romer-Heitman covers the military battles and some of the SADF-
politics that accompanied South African victories and defeats. A strong feature is that Romer-
Heitman’s chronicle does not simply gloss over the failings of the SADF, arguing that it appears 
that learning from failure was one of the conscious internal processes within the SADF. This 
writer provides us with an account of every battle from 1987 onwards, as well as giving the 
reader a glimpse into the detailed planning that accompanied both the run-up and wind-down 
from each encounter with FAPLA forces. Granted, the declared intimate relationship that 
Romer-Heitman had with the SADF is one which should cause the reader to pause. Equally, his 
account pulls no punches, and it shows little sign of straining hard to convince the reader 
through emotive language or tales of heroism. Instead, opting for a sober rather than a florid 
tone, he attempts to reconstruct the events as he has found them through interviews, 
documents, and reported personal experience, and accompanies these accounts with factual 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
17 
 
statistics and other figures5. In summing up, Romer-Heitman appears not to see any defeat for 
the SADF. He contends that the SADF had achieved its operational objectives of 1987 by 
countering the FAPLA advance, but that the unfolding of the events of 1988 were overshadowed 
by the negotiations. The concessions made by South Africa are not considered to have been 
losses by Romer-Heitman, arguing that with no supportive Cuban presence, SWAPO was not a 
threat to South African interests. His unambiguous summation of Angolan circumstances, while 
open to question, does not, however, necessarily detract from the quality of the entire narrative, 
as the information provided, combined with issues which he ignores in his conclusion, still make 
for a useful text on the war. 
    The most balanced account of the Angolan war, in my view, is the comprehensive overview 
produced by Leopold Scholtz. Scholtz, who has frequently published articles on the subject of 
the Angolan war in the journal Militaria Scientia, eventually compiled his extensive research 
into a book in 2013.  Scholtz’s preceding articles are well written and logically sound, they ask 
questions about the nature of the SADF operations in Angola, and answer them using a 
persuasive measure of reason. Scholtz deftly demonstrates that the SADF campaign in Angola 
did not end in defeat by concentrating on the operational objectives of the SADF throughout the 
conflict. In the case of 1987-1988 it is clear that the SADF achieved much of its objectives, which 
he confirms using a variety of sources without twisting statements, including those which would 
normally be used to argue for an SADF defeat. The main source of interest in all of Scholtz’s 
work, both articles and his book, is that of the: 61 mechanised battalion online archive. 
Regrettably, for those trying to follow Scholtz in his research, this resource has seemingly 
disappeared, as the 61 mech battalion website no longer offers a link to their archive.6 Despite 
this issue, Scholtz’ work has been a significant factor in this study, as his book provides arguably 
the first most balanced account of the Angolan war. Scholtz frequently applies valid reasoning to 
the points made by other ‘pro-SADF’ sources such as his questioning of the use of statistics to 
claim South African victories in operations which did not primarily achieve their objectives. 
Another point in Scholtz’ favour is that he provides the Cubans and Angolans with a significant 
degree of agency and does not treat them as rearguard movements, as well as not depicting 
them as simple pawns of the USSR. In his conclusion about the outcome of the Angolan war, 
Scholtz looks from each faction’s perspective and attempts to see whether they achieved their 
goals. Like Bridgland before him, Scholtz concludes that each of the major factions involved in 
this conflict emerged victorious in some aspect. His ability to ‘pick’ a side without demeaning 
                                                             
5 These figures are ‘verified’ mostly through the aforementioned SADF document. 
6 An email was sent to the site admin querying this in July 2015, but no response has returned. Direct 
URLS can yield results when accessing the material, but there is no way to find these sources without 
prior knowledge. 
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the other narratives at play is what makes him a valuable source in any future work on the 
subject of the Angolan hostilities. 
    In a similar vein to Leopold Scholtz, Gary Baines recently published a well - structured and 
academically informed book in 2014, titled South Africa’s ‘Border War’: Contested Narratives and 
Conflicting Memories. The book is comprised of a series of essays about the ‘Border War’, a great 
many of which are devoted to material that is not entirely relevant to this present study. Where 
Baines becomes relevant is in his chapter dealing with the “Battle of Cuito Cuanavale”. In this 
essay, Baines sets out to adopt a balanced approach towards dispelling myths from both sides 
which surround this period, by introducing the concept of a “battle-centric” approach. While the 
author focuses this more towards partisan, nationalistic ANC and Cuban narratives, 
demythologising is undoubtedly applicable to all sides of this ‘debate’, as virtually all historical 
commentators are culpable of reducing the balance sheet of the Angolan conflict to military 
matters alone. Baines also adopts a view associated increasingly with contemporary authors 
and historians – namely, that the Angolan ‘Border War’ was not a war of “victors or 
vanquished”, but rather one that was resolved on the basis of concession. Of particular note is 
that like those writers who have considered the ANC’s ‘battle’ mythology surrounding the 
outcome of the Cuito contest, Baines has emphasised the more decisive geopolitical events that 
unfolded afterwards, to argue that it has little basis on which to claim a victorious outcome. His 
work provides an important even-handed approach in a field of interpretation that has long 
been highly polarised. Again, as with Scholtz, Baines’s Contested Narratives will be essential to 
virtually all future research on the Angolan border war.  
 
    On the “other” side of the Angolan war narratives we have the emergence of distinct thematic 
groups. The first of these is what might be termed the stock Cuban narrative. The second is a 
stand-alone perspective which uses information from various sources to create an anti-
apartheid South Africa narrative. This narrative is used by many as a backbone for their political 
beliefs, and it becomes most apparent when we examine the view put forward by the ANC and 
some of its influential authorial voices in later discussion in this thesis. The relevant articles that 
have been chosen for critique were selected because their authors are all influential figures and 
what they wrote – however much subject to later revision -  have carried weight in 
understandings of contemporary history. As such, it is important that questionable 
‘inaccuracies’ and ‘falsehoods’ that are included in these accounts are highlighted, in order both 
to understand how these narratives were generated, and to establish if they are in fact based on 
misinformation.  
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    The first of these treatments to explore is the conventional Cuban narrative which naturally 
features in this thesis on several occasions. The most notable and also the most plainly stated 
accounts are those of Fidel Castro and Jorge Risquet, as recorded by David Deutschman but this 
perspective is also in part fed by Pierro Gleijeses. In the accounts provided by Deutschman we 
are given an uneven mixture of useful information which provides an insight into the Cuban 
perspective, and then predictable propaganda. The greatest issue when dealing with any 
literature on the contested topic of the ‘Border War’ is that of bias, and both Castro and Risquet 
provide that in spades. It is also revealed in this set of writings that it was Castro’s plan to turn 
Cuito Cuanavale into a ‘symbol of resistance’ - this makes it seem plausible that Fidel Castro was 
a source of the battle-centric narrative when pervades the subject of Cuito Cuanavale as a 
‘turning point’ in the recent history of Southern Africa. That notwithstanding, these are two very 
important and highly interesting documents. Both of the men involved in their creation held 
great influence; Fidel Castro as the President of Cuba for more than three decades, and Jorge 
Risquet as a founding member of the Cuban Communist Party as well as a figure who served the 
Cuban government in multiple roles including an Angolan role in the 1988 tripartite 
negotiations. Their positions bestowed upon them the role of authority figures who have been 
widely respected in sympathetic circles; as such, the narratives that these individuals have 
espoused have been, and will continue to be, believed by supportive audiences.   
    There is also an issue of relevance when we consider the Cuban perspective which somewhat 
inflates the position of the historian, Pierro Gleijeses, and that is the lack of access by the public 
to Cuban archival documents. So far as it has been possible to establish, Pierro Gleijeses is the 
only historian who has had the privilege of being given access to a limited run of the relevant 
Cuban archives, which he describes in his acknowledgements in Conflicting Missions as having 
being facilitated by none other than Jorge Risquet. Although Gleijeses has not written in the 
same depth about the ‘battle of Cuito Cuanavale’ as he has about Cuba’s policies and 
interventions in Africa, he does provide a sound and detailed version of Cuba’s intervention 
during the SADF’s Operation Savannah in Angola. This provides the reader with a glimpse into 
the Cuban archives, albeit a heavily pro-Cuban account. The pro-Cuba slant is demonstrated 
amply by the absence of any acknowledgement of negative outcomes or of mixed factors in the 
experience of Cuban intervention. For Castro and Risquet, willing Cubans were happy to help 
Africans through high levels of motivation and sacrifice. On the other hand, it is probably much 
easier to credit SADF intelligence reports which claim that Cuban soldiers grew increasingly 
disillusioned and ended up facing a similar experience to the cynicism and weariness of 
American soldiers fighting in Vietnam. Predictably, this factor is never mentioned by Castro 
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when discussing Cuba’s reasoning for entering into negotiations. Gleijeses, too, steers clear of 
any critical weighing-up of the Cuban war effort.  
     A further author who could be considered a part of this narrative is Isaac Saney,in his article 
titled, ‘African Stalingrad’. Saney adopts the battle-centric narrative of a sweeping victory and 
grand turning point at Cuito Cuanavale and places it into the context of the Cuban ‘mission to 
Africa’. Saney seeks to use the notion of a regional turning point as a cause of the eventual 
ending of apartheid in South Africa, and as a means of promoting the Cuban government and the 
actions of the Cuban Communist Party. The case being made is mostly that of establishing the 
Cubans as an altruistic anti-colonial force in Africa. Again, Saney’s narrative is one which is not 
without influence. Through his position at Dalhousie University in Canada, and his published 
books such as Cuba: Revolution in Motion, Saney has established himself as an authority on the 
intersection of Cuban and African histories.  
    The second sub-type of this broad narrative is that put forward by Horace Campbell, in work 
which has come to act as a backbone to articles and beliefs that constitute an explicit anti-SADF 
and pro-Cuban narrative. The figures and statistics that Campbell utilises in ‘The Siege of Cuito 
Cuanavale’ are repeated by other writers in the same camp on the basis of what appears to be 
complete faith in the accuracy of Campbell’s scholarship. Yet, this author’s particular Siege 
article could be adjudged to contain numerous errors, ranging from loaded phrasing to incorrect 
facts and figures, in the pursuit of a tendentious line of argument at the expense  of more 
credible historical accuracy. Still, Campbell’s articles have been widely referenced and his work 
is significant for this present discussion, to be taken up fully in Chapter Four. Indeed, this 
narrative is most noteworthy as Campbell’s writings are reflected in the standard ANC 
interpretation of this Southern African episode. 
The final sub-type of the anti-SADF/ pro-Cuban narrative is, then, that provided by the ANC 
itself. This takes the form of articles published by prominent ANC personalities such as Ronnie 
Kasrils in the recent past, and through government channels like the Parliamentary publication, 
Insession, as well as press statements. Ronnie Kasrils’ views in particular are important as he 
has held various positions in the government, was on the National Executive Committee of the 
ANC from 1987-2007, served as Minister of Intelligence from 2004-2008, and has also held a 
position on the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party which has, of course, 
formed part of the ANC’s tripartite alliance. Kasrils’ publicly-expressed beliefs and statements 
could still be said to represent the main views of the party on this matter.7 Accordingly, his 
representative ANC voice is likely to have influenced the formation of beliefs on the subject of 
                                                             
7 At least it is a requirement not to speak out against your chosen party’s beliefs. 
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Cuito Cuanavale and the ‘Border War’ in general. The inclusion of Insession and a 
complementing ANC statement from March 2008 serves to illustrate the similarities between 
the ANC government’s official stance and that of the individual voice of Ronnie Kasrils.  
This study has expressly not included the more ‘tub-thumping’ standpoints backing the SADF 
which are associated with popular authors aligned with the old defence force. Similarly, care has 
been taken in the case of the counter-narratives to the pro-SADF readings. By and large, the 
authors included are respected. Thus, as stated previously, the literature chosen for the 
interpretative core of this topic has been selected chosen for its influence and regular 
appearance as scholarly citations. 
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Context             
 
Introduction             
    The ‘Border War’ as a whole and the Republic of South Africa’s actions in Angola should not be 
seen as an isolated military attempt at the destabilisation of a neighbouring state. Instead, the 
border war ought to be viewed as part of an intricate web of events connected by global and 
domestic politics, affected heavily by the Cold War’s effect on late-decolonisation in Southern 
Africa. As such, this chapter will try to provide the wider anti-communist context of South 
Africa’s Border War, up to the military planning of its Operation Moduler, which signals what 
some commentators have called “the final phase” of South Africa’s involvement in Angola. 
The Cold War and newly independent states        
    The era of ‘decolonisation’ set in motion a difficult precedent for the future of parts of Africa, 
for it heralded a future in which violent coups and overthrows would become the modus 
operandi for political change. This was in part due to the hurried manner in which European 
imperialist powers pulled out of Africa, as when in one state a colonial power could commence 
moving out, that rapid transition could create a sense of expectation and urgency within 
neighbouring states. At times, this edgy expectation teetered particularly dangerously, as when 
the processes of decolonisation slowed, rising popular expectation could turn to violence.1 An 
example of that might be the January riots in the Belgian Congo in 1959, after which Brussels 
quickly promised independence, but on the basis of a long and slow transitional period of about 
fifteen years. The urgency to acquire independence created pressures which soon spiralled into 
mass violence and threatened the administration’s ability to govern the country.2 With the 
governing power caught on the back foot, the process of decolonisation was speeded up and the 
country was granted independence within four years, with little handover preparation for the 
troubles that would involve and a strife-torn future history of independence.3 
    Decolonisation in much of Africa brought into being a highly unstable system of nationalist 
governance, with post-colonial rulers invariably claiming that their new order of national 
freedom embodied the unanimous voice and will of the people. Meanwhile, the possible 
meaning of spreading African independence was receiving attention outside Europe. An 
American National Intelligence estimate concluded that the immaturity of the newly 
independent states and popular resentment of their former colonial rulers could cause a major 
                                                             
1 Gleijeses, Piero. Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, Pretoria. Alberton, South Africa: Galago, 
2003. pp.5 
2 Gleijeses, Piero. Conflicting Missions. pp. 5 
3 Gleijeses, Piero. Conflicting Missions. pp. 6 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
23 
 
swing towards communism and an alignment with the Soviet Union. The influence of the 
communist bloc had supposedly gone from negligible under colonial rule to “significant” in the 
era of independence, which created an advantageous position for the Soviet Union as Africa was 
a valuable source of natural resources.4 In this light, Africa was now an important playing field 
in the Cold War as African states were now sovereign territories which could choose their own 
alignment and African views and interests became more important to both America and the 
Soviet Union. America, however, had two advantages over the Soviet Union. The first was that it 
was able to provide more aid than the Soviets, and the second was that its Western European 
allies still held residual positions of influence in many of their former colonies, and these links 
could be used to manoeuvre new African leaders into working by preference with America.5 
Prime examples of this were former Francophone colonies in North Africa and in West Africa. 
However, this not always the case. Some of the new African states were led by radical 
nationalists who distrusted or hated their former colonial rulers, particularly in the Portuguese 
and Belgian colonies of these lesser imperial powers. In countries such as Guinea Bissau, 
America’s ties with and aid to Portugal heightened anti-Portuguese sentiment and pushed its 
growing independence movement towards alignment with the Soviet Union.6  
    The Cold War ‘scramble’ for Africa tends to paint many African conflicts with the same brush, 
as conflicts of ideology and of East versus West. This, though, is surely an over-simplification, 
and especially so when it comes to the turbulence in Southern Africa. Although the Cold War 
definitely affected some of what happened, we should not dismiss the independent agency of 
South Africa, Angola or Cuba, for the Angolan conflict was more than just a Cold War conflict. 
Namibia or South West Africa          
    Namibia was an important aspect of the Angolan conflict, due to the MPLA’s complicit attitude 
to the Namibian independence movement, SWAPO. Much of the SADF’s early operations or 
cross-border strikes were motivated by hitting SWAPO targets that were being allowed 
seemingly free reign in Angola. The territory also featured prominently in the global politics of 
the 1970s and 1980s, as well as being central to the negotiations which eventually ended the 
conflict between South African and the Angolan-Cuban alliance. 
    Namibia was colonised originally by Germany in 1884 as a protectorate which became known 
in English as South West Africa (henceforth SWA). Control over SWA changed hands after 
Germany’s defeat in the First World War, and the Union of South Africa was assigned a Class C 
                                                             
4 Gleijeses, Piero. Conflicting Missions. pp. 6 
5 Gleijeses, Piero. Conflicting Missions. pp. 6 
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mandate to administer it by the League of Nations.7 As such, SWA was to be governed under the 
segregationist laws of South Africa which would later include the laws of the Nationalist 
apartheid government. When the League of Nations was dissolved at the end of the Second 
World War and the United Nations was formed, the South African government applied to annex 
SWA and incorporate it into South Africa. The United Nations rejected this and instead resolved 
that SWA should be placed under a new “International Trusteeship System” with a view to its 
eventual independence. South Africa, in turn, rejected this and refused to comply. This defiance 
put strain on the South African – American diplomatic relationship.8  
    In order to avoid appearing ineffectual, the United Nations declared in July 1950 that the 
League of Nations mandate for SWA was still in effect, and that as it remained in force, South 
Africa would not be required to relinquish control over its neighbouring territory.9 This was 
only challenged in June 1960, when Liberia and Ethiopia announced that they would begin legal 
proceedings at the International Court of Justice against South Africa, claiming that Pretoria had 
modified the terms of its SWA mandate without the consent of the United Nations.10 After six 
years of deliberation, the International Court of Justice ruled that it had no power to rule on the 
substance of the case because Ethiopia and Liberia had no right or special interest in the legality 
of the SWA case. This limp ruling sparked international outrage. In due course, the United 
Nations General Assembly terminated South Africa’s mandate over SWA and created a council 
with the intention of overseeing SWA affairs. This was frustrated as South Africa remained non-
compliant with the United Nations position and, without any sanctions to back it up, SWA 
remained under South African rule. 
    The gathering context of the Cold War meant that the USA, despite objecting to the 
international conduct of South Africa, did not wish to imperil their relationship over the 
contentious issue of SWA. Ultimately, a strong anti-communist presence in sub-Saharan Africa 
was more important to America and its ideological stance than any stigma of associating with 
the apartheid government.11 Washington was content to mark time for as long as it was 
necessary – and it was able to do so for as long as SWA did not again become a flashpoint. 
Indeed, it was only in 1970 that the United Nations Security Council authorised the termination 
of South Africa’s mandate in SWA, by which all member states were instructed to no longer 
recognise Pretoria’s territorial rule. In 1971, the legitimacy case was brought to the 
International Court of Justice again and this time South Africa was ruled to be maintaining an 
                                                             
7 Davies, J. E. Constructive Engagement?: Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, Namibia & 
Angola, 1981-8. Oxford: James Currey ;, 2007. pp. 10 
8 Davies, J. E. Constructive Engagement?. pp. 10 
9 Davies, J. E. Constructive Engagement?. pp. 11 
10 Davies, J. E. Constructive Engagement?. pp. 11 
11 Davies, J. E. Constructive Engagement?. pp. 11 
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illegal occupation of the territory of Namibia.12 Yet, once again, the ruling had no effect. South 
Africa remained incumbent in the territory of Namibia and the United Nations did nothing until 
December 1974, and again in January 1976, when it passed resolutions calling for mandatory 
sanctions against South Africa. The country, however, still had friends in high places and these 
resolutions were vetoed by America, France and Great Britain.13 
   All the while, under the yoke of South African rule the Namibian people had begun to struggle 
for their own independence and in the 1960s the group known as the South West Africa 
People’s Organisation (SWAPO) emerged from various regionalised groups to fight under a 
single banner.14 While this independence movement was recognised by the Organization of 
African Unity and received aid from nearby African states, as well as having the recognised 
legitimacy of an office in London, the Americans were suspicious of SWAPO. America believed 
that SWAPO had Marxist ties and that if Namibia became independent, its leadership would 
mean another Soviet-aligned state on the continent. It also meant that Pretoria could count on 
Washington’s tacit support in maintaining control over Namibia. 
    Yet, with apartheid South Africa growing ever more unpopular, SWA was, inevitably, 
becoming more and more of an international issue, in 1977, Britain, America, France, West 
Germany, and Canada formed the ‘Contact Group of Western Nations’ with the specific intention 
of ending the SWA crisis diplomatically.15 This group brought forward the pivotal United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (UNSCR 435) which, once formalised, would go on to 
lay the international foundations for bringing about Namibian independence.16 This resolution 
proposed an end to SADF action in both SWA and Angola, as well as the holding of 
internationally supervised free elections in Namibia.   
    While there was much talk and some promise of action from the global diplomatic stage, 
within the more domestic field South African forces were fighting their Namibian enemy of 
SWAPO as scattered insurgents within the territory, as well as those based northwards across 
the border in Angola. Angola’s tacit approval of SWAPO and the fact that SWAPO bases were 
permitted just across the Angolan border meant that the territory would become a central 
element in the SWA independence struggle, much as the complicating Namibian factor also 
helped to cause Angola’s own civil war to become much more intense. 
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Angolan Independence movements        
    Before embarking on a discussion about the Angolan border war, we must have a firm 
understanding of all the factions and their relation to one another. The Angolan political stage 
was crowded by three major groups the Movimento Popular Libertacao de Angola (henceforth 
the MPLA), Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (henceforth the FNLA) and União Nacional 
para a Independência Total de Angola (Henceforth UNITA). 
    The MPLA was formed in 1956 and was the result of a merger of parties including the 
umbrella Communist Party of Angola. As such, the MPLA came to be based on a communist 
manifesto and enjoyed ground support from the usual constituences, ranging from the urban 
poor to intellectuals, and the disaffected.17 The MPLA began an armed resistance movement 
with the goal of independence in 1961. From the very beginning, it enjoyed some support from 
the Soviet Union, employing Soviet-supplied firearms in the insurrection that marked the 
beginning of armed resistance.18 The MPLA was led by the authoritarian figure, Augustino Neto, 
whose background was that of an intellectual, as were a number of Africa’s first wave of post-
independence leaders.19 Out of the three major resistance groups, the Portuguese viewed the 
MPLA as the biggest and most dangerous foe of Lisbon’s rule in Angola.20  The MPLA founded its 
military wing in 1975, called the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (henceforth 
FAPLA), which would act as a regular army and serve as the MPLA’s military strength in the 
coming conflict.21 
    The FNLA was founded by Holden Roberto but it began its life under a different name, the 
Union of the Peoples’ of Angola (UPA).  Roberto’s UPA held both tribal and racial policies, and 
strict membership requirements meant that Angolans from the wrong area, Mestizos (mixed 
heritage), and whites were not allowed membership.22 The UPA was made up of Bakongo 
people who lived on the Angola-Zaire border, and as such Roberto enjoyed the support of Zaire 
and its ruler Mobuto Sese Seko. In the same year that the MPLA declared its armed struggle 
(1961), Roberto ordered a group of five thousand UPA insurgents to enter Angola from the 
Congo and to attack all mestizos, MPLA supporters, whites, and all other assumed enemies of 
the Bakongo people.23 Official reports claim that roughly two thousand whites were killed; 
however, Jonas Savimbi (who at the time was a lieutenant of Roberto) estimates that it was 
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more likely that two hundred were killed.24 In 1962, the UPA merged with the Democratic Party 
of Angola and retained Roberto as its leader. The new party was called the FNLA and would 
form the Revolutionary Angolan Government in Exile. The OAU, with very few exceptions, 
recognised this movement as the only legitimate nationalist movement in Angola, ignoring the 
politically radical MPLA.25 Due to the preceding extreme actions of the UPA, the FNLA remained 
the main target of Portuguese military action, encouraging Jonas Savimbi to break away and to 
start his own movement in 1964, called UNITA. 
    UNITA was, then, formed and led by Jonas Savimbi as a breakaway faction of the FNLA. It 
started as a distinct underdog and would probably have remained as such, if it had not been for 
Savimbi’s open-handed willingness to wheel and deal. According to many sources, for instance, 
he even made an agreement with the Portuguese to work with them against their FNLA targets, 
allowing UNITA time and space to grow and to assert power. Savimbi would demonstrate his 
charisma and pragmatism throughout the Angolan conflict, making contacts in America and a 
tactical alliance with South Africa.26 
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Angola            
  
27 
     As already noted, outright resistance to the Portuguese in the form that eventually lead to the 
taking of power in Angola was only initiated in 1961, with the launch of the MPLA’s armed 
struggle. The attempts by the various Angolan resistance movements were not enough by 
themselves to take power in the capital of Luanda, which was symbolically important because of 
the uneven spread of Lisbon’s colonial rule. For although Portugal claimed control over the 
entire country, its rule was spread effectively only as far as it had sufficient soldiers and officials 
to enforce it. The resistance movements of Angola were eventually successful because of an 
internal metropolitan Portuguese struggle, which culminated in the ‘Officers Coup’ of 1974 
which ousted Prime Minister Caetano and replaced him with a military junta.28 The generals in 
charge changed the focus of the country inwards and accordingly moved swiftly towards the 
decolonisation of its now unwanted African dependancies. For other Portuguese colonies like 
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Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, this led to relatively settled dominant new alignments and 
allegiances in the immediate post-colonial phase. Angola, however, was a far more polarised 
political landscape.29 There, the jockeying ‘rebel’ groups saw one another as rivals in a race to 
inevitable independence, and the fall in the 1970s of the Portuguese empire was merely a 
catalyst which would accelerate them into a battle with fewer external imperial distractions.  
    In January 1975, the rebel groups, along with Portuguese representatives, signed what was 
termed the Alvor agreement. Its intentions were to bring an end to the fighting between the 
emerging new political parties, and to pave the way to elections and a constitutive assembly in 
October of that year.30 Until then, Angola was to be governed by a transitional government with 
a Portuguese figurehead. Independence would be granted once elections had been concluded, 
and independence day was scheduled for November 1975. The transitional government was, 
however, doomed to failure due to the behaviour of the heads of the three Angolan parties. Neto, 
Roberto, and Savimibi all became embroiled in consolidating their own political positions in the 
country, rather than in governing it and in sharing power.31 The groups also failed to honour the 
protocol commitments they had made as part of the Alvor agreement, with the MPLA and 
UNITA both lacking the following to back up their mass popularity claims, while the FNLA had 
sectoral interests that it was safeguarding elsewhere.32 A provisional constitution and a new 
electoral law was also supposed to have been drawn up by the middle of 1975, yet again none of 
the parties made any effort to abide by these terms of the Alvor agreement.33 
    Far from working together, both the MPLA and FNLA had begun stockpiling arsenals for an 
anticipated war. The FNLA was receiving money and supplies from the United States, which 
were covertly provided by the CIA.34 For its part, the MPLA had turned to the Eastern Bloc, from 
which the Soviets supplied it with vehicles and weaponry rather than solely funding. The MPLA 
also turned to Cuba, an alliance which would eventually pay off exceptionally handsomely, no 
matter how small the beginnings of the original Cuban aid. Cuba supplied 240 military 
instructors to train FAPLA forces, and within four months these officers were seeing a turnover 
rate of 2000 troops every month.35 The absence of much secrecy by the Soviets alarmed the 
United States, which in turn helped to facilitate an increased build-up of arms and created an 
interest which fed into Washington’s tacit support of South Africa in SWA and its operations in 
Angola. 
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    During 1975, violence increased dramatically as the months wore on, with fighting between 
the MPLA and FNLA breaking out in Luanda itself. As the MPLA made more and more gains 
within the city it became clear to the Portuguese that it was time to evacuate their citizens, and 
by October 1975, over 23,000 refugees had been airlifted out of Angola.36  Other refugees, both 
black and white, fled to SWA to escape the war between the MPLA and FNLA. The MPLA 
embarked on a campaign of authoritarian political indoctrination within the areas coming under 
its control, suppressing FNLA opposition which it denounced as tribalism and reactionary 
nationalism.37 By July 1975, the FNLA had been pushed out of Luanda, which then fell under 
MPLA control; this was followed shortly by the whole of central Angola as the MPLA pushed 
home its advantage.38 Savimbi became worried that the MPLA would deny UNITA a chance to 
gain any political footing, and so pulled his movement back into the UNITA-controlled Ovambu 
tribal lands.  
Angola and South Africa           
    South Africa did not get involved in Angolan hostilities only because of its own need to 
destroy SWAPO operations. For, in the mid-1970s, delegations of Portuguese businessmen and 
FNLA envoys approached Pretoria in search of support in the civil war. Although the 
government was unwilling initially to aid the FNLA due to its strident anti-white track record, 
the threatening spectre of communism in Angola outweighed its distaste for, and distrust of, the 
FNLA and Roberto.39 Still, when it materialised, South African aid to the FNLA was not on simple 
terms, with much strategic discussion between political leadership, the general staff and 
intelligence chiefs, before aid was given. At the same time, the B.J. Vorster administration 
decided to start hedging its bets, and communications were also opened with Jonas Savimbi,  
viewed as a moderate conservative by comparison to Roberto.40 However, before South African 
officials had been able to conclude anything with Savimbi, the cabinet voted, under the strong 
influence of the Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, to follow a path of support for the FNLA to fight 
the perceived communist threat posed by the MPLA. The possibility of further aid for UNITA 
was left as an afterthought.41 This move signified an emerging rift in Pretoria’s high politics, 
with clear B.J. Vorster and P.W. Botha camps appearing to coalesce. Vorster’s close political ally 
in Intelligence, Hendrik van den Bergh, had met with Savimbi and had vigorously supported aid 
to UNITA rather than to the FNLA. Botha’s power was, however, a dominant factor, and he and 
the army’s generals believed that van den Bergh held too much influence over the Prime 
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Minister. The SADF scenario for checking regional communism was to aid anti-communist 
forces as widely as possible to ensure that left-wing forces occupied the least amount of 
territory by Angolan Independence Day. 
    Aid to the FNLA did not only come from South Africa. The United States had been cosseting 
the pro-capitalist Mobuto Sese Seko in neighbouring Zaire for roughly a decade, but when world 
copper prices tumbled in the 1970s to the detriment of Zaire’s economy, Mobuto blamed the 
market crisis on America, souring relations between the two states. To try to regain favour with 
Mobuto, Washington began funding the FNLA, which had always been a ‘pet project’ of Mobuto’s 
after Roberto had married into his family.42 Aid to the FNLA was funnelled through the CIA with 
the aim of bolstering its fighting position. What the United States desired was not necessarily to 
see the FNLA win the civil war, given the waywardness of Holden Roberto, but rather to ensure 
that it would end up placed in a favourable position which would ensure Washington’s ability to 
exercise some influence in a future Angolan government.43 The CIA also requested that the 
South African intelligence agency, the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) offer support to FNLA in 
the form of recruiting mercenaries to aid Roberto.44 At the same time, CIA operatives also soon 
discovered that UNITA was in fact better armed, better supported, and had greater numbers 
than the FNLA, and soon the CIA was also supplying UNITA with weapons, vehicles and other 
equipment.45 The stage was being set for a particularly messy round of armed conflict.   
    South Africa’s first major intervention, or Angolan interference, was in August 1975 at 
Calueque. The Republic, working with Portugal, had earlier constructed a Ruacana power plant 
on the SWA – Angola border for the production of power on either side. When troops who had 
been defending the Angolan side of the Ruacana facility were withdrawn as part of the 
evacuation of Portuguese nationals in July 1975, the plant was left undefended.46 Pretoria 
immediately drew up plans to station soldiers in Angola to protect the South African interest in 
the Ruacana hydro-electric plant. In the event, it was UNITA which turned out to be a threat as 
in August 1975 its forces began to bar South African technicians from gaining access to the 
plant. Concerned by the possibility of a hostage-type situation, Pretoria took a snap decision to 
send an infantry force across the border to Calueque to secure the plant.47 On 10 August, the 2 
SAI (South African Infantry) crossed into Angola and engaged UNITA forces, after which it 
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moved into Calueque which had until then been occupied by a FNLA contingent which withdrew 
in confusion.48 
    South Africa also began training FNLA forces within Angola in August 1975, in a joint deal 
with the CIA which had promised weapons for the FNLA as long as South African trained the 
FNLA soldiers.49 Commandant Jan Breytenbach was flown from Pretoria, along with a few 
officers, and fulfilled South Africa’s side of the deal. The purported CIA weapons, however, failed 
to arrive. Whilst FNLA soldiers were being trained, UNITA’s requests for South African aid had 
finally been accepted and South African forces were now already aiding UNITA in its struggle 
against the MPLA. This was aggravating the foreign policy dissension in National Party politics. 
On the one hand, the generals, along with their Minister of Defence, wanted to escalate action in 
Angola and to send armoured units across the border. On the other, Van den Bergh and Vorster 
felt that South Africa should avoid any further escalation of its still token cross-border military 
presence.50 Notwithstanding such division of opinion, and disagreement over authorisation, 
armoured vehicles arrived in Angola from across the SWA border. 
     On 15 October, South Africa launched its first official intervention, code-named Operation 
Savannah51. Jan Breytenbach’s FNLA detachment was assigned to the lead with some SADF 
specialist backing, and spent over a month crossing Angola, clearing FAPLA forces out of towns 
and strongholds as they made their way towards Luanda.52 The most notable aspect about 
Operation Savannah is that Breytenbach’s force suffered very few casualties (or at least 
reportedly very few) whilst inflicting heavy losses to FAPLA forces. Once Luanda was in sight, 
the South African command began preparing for an invasion and occupation, a move which it 
was estimated would require 1500 South African servicemen to enter Angola to assist in taking 
the capital. This, however, did not transpire. Pretoria’s ruling politicians were reluctant to have 
to deal with the inevitable publicity around any South African deaths in a foreign country. 
    A further difficulty was that a large Cuban contingent had now joined the MPLA to defend 
Luanda, and this complication was just too great for Operation Savannah to remain viable for 
Pretoria. The South Africans had also concluded that neither UNITA nor the FNLA had the 
capacity to maintain control over the city in the event of it being captured for them.53 
Accordingly, Savannah ground to a halt with the lights of Luanda virtually within view. 
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Breytenbach’s force, according to the final tally had lost only five men (merely one of them 
South African) and had sustained about forty wounded (of whom half were South African). 
Despite not attaining its ultimate objective, Operation Savannah did not amount to a military 
defeat. Rather, its significance lay in providing a precedent for politics playing a vital role in 
military actions, a crucial factor which would become ever more important as the stakes in 
Angola climbed higher. 
    November 1975 saw a major loss for the South Africa alliance, but more specifically for the 
FNLA. Holden Roberto became increasingly fixated on the idea of being in control of Luanda 
ahead of Independence Day, hoping to achieve enhanced legitimacy in the eyes of the OAU.54 
While the FNLA favoured a direct line of assault, its South African advisors saw danger, and 
suggested a less risky route of advance. But Roberto dismissed this as it would take too long for 
his urgent need to be on top in Luanda by the eleventh of the month. South African command 
decided that support for Roberto’s campaign would be restricted to the provision of artillery, 
which should avoid any SADF casualties.55 As had been foreseen, when FNLA soldiers advanced 
they were cut down by heavy fire from entrenched Cuban and MPLA forces. Roberto’s surviving 
troops fled down a path that would become known in FNLA folklore as ‘the death road’. This 
was the last major effort from the battered FNLA. From this point onwards, the Angolan conflict 
would begin to be one of UNITA and South Africa versus the MPLA and Cuba. 
     Although Angola’s touted Independence Day had come and gone, Operation Savannah was 
not yet over. With a nod from America and France, and at the urgings of America, France, 
UNITA, and the FNLA, the SADF’s objective shifted to maintaining a defensible position in 
Angola.56 This new development was not to last long, however. For in December 1975, the 
American Senate passed the Clark Amendment which blocked aid to insurgents fighting in 
Angola, with the implicit purpose of ending SADF intrusion and action in the embattled state.57 
This was a message to the Republic that the United States would no longer maintain even 
clandestine support of its government’s cross-border practices and decisions. Still, it was not 
without some qualification. Washington still requested that South African hold off on a 
withdrawal until January 1976, in the hope that the OAU would condemn the Cuban 
intervention in Angola and thus ease some of the pressure over South Africa’s territorial 
presence there.  
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   The OAU, however, given its unremitting hostility towards the apartheid state, came down in 
favour of the MPLA and recognised it as the legal Angolan government, ignoring the notion of 
creating a government of national unity as had been envisaged in the long-defunct Alvor 
agreement.58 This support for the MPLA weakened the status of the FNLA and UNITA, and made 
external aid to both these factions less desirable. With this, the first South African withdrawal 
from Angola began. Globally, the Republic no longer had much of a leg on which to stand and, 
yielding to circumstances, found itself having to withdraw for political reasons. 
    The SADF, and the government, showed throughout this period of the Angolan war that they 
were able to learn from their mistakes in the field, so that Operation Savannah came to be a 
major learning curve. Henceforward, operations were to be planned with an explicit political 
dimension, bringing such SADF policy developments as the programmatic introduction of Total 
Onslaught. Total Onslaught would see the introduction of a multi-faceted approach to warfare, 
including psychological, political, economic and diplomatic planks.59 Within SWA, this also 
ushered in a new SADF policy of Winning Hearts And Minds (WHAM). Its generalship had learnt 
from Operation Savannah that successful operations required required securing and 
maintaining full political support across a wide front.  Operation Savannah had also revealed 
that a lingering hold upon territory was also not an effective strategy in clandestine operations. 
In response, commanders such as General Constand Viljoen devised a new South African 
military doctrine based around mobile warfare. In future operations, the objective would not be 
centred around maintaining territorial position, but would be that of concentrating on the 
moving about of small strike forces, and enabling their accompanying allied insurgents to 
control their new territorial gains.60 Lastly, the setback of Operation Savannah also speeded up 
new weapons research. Future operations would be conducted with increasingly advanced 
fighting technologies such as the highly-accurate G5 artillery gun, the modernised Oliphant 
battle tank, and the fast Ratel armoured vehicle.61  
    From the end of Operation Savannah until 1985, South Africa shifted its focus back to SWA 
and the problem of its SWAPO adversary. The issue for Pretoria in its counter-insurgency 
campaign was the SWAPO presence in Angola and its ability to conduct cross-border raids into 
SWA, unchecked by FAPLA and with the seeming support of the MPLA. Support for the 
movement was growing steadily within SWA, as its military actions were becoming more 
effective. This SWAPO strengthening  was playing out against the backdrop of UNSCR Resolution 
435. If it continued to grow in popular support and to gain in momentum, SWAPO would have 
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increased sway in the negotiations, an international resolution to the Namibian crisis to which 
South Africa had already resigned itself.62 As such, South Africa had to curb SWAPO’s influence 
in order to get the best possible outcome for its interests in a free SWA election.63 Thus, 
operations up to the mid-1980s - even when conducted inside Angola - were targeted at SWAPO 
and at maintaining political order within its contested South African territory. Angola would 
only resurface as an important regional factor when the MPLA had gathered sufficient strength 
to pose a renewed threat to South Africa’s old ally, UNITA. 
    Angolan affairs came to the boil again in 1985, when FAPLA forces began the first of many 
pushes to take UNITA strongholds in southern Angola to try to eliminate its opponent, striking 
across the Cuito River at Savimbi’s UNITA headquarters at Jamba.64 With UNITA forces too weak 
to repel a FAPLA assault, its leader had no alternative but to turn to South Africa. This faced 
Pretoria with an immediate dilemma. Aiding UNITA would be in contravention of international 
agreement and risked South Africa getting sucked into Angola’s continuing civil war. Any South 
African deaths in Angola would be domestically controversial and could also jeopardise the ever 
fragile diplomatic détente surrounding SWA. On the other hand, should UNITA be wiped out 
South Africa would lose an ally, as it had been assisting the SADF against SWAPO.65 After 
meeting with Savimbi, Jannie Geldenhuys bit the bullet and authorised SADF aid to UNITA, and 
then successfully repelled the FAPLA offensive. UNITA then seemed to be on a lucky streak, as in 
February 1986 Ronald Reagan announced a new blanket doctrine of aid to all those fighting 
“Soviet-aggression” and, soon enough, the Clark Amendment which had ended ties to UNITA 
was repealed. Covert aid to Savimbi’s camp was immediately resumed. 1986 also saw FAPLA 
attempt to repeat its 1985 assault but, strengthened by its newly-regained alliances, UNITA was 
able to push FAPLA back and even to raid the town of Cuito Cuanavale. 
    South Africa was now in a position to back UNITA more openly than before, which would help 
directly in its offensives against SWAPO. Yet, the continuing frequency of FAPLA offences 
against UNITA was worrying. It was in this troubled context that the SADF would escalate its 
Angolan involvement, with the aim of crippling FAPLA, and of aiding UNITA in controlling the 
insecure southern border.  
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Chapter One  
Operation Modular phase one – The South African Defence Force.                   
 
 The 1985 FAPLA offensive is a key aspect in understanding the motives and objectives of the 
SADF during the border war. This Angolan groupings’ repeated attempts to wipe out UNITA 
presented South Africa with the possibility of destruction of an ally. The almost annual nature of 
these attacks eventually informed the objectives behind the SADF escalation in Angola: the 
South Africans needed to remove FAPLA’s ability to keep renewing its assaults. Although the 
1985 assault was the first of the concerted attempts to wipe out UNITA, it is not as central to the 
border war narratives as the fateful offensive of 1987. This chapter will begin by briefly 
highlighting the run-up to and executing of the MPLA’s Second Congress, placing it within the 
pro-SADF narrative of the border war and considering sources for this version of events. It 
touches on a fair degree of detail on aspects which are not necessarily directly pertinent, but the 
information furnished is valuable in establishing a credible narrative which helps to explain the 
SADF mentality and actions in Angola. Considerable reliance is placed on the valuable historical 
record of Commandant Johannes von Moltke.  
 
   The overall failure1 of Operation Savannah in 1975 caused South Africa’s attention to shift 
from providing full support and backing to UNITA, to small scale limited support which would 
enable Savimbi’s men to turn towards more guerrilla-style tactics.2 South African assistance 
gradually increased between 1975 and 1985, enabling UNITA to develop a significant 
conventional force. This force numbered 30,000 “trained”3 fighters, making UNITA a substantial 
contender again in Angola’s political sphere. UNITA’s troop size provided the organisation with 
the influence to maintain control over the southeastern portion of Angola, from the Cuito River 
to the country’s border, with its main headquarters fixed at Jamba.4 As South African influence 
within UNITA expanded, it became all the more critical that all operations, especially once the 
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SADF had arrived ‘in person’ to back Savimbi’s force, were presented as UNITA-led operations, 
such that it would not appear as if South Africa was operating across its borders.5 
    Meanwhile, FAPLA had also done some consolidation since its losses from Operation 
Savannah, which had seen FAPLA lose control of many of its strongholds throughout the 
country. Upon regaining its footholds, FAPLA went to work to fortify these locations to 
strengthen its defences in the event of further SADF intervention.6 Aid from the Soviet Union 
was ramped up heavily during this period, including sophisticated aviation equipment such as 
MiG-23 fighter jets capable of combating the SADF Mirage fighters, and further hedging against 
SADF air superiority, should it return.7 1984 saw the first attempt at rooting out UNITA from its 
territories in the South East, but FAPLA forces were met by heavy resistance that they had not 
planned on, and the assault then changed targets, seeking faster and easier penetration. Soon 
enough, FAPLA pulled back and instead prepared at the town of Cuito Cuanavale on the west 
bank of the Cuito River. A result of this failure was the swift posting of Soviet officers and 
FAPLA’s regional HQ to take control of tactical planning and operations, as well as an increased 
flow of weaponry and supplies.8 Under Soviet guidance, a new operation was designed in order 
to remove UNITA from its foothold, utilising twenty brigades (ranging in individual size 
between 1500-4000 men), which were comprised of a combination of FAPLA brigades, one 
SWAPO brigade, and five UMkhonto we Sizwe brigades (drawn from the armed wing of the 
African National Congress) .9 This force was split into two prongs, one comprising of nine 
brigades which would strike at Cazombo in order to draw UNITA’s strength away from its HQ.10 
The second, numbering eleven brigades, would advance towards the Lomba River and then 
strike at Mavinga, which would provide a springboard for an attack on the UNITA HQ at Jamba.11  
   Savimbi fell for this diversion, and moved his strength to Cazombo, believing it to be the main 
objective of FAPLA movements. But as soon as he had completed his troop movements, the 
FAPLA forces at Lomba sprang into action and advanced on Mavinga.12 UNITA was left with no 
options, as should Mavinga fall, it would lose its entire base of operations in Angola. Predictably, 
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Savimbi then turned to the South Africans yet again, pleading the gravity of his imperilled 
position. At a political level, there is much to suggest that Pretoria was wary of intervening on 
UNITA’s behalf, after the outcomes of Savannah13. Peter Stiff notes that this was a response from 
governing politicians although not from their generals14, a view which is echoed by the accounts 
of General George Meiring15, but it remains interesting to observe that authorisation was 
provided quickly by the State Security Council.16 Within two days of its meeting, the South 
African Air Force (SAAF) was already bombing FAPLA positions in Angola, as well as ferrying 
UNITA troops from Cazombo to Mavinga in order to try to remedy their earlier strategic error.17  
    Stiff attributes the checking of the MPLA’s Second Congress resolution on a more forceful 
military push against Angolan opposition to effective SAAF bombing runs which wiped out large 
portions of the enemy brigades. Meiring, in his account to the journalist, Hilton Hamann, takes a 
contrary view, asserting that the transportation of UNITA forces back to Mavinga in time was 
the real basis of defensive success.18 Regardless, the FAPLA offensive was broken before 
Mavinga, and its surviving brigades were forced to withdraw back across the Cuito River. The 
South Africans, however, were unable to officially celebrate a victory as their presence in Angola 
was supposed to be secret. Thus, UNITA took the credit for halting FAPLA, despite having 
officially lost control over Cazombo which they were unable to adequately defend at the same 
time as defending the strategically more important position at Mavinga.19 
    FAPLA’s failure to secure its primary objective of Mavinga did not, however, dishearten the 
MPLA president, Eduardo dos Santos. If anything, he concluded that South Africa had played the 
limits of its hand. The stealthy nature of its aid to UNITA suggested that international pressures 
on Pretoria were too great for any full scale intervention in Angola, and thus if the assault were 
to be repeated, it seemed unlikely that the SADF would again come to the aid of UNITA and run 
the increased risk of being identified as an illegal expeditionary force in Angolan territory.20 
Equally, not all of FAPLA’s losses contained some silver lining for its enemy. Political twists and 
turns within the MPLA prompted the Reagan administration to openly declare support for 
UNITA when the MPLA refused United States mediation in the civil war, and also refused to see 
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to a Cuban withdrawal from the country. With Washington’s support for UNITA came the 
shipment of more sophisticated weaponry.21 To make matters worse for the MPLA, Moscow had 
also begun to have second thoughts about the levels of its commitment to its Third World allies; 
with domestic economic and other strains starting to hurt the Soviet Union, under Yuri 
Andropov’s rule the communist party began to back away from expenditure on outside Marxist 
movements.22 Moscow did, however, dispatch General Konstantin Shagonvitch to Angola in 
December 1985 to take charge of all FAPLA forces, and he immediately began preparing for 
another drive against UNITA.23 
    Upon learning of a forthcoming renewed assault, Savimbi shifted gears, changing from a 
defensive to an offensive strategy, as well as adopting the South African approach of mobile 
warfare and hit-and-run tactics.24 Hamann, again, suggests that Savimbi was also well aware of 
the uncertain ability of the SADF to intervene on his behalf again so soon. With that in mind, 
UNITA began planning an assault on Cuito Cuanavale without informing the SADF.2526 UNITA’s 
infantry assault on the town of Cuito Cuanavale was nonetheless given artillery backing from 
the SADF’s 32 Battalion which had remained in Angola on the off-chance that conventional 
warfare broke out.27 UNITA’s attack on Cuito failed, although the availability of 32 Battalion 
artillery caused sufficient damage to the defenders to dissuade FAPLA from any immediate 
retaliatory assault on UNITA.28 The failed infantry assault revealed that UNITA did not have the 
ground force to overcome FAPLA.  
    In response, UNITA began a joint planning program with the SADF and devised and adopted a 
new strategy for continued action against the MPLA’s army. New objectives included ensuring 
an optimal concentrates on a guerrilla modus operandi by March 1987, preventing FAPLA from 
conventionally threatening key UNITA strongholds in its southeastern territories, and 
neutralising FAPLA’s conventional offensive capabilities by the early months of 1988.29 Joint 
planning for the first of these three objectives was completed in December of 1986. However, 
soon afterwards the relationship between UNITA and South Africa began to deteriorate as the 
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Savimbi leadership began to suspect that the SADF was trying to assume too great a command 
of its campaigning.30  
    This souring of relations meant that planning for the second and third objectives did not 
happen. Moreover, despite evidence of an imminent FAPLA assault in March 1987, UNITA 
refused to accept that it would require SADF assistance in halting an enemy advance.31 This 
cooling of the relationship is not well represented in SADF histories. These resort to 
contradictory accounts which suggest that South Africa did not wish to get politically involved 
in Angola during this period32 (although they already were), or which convey the views of 
generals who suggested – cryptically – that hanging fire would be in the interest of conserving 
power for greater battles which might yet be coming33. In his addressing of the relationship 
between South Africa and UNITA, Hilton Hamman focuses on the interpersonal relationships 
between Savimbi and senior SADF generals such as General Jannie Geldenhuys who, reportedly, 
had little regard for Savimbi when it came to business.34 The case being made is for 
irreconciliable temperaments or personalities as a decisive element.  
Interestingly, Fred Bridgland attributes the FAPLA build-up and holding to a decision not to 
commence an operation which could have seen 32 Battalion assault the bridge over the Cuito 
River with the prospect of its destruction, rather than to any deterioration of the UNITA-
Pretoria relationship.35 
    The links between UNITA and South Africa were restored by April 1987, but the damage 
caused by their brief alienation was considerable. FAPLA had been given plenty of time to 
stockpile arms and reinforcements at Cuito Cuanavale, undoing the losses that had been 
inflicted upon it in the UNITA-SADF raid on the town, and going further in building a stronger 
force.36 At the same time, though, the planned assault was creating division within FAPLA and 
its allies. The FAPLA generals, for a start, did not believe that their forces had sufficient training, 
as they were mostly young conscripts who would be pitted against battle-hardened UNITA 
soldiers, even if the SADF did not intervene as additional muscle - which was a distinct 
possibility.37 Forces outside of the FAPLA leadership were, however, a motivating factor – the 
political leadership in Luanda was facing serious economic pressure, burdened by the costs of a 
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civil war which was sparking unrest among its own supporters. FAPLA’s losing streak was also 
not helping the spirits of its MPLA following: Luanda needed positive war news, and required a 
victory to rally its constituency.38  
   This view was shared by Moscow, and in particular by General Shagnovitch who had been 
planning an offensive to obliterate UNITA since his December 1985 arrival in Angola.39 
However, this push for action created tension between Moscow and Havana. Castro and his 
advisors did not believe that any assault on UNITA would be successful until it could be 
guaranteed that the SADF would not intervene. Fidel Castro himself claims that this advice was 
heeded after 1985, but that it was ignored “by those who advised such operations”40 in 1987, 
whatever the accuracy of Cuba’s misgivings over the outcome.41 The Cuban leadership in the 
field in Angola also believed that a single assault of this planned magnitude was a grave mistake, 
as it would allow the SADF, should it intervene, to break FAPLA with one decisive operation.42 
Shagonvitch, though, got his way, and the offensive against UNITA strongholds began to move 
forward. Under protest, the Cubans declined to commit any of their soldiers to the action, 
although they did assign thirty-five specialist advisors.43 With the offensive scheduled for its 
eventual commencement in August 1987, South Africa busied itself with preparations for the 
aiding of UNITA. 
    Close liaison teams were set up between UNITA and the SADF to try to ease coordination, 
including bringing the Savimbi group into planning from which it had previously felt left out. A 
jointly-compiled intelligence report suggested a looming FAPLA offensive before the end of the 
year. Once again, the assault was calculated to be two-pronged, originating from two areas, 
Lucusse and Cuito Cuanavale. Intelligence also correctly identified the Lucusse force as a 
diversionary tactic, and efforts were put in to focusing on the force across the Cuito River.44 In 
anticipation, the SADF began a long planning cycle, detailing possibilities and eventualities, their 
outcomes, and the most viable courses of action. A working document, “OP MODULER 
BEPLANNING: SAW DEELNAME AAN OPERASIES TER ONDERSTEUNING VAN UNITA IN DIE 
SESDE MILITERE STREEK”4546, was produced as a framework for discussion within the SADF 
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about its available options in providing support to UNITA. The overall objective was clearly 
defined as: “To halt the 1987 FAPLA offensive in the Sixth Military Region”.47 At this stage, the 
plan had four possible methods of attaining this southern Angola objective. These were, in 
summary: 
    Option One. The SADF’s involvement remains on a clandestine level, with the responsibility 
for the stopping of FAPLA’s offensive resting squarely with UNITA. Only limited SADF support in 
the form of liaison teams, Special Forces anti-tank teams, a unit for fire support, infantry of 32 
Battalion and a clandestine communications and transport air support to be committed, even in 
the eventuality of Mavinga falling to the enemy.48  
    Option Two. Clandestine support (as in Option One) continues. But the FAPLA brigades are 
attacked on the march in offensive fashion by open SADF involvement, via offensive air strikes, 
attacks by a mechanised group and/or 32 Bn with sufficient fire support, infrastructural targets 
not to be attacked, and the area of action restricted to approximately 30 kilometres from 
Cuito.49 
    Option Three. The FAPLA offensive is delayed by actions such as described in Option One and 
Two, but the enemy nevertheless succeeds in capturing Mavinga. In this case, an aggressive 
approach is followed to make the situation for the enemy in Mavinga untenable, involving air 
strikes and the deployment of 32 Battalion and 61 Mechanised Battalion Group in an eventual 
attack on Mavinga itself with a  view to recapturing it from the enemy.50 
    Option Four. This contingency entails a surprise SAAF offensive against infrastructural targets 
in southern Angola, including attacks on the FAPLA air bases at Menongue and Lubango. After a 
favourable air situation has been created in this Sixth Military Region, a coordinated infantry 
and armour offensive by ground forces is launched against Cuito Cuanavale with a view to 
handing the town over to UNITA for permanent occupation.51  
    These options were accompanied by recommendations on a preferred primary course of 
action. Option Four was dismissed immediately due to the risks involved in frontal, open attacks 
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on targets which could incur heavy aircraft losses.52 Options Two and Three implied acceptance 
of Mavinga being lost to FAPLA forces. Given that eventuality, Option Three was viewed as 
preferable to Option Two at the time of tabling possibilities53, but ultimately Option One was the 
preferred path of making progress.54 After deliberations by general staff in June 1987, the 
decision was reached that a combination of Options One and Two would be the best method of 
aiding UNITA.55 Clearly, the SADF wished to avoid getting stuck in any Vietnam-esque 
circumstances of a military quagmire. 
    In the event, option one as recommended, was to be put into action immediately and 
preparations for option two began in case FAPLA presented too strong a force for UNITA with 
only limited clandestine aid from South Africa.56 Political approval of the action was 
forthcoming, and within a week instructions for ‘OP MODULER’ was issued by the SADF 
Directorate of Operations.57 There were, of course, political riders. P.W Botha had already 
denied permission for an operation to sever the Menongue - Cuito Cuanavale supply route, as he 
was wary of an international outcry.58 Thus, to minimise international repercussions, the SADF 
would have to adhere to government guidelines. All SADF action had to be in defence of UNITA 
as South Africa needed to maintain a defensive image of protecting a friendly faction in Angola 
in case of international scrutiny.59 Most importantly, the SADF would have to minimise its 
Angolan casualties; it could not conduct operations in which casualties might be unpredictable. 
Indeed, the safety of personnel and equipment was even given a higher priority than the overall 
success of the operation.60 This was essential to the maintaining of internationally plausible 
deniability.61  Without SADF casualties, prisoners, or equipment, the Angolans and Cubans 
would be unable to conclusively show a South African presence on their territory.   
    Due to the covert nature of the operation in its early stages, South African forces were to be 
deployed in a staggered fashion. Multiple squads were kept in reserve and vehicles were held 
back only to be used should the situation escalate.62 As soon as their orders were issued, SADF 
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battalions assigned to Operation Moduler embarked on preparation for an extended period of 
operational deployment.63 
    Moduler’s operational targets became clearer as planning advanced. In June 1987 SADF and 
UNITA intelligence found large scale troop and supply movements converging on Cuito 
Cuanavale, which had already been identified as the coming assault’s staging ground. FAPLA had 
decided to use four reinforced brigade for its assault on Mavinga and to hold back another four 
for logistics and other tasks.64 This would make the vanguard FAPLA brigades the priority 
targets of the SADF battalions to halt the attack on Mavinga, with the other four formations only 
becoming targets should they be moved forward as reinforcements.   
    FAPLA activity also hastened further joint planning between the SADF and UNITA, centred on 
speedy action to maximise their chances of crushing their enemy’s offensive. It was decided that 
another regular SADF battalion was to be deployed in Angola, but further west from Mavinga, to 
lift any pressures on UNITA and SADF forces there should FAPLA advance on another front. 
Officers were moved around to assist in preparations and to strengthen the command chain of 
troops in various locations. Crucially, it was also decided that immediately after the opening of 
the FAPLA offensive, a SADF squad would destroy the bridge over the Cuito River.65 Known as 
Operation Coolidge, this action took place in the last week of August 1987 but turned out to be 
only partially effective in that it failed to bring down the bridge completely.66 Still, as what was 
left was no longer crossable by tanks and other heavily vehicles, the operation had 
accomplished its essential tactical objective.  
    The Coolidge ‘success’ has been somewhat downplayed by Romer-Heitman, who observes 
that the bridge was only out of order temporarily until it could be repaired, and that supply 
lines had in any event not been cut off as the means of moving supplies across the river could be 
changed to airlifting.67 That view notwithstanding, even this early on in the conflict the town of 
Cuito Cuanavale was coming to play a large role in the Angolan affairs of the SADF. Although the 
bridge over the Cuito river was the first part of an apparent strategic fascination, it was also not 
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the last. And it would assume a prominent position not only in a South African gaze. Predictably, 
for Fidel Castro the town would be turned into an icon of Cuba’s Angolan odyssey.  
    SADF-UNITA joint planning also saw UNITA running harassment engagements during the 
build up to the FAPLA offensive and in its early stages. This tactic effectively delayed the 
offensive by a further two weeks, and inflicted light casualties on FAPLA before the major 
fighting had really begun.68 A consequence of this very early success with running attacks was 
the creation of further liaison teams, and an enhanced sense of the value of working closely with 
UNITA.  
    SADF deployment came under the direction of Commandant Robbie Hartslief, whose strategy 
mirrored exactly what the instructions from Pretoria had called for - defence operations to 
bolster UNITA’s position in southern Angola. Most obviously, this involved despatching 
reinforcements to UNITA command at Mavinga.69 Then, rather than simply deploying the SADF 
troops at Mavinga to await the arrival of the FAPLA onslaught, Hartslief followed the SADF’s 
mechanical warfare doctrines, and positioned his men west of Mavinga.70 This provided his 
force with the ability to move about and to intercept FAPLA forces before they could hit UNITA 
targets, without having to maintain standing control over their territory.  
    This detachment was, however, a relatively small formation of soldiers. Although there were a 
further two SADF squadrons at the ready and waiting to move, again there was caution from 
Pretoria which had only authorised the utilisation of these troops should Mavinga come under 
direct threat.71 Here was another sign of the unwillingness of the South African government to 
raise its military profile in Angola, worried about international reaction and nervous about 
getting sucked into some Angolan version of America’s messy Vietnam War. At the same time, 
affairs were not left to stand still. The operational phase of Moduler soon got underway, with 
the SADF unleashed to target a FAPLA brigade positioned close to its area of deployment, in its 
backing of UNITA.72  
Commanded by Colonel Jock Harris, this force which was assigned the destruction of the 
Angolan brigade on 17 August, would now receive a last second boost to its strength. On 16 
August, the general staff inspected the front to view the unfolding operation and to see what 
might be done to overcome the initial limitations of Moduler. On the following day, the chief of 
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army  authorised the use of the reserve squadrons in Angola.7374 In the meantime, Colonel 
Harris’s force would also be reinforced by mobile artillery and armoured support. The SADF’s 
61 Mechanised Battalion, held in reserve, was, however, still kept back on the basis that it would 
only be deployed in the event of a wholesale routing of FAPLA forces, thereby ending any 
prospect of further offensives from Luanda.75  
 
76 
 
    The SADF’s plans and adjustments proved timely, as FAPLA began its long-awaited insurgency 
into UNITA territory on 17  August.77 This enabled its local command to put into immediate 
action its own measures. The only concern for Harris was that the promised reinforcements had 
not yet arrived, and four FAPLA brigades had already begun moving. Enemy movement was 
slowed by SADF artillery bombardments which bought a breathing space of several days.78 
Harris’s command was then promised the arrival of artillery reinforcements in the last week of 
                                                             
73 Commandant van Moltke. A Concise History of Operation Modular. pp. 26 
74 Heitman, H. War in Angola. pp. 39 
75 Commandant van Moltke. A Concise History of Operation Modular. pp. 26 
76  Scholtz, Leopold. The SADF in the Border War. pp. 264 
77 Commandant van Moltke. A Concise History of Operation Modular. pp. 26, Nortje, Piet. 32 Battalion. 
Pp. 236 
78 Heitman, H. War in Angola. pp. 40 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
47 
 
August, and the supply of troop reinforcements in the first week of September.79 His force would 
then be re-positioned to meet up with his reinforcements before engaging FAPLA forces near 
the Lomba River.  
    That would involve a temporary withdrawal from the field of operations to Mavinga to attach 
the artillery battery before moving back out into position near the Lomba River crossings. The 
power of the SADF artillery which was already operating in Angola prolonged the FAPLA 
advance over the end of August, slowing down and inflicting casualties on two of its large 
brigades, and providing time for SADF reinforcements to assemble. The heavy use of artillery 
from protected rear positions in the early stages of Operation Moduler was supposedly to help 
to keep up the fig-leaf image that the SADF was not involved in warfare, although the 
unprecedented power and accuracy of the army’s G5 cannon could not have failed to arouse 
some suspicion of the origin of the newly-introduced firepower.80 Accompanying this was, as 
noted earlier, the execution of the Coolidge intervention. FAPLA forces that had extended into 
UNITA territory now found themselves partially cut off from their re-supply route and were 
wholly cut off from any armoured reinforcements.81  
    There was also another favourable development for South African ground forces. For all 
Pretoria’s political caution over Angola, the SADF itself was gradually increasing the level of its 
forces there.  Discretionary use of the South African Air Force (SAAF) was authorised, and air 
support in the form of runs against FAPLA supplies and FAPLA advance columns was soon 
underway.82 The trend of creeping SADF escalation reached a peak on 28 August, when its 
general staff met at Rundu and decided to commit a new brigade - sized force, including a 
mechanised armour group, to Operation Moduler.83 Before the enlargement pushed through by 
SADF command, it seems that the forces assigned to Angola were too low in strength to achieve 
the goals set out for Operation Moduler. It is certainly feasible that had it not been for these 
constant additions, it appears likely that the SADF would have suffered either unacceptably high 
casualties, or might even have lost all of the Republic’s strategic objectives in Southern Angola. 
    After almost a month of slow and careful movement, FAPLA forces suddenly speeded up their 
oncoming assault at an alarming pace for the South Africans. On 29 August, two brigades which 
had until then been moving in tandem, split, with one moving west and the other heading east 
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along the Lomba River.84 A further pair of brigades also diverged to move in different directions, 
one heading southwards, and the other continuing eastwards to the Cunjamba River which it 
could follow all the way to Mavinga.85 The sudden movement by FAPLA caught the SADF 
unprepared for sudden action. At the same time, although the now more dispersed FAPLA 
brigades posed a much greater threat to Mavinga, their greater isolation from one another made 
them a much easier target.  
    The problem of FAPLA mobility was seen to by the employment of long-range G5 artillery. 
Cannon positioned along the Lomba River were capable of hitting all three brigades.86 Their 
introduction and effectiveness ‘stabilised’ the situation for the SADF, and allowed for a buffer of 
time before the commencement of any operations against the FAPLA brigades which were 
closing in.87 In this short period of relative inaction, the SADF’s guidelines were re-affirmed – its 
role remained that of backup for UNITA to ensure that it was able to maintain its position, that it 
was to serve as UNITA or as its indistinguishable proxy, that it was not to follow any suspect 
independent agenda, and, of course, that the loss of any equipment or South African servicemen 
was to be fiercely guarded against.88  
    The impact of SADF artillery had greatly reduced FAPLA’s ability to advance and the first 
week of September passed with little progress.89 The morning of 9 September would, however, 
see a sudden surge of activity as a FAPLA brigade managed to secure a crossing point on the 
Lomba river. At this point, the South African objective was to stop FAPLA from crossing the 
river, and all available force was brought to bear against its brigade. SADF artillery began 
shelling the crossing point, ahead of an assault from  Hartslief’s force. This attack proved to be 
highly effective as it caught the FAPLA brigade in the middle of transferring vehicles across the 
river, destroying tanks and dissuading the force from any further movement.90 With the 
additional loss of an estimated 150 FAPLA soldiers killed, the remainder of the brigade fled 
northwards across the Lomba flood plain. Further FAPLA efforts to cross at the same point were 
again scuppered by SADF firepower and, by 10 September, the situation was viewed by South 
African command as once again stabilised.91  
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    While this force was being battered by the SADF, it became apparent that another brigade, 
previously viewed as the greater approaching threat, had halted all movement and had instead 
entrenched itself in defence against artillery fire.92 The SADF assault on this formation began on 
13 September. Yet, unlike the immediately preceding clash, this would not be a clean sweep for 
the South Africans. The FAPLA brigade had holed up in an abandoned UNITA logistics position 
and this holding, combined with stiff trench defences, made it heavy going for the enemy’s 
assaulting armour. The SADF could not commit to a potentially costly battle, and the force was 
ordered to withdraw, returning later to retrieve abandoned vehicles, as well as the bodies of 
some of its soldiers. This battle showed just how firm was the political policy of no casualties. 
The SADF withdrew after losing eight dead (only four of whom were “European”, who were 
what counted most in the government’s political calculation).9394 This figure was in stark 
contrast to FAPLA losses, estimated to have been between 250-300 FAPLA soldiers killed.95 The 
final outcome, then, was mixed. Although the SADF withdrew from combat, its FAPLA enemy 
also pulled back and abandoned its attempt to join up with another brigade further along the 
river. Thus, the SADF had made gains. FAPLA brigades remained isolated and vulnerable to 
strikes. And their failure to establish a bridgehead over the Lomba meant that they would be 
unable to create a staging ground for the original planned advance on Mavinga.96  
    The rest of September 1987 would see the SADF fighting a “war of attrition” against FAPLA, 
rather than making grand operational movements – there was monitoring of its brigade 
movements and regular shelling. This tactic proved extremely effective, as it inflicted heavy 
casualties at no expense to SADF manpower, restricted the movement of FAPLA brigades, 
weakened their morale, and made it difficult for these forces to re-supply nearby units in need.97 
Not short of confidence, by the end of September 1987 South African intelligence calculated that 
enemy forces were operating at only a third of their effective strength, and had not achieved any 
of their set objectives.98 Estimates of FAPLA losses were well over 800 soldiers killed, over 800 
wounded, and two dozen captured, as well as heavy equipment.99 Facing crippling losses, it was 
likely that FAPLA would soon be obliged to withdraw, handing the SADF the possibility of an 
offensive strike to wipe out enemy brigades to cripple its capacity to stay in the fight. 
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    But SADF operational strength would need to be boosted for that, given the parliamentary 
requirement that the Angolan deployment had to be defensive. This, though, would change after 
a visit by P.W Botha at the end of September. After an extensive briefing, President Botha gave 
his approval for the offensive phase of Operation Moduler. Its purpose would be the elimination 
of all FAPLA forces east of the Cuito River. If achieved, this would ensure that there would be no 
repeat FAPLA offensive in the following year, and would provide UNITA and South Africa with 
space in which to take stock. Botha also committed additional forces, including tanks, to Angola 
for this new stage of Operation Moduler. Following the State Presidential visit, the general staff 
returned to Pretoria to begin planning for a second phase of warfare, in which they would now 
have a far freer hand than before.   
    Phase one, however, was not yet over. The SADF needed to achieve stabilisation of the area 
south of the Lomba River. On the south side, the FAPLA brigade had gone to ground to hold its 
position but it was vulnerable as it was in the sights of the SADF.100 On the morning of 30 
September, as South African command was planning an attack on the brigade, at exactly the 
same time that FAPLA commanders were preparing to evacuate back to the north. SADF 
intelligence witnessed an advance brigade unit laying a temporary bridge across the Lomba 
River near the position of another force. A decision was then taken to strike before the FAPLA 
enemy had any opportunity to combine brigades or to receive supplies and reinforcements.101  
    On 3 October the SADF moved to its planned attack position after receiving word that the 
FAPLA brigade had begun its withdrawal. Its enemy force was ambushed on an open flood plain 
before its Lomba River crossing, and provided little resistance.   FAPLA troops who were not 
gunned down fled, abandoning vehicles and equipment, while the rickety bridge subsequently 
collapsed underneath the weight of retreating FAPLA armour.102 By 3 October, the Angolan 
brigade was viewed officially as having been destroyed. With this nail in the coffin of the FAPLA 
offensive, the remaining shaken brigades east of the Cuito River had no option but to withdraw. 
    What do the events of phase one of Operation Moduler tell us about the SADF? The first thing 
we should notice is that there was extensive planning and that various contingencies were 
planned for. Planning – and its scope - also reflects the shifting concerns and priorities of South 
Africa’s government. Under B.J. Vorster, there was a greater sense of circumscribed limits and a 
clear stance against the risks of escalation. Major escalation commenced after P.W Botha came 
to power in the new role of State President. As we have already seen, as Vorster’s Minister of 
Defence, Botha had already been pushing for a greater interventionist role in Angola. This came 
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to a climax after his visit to the front in September 1987 when he more ior less authorised his 
generals to be free to use forces as they saw fit. Leopold Scholtz ponders whether Botha’s 
“helpful attitude” suggests that the generals held more sway than he did.  
   To a degree, this may be taking insufficient account of the wider political situation. Vorster had 
put in place the measures required for covert operations, and Botha had been in favour of 
heightened intervention in Angola from the outset. Phase one provided Botha with a precedent 
to show his security advisers that the SADF was in control across the border and could maintain 
the upper hand. Even so, some continuities in scenario planning continued to be an important 
factor in SADF deliberations. Even with its Chief of Army (by then Jannie Geldenhuys) drawn 
into Pretoria planning of a more openly aggressive phase two of Operation Moduler, it needs to 
be remembered that P.W. Botha had not authorised open conventional warfare and the policy of 
minimising troop casualties and equipment losses remained firm, despite Geldenhuys’s eventual 
announcement in November that South Africa was involved in operations in Angola.103 By then, 
it was highly unlikely that the South African government would have been able to explain away 
an expeditionary intervention escalation on the scale in which troops and armour were being 
funnelled into its neighbouring territory.  
    Phase one of Operation Moduler is viewed by the author of The Concise History of Operation 
Moduler, Commandant von Moltke, as having been the most crucial phase of the Angolan conflict 
of the 1980s. Had that stage failed, UNITA would have lost control of Mavinga, and South 
Africa’s key Angolan ally would have been toppled. The knock-on effect of that would have been 
felt in the negotiations around UNSCR 435 and the future of South West Africa. Having Angola 
drawn into the diplomatic equation amounted to a crucial bargaining chip, which was that the 
development of circumstances favourable to Pretoria could lead to the withdrawal of the SADF 
and of SADF aid to UNITA. In any event, Phase one was effective in what it had accomplished for 
the SADF. It had crushed the FAPLA advance on Mavinga, and left South African forces well-
placed for a further drive against UNITA’s enemy. In addition, the Defence Force generals were 
able to gain political consent for the use of enlarged forces at their discretion. At this stage, then, 
the Angolan theatre looked to be yielding favourable outcomes. and possibilities for South 
Africa, in the managing of both its own regional affairs and in negotiating its tricky position in 
the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
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Chapter Two 
 Operation Moduler Phase Two       
  
   Phase Two of Operation Moduler begins to tie in with the best-established popular narrative of 
the Angolan border war, a story which centres on the battle of Cuito Cuanavale. This was 
because prevailing in that theatre of hostilities was one of the possible objectives for the SADF, 
given that it was the staging ground of the latest FAPLA offensive. In this chapter, we will 
consider the evolution of Moduler as it began to wind down and to transform itself into a cycle 
of successively extended operations designed to  push FAPLA forces back against Cuito 
Cuanavale, and creating circumstances for blurred decisions and confusion over the intentions 
of planning.. 
   The second leg of the Moduler operation moved within a context of FAPLA failure, as 
according to its directives, Mavinga was supposed to have been under its control by the end of 
September, in time for the start of the rainy season which would have provided a defensive 
ground advantage while its command bolstered its strength within UNITA territory. This was to 
have been followed by an assault on the UNITA headquarters at Jamba in July 1988.1 This, as we 
have seen, did not occur. FAPLA was thwarted at the Lomba River, a reversal which was 
attributed to South African intervention.2 FAPLA propaganda predictably exaggerated the 
brigade strength of the enemy it had confronted in the field.  
   Yet, their Pretoria adversary had not been deployed at full capacity. To the contrary, the South 
African expeditionary battalions  which faced the FAPLA offensive were considered by their 
command to be under-equipped and not able to commit adequately to the offensive drive of 
Operation Moduler without further rearmament and reinforcements. There were a number of 
hindrances when it came to moving into any immediately renewed action. The SADF’s only 
assault vehicles were its Ratels, light armoured troop-carriers, while FAPLA had at its disposal 
heavy Russian tanks. The bulk of the UNITA forces to which the SADF was assigned was 
untrained in conventional warfare, and was likely to be an uncertain quality in a situation of set-
piece battle. FAPLA was also known to be equipped with sophisticated Soviet anti-air defences, 
as well as advanced MiG23 fighter jets, and this meant that any air support for South African 
operations would have to face the risk of equipment losses and that constant worry for – an 
unacceptable number of combat casualities. 
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  A further weighty consideration was that all planning up to this point had been as specifically 
defensive measures. And, as yet, there had been no indication of a sudden shift in government 
policy which would allowed for a South African counter offensive.3 Therefore, the SADF had no 
option but to hold its position until troop and armour reinforcements arrived to enable it to 
return to the fighting field. This gave the beleaguered FAPLA brigades time to withdraw, re-
group and re-supply, denying their enemy a chance to finish them off. Intelligence awareness of 
this re-grouping also worried the SADF, stuck in its defensive postures while anxieties over a 
renewed assault lingered.4 The South Africans only sounded an all-clear on the 5 October, when 
it became clear that FAPLA was withdrawing completely and would not be embarking on any 
offensive action. 
   The transitional phasing of Operation Moduler is summarised crisply by Major W.A. Dorning, 
following a visit to a brigade’s forward headquarters in September.5 By the end of that month, 
all previous objectives had been attained, and these gains had led to Botha giving the Chief of 
Army carte blanche for further expansion in Angola.6 This easing of political restrictions 
ushered in a significantly more ambitious military enterprise, marking the major Moduler 
operational transition. Envisaged within a time frame of 6 October to 15 December 1987, this 
second offensive stage was projected as three actions: 
Phase 1 – Stopping the FAPLA offensive, to be effectively completed by 3 October. 
Phase 2 - 20 SA Brigade to gain initiative by 6 November, using only its existing forces, and 
thereafter to inflict maximum damage  on FAPLA forces east of the Cuito. 
Phase 3 – 20 SA Brigade and linked forces to operate with UNITA to destroy FAPLA forces east 
of the Cuito by 15 December.”7 
    This chimed with Pretoria’s political thrust of aiding UNITA and terminating FAPLA’s 
offensive capabilities. Operations would be run in accordance with the doctrine of mobilised 
warfare, with the SADF and UNITA conducting skirmishes, staging light artillery strikes, 
engaging in psychological warfare, and launching air-strikes on enemy encampments to 
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continually harass Luanda’s forces and erode their morale.8 These small-scale stabs bought the 
SADF time for the arrival of infantry reinforcements. Aside from concentrating on the 
elimination of FAPLA forces on the east bank of the Cuito, phase three also included the 
targeting and shelling of Cuito Cuanavale in the event that such more sweeping action would be 
necessary for attaining South African objectives.9  
    With that contingency part of SADF thinking, its artillery was positioned to fire not only on 
locations that were identified as active conflict zones, but also on Cuito town itself.10 SADF 
artillery and air-strikes on the town on 11 and 12 October seem to have been a diversionary 
tactic to shift the focus of FAPLA forces away from the SADF formations as a primary target, 
tempting them to push defensive resources into the wrong place. 
   What the SADF faced was a narrowing gap. Although the FAPLA withdrawal created suitable 
conditions for mobile warfare, the fact that FAPLA forces had begun to converge around 13 
October, and the prospect of fortified brigades which were dug in on higher ground, raised the 
prospect of conventional warfare. This positional confrontation was not appealing to South 
African command, given its politically-driven anxieties over high white casualty rates. SADF 
reconnaissance teams were despatched to scout FAPLA positions around the Cuanavale-
Chambinga high ground area, in order to prepare for the destruction of Angolan forces stationed 
nearby. The South Africans also began to run dummy tactics, creating mock artillery positions to 
throw FAPLA off the trail of their gun emplacements.11 
   In due course, two options were presented to General Liebenberg: 
1. Prevent the FAPLA brigades from withdrawing into positions around Cuito Cuanavale until 
strong infantry and armour is deployed; then destroying them in their current positions. 
2. Prevent the FAPLA brigades from withdrawing into positions around Cuito Cuanavale until 
completion of full deployment. Then send a force up west of the Cuito to take Cuito Cuanavale 
from the north-west. The brigades east of the Cuito would be cut off and could be eliminated ‘at 
leisure’.12 
   Romer-Heitman records that Liebenberg was inclined towards the second tactical option, 
scouting potential river crossing spots and ordering bridging equipment, although, ultimately, 
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he did not follow either proposals.13 This may have been due partly to a concern that a big run at 
Cuito Cuanavale could run too high a risk of damaging enemy air strikes.14 Instead, Liebenberg 
opted for an operation on the Chambinga high ground where enemy forces were then deployed. 
Its launch was set tentatively for the first week of November.15  
    Leopold Scholtz has considered South African planning at this stage in his ‘The South African 
Strategic and Operational Objectives in Angola’. As Scholtz has noted, a first option involved 
utilising a UNITA force to disrupt FAPLA logistics to force a withdrawal. A second entailed a 
secondary force attacking Cuito from the west, after which UNITA would occupy the town. The 
third recourse was maintaining a force on the east bank of the river, and sending a western 
force to harry the FAPLA position at Cuito Cuanavale to try to induce a withdrawal.16 Unlike 
other commentators such as Romer-Heitman who assume that the town formed a prize for the 
SADF, in Scholtz’s view Liebenberg’s course of action did not include the capture of Cuito 
Cuanavale. Indeed, later planning documents emanating from Liebenberg’s command contained 
no reference to the capture of the town, underlining that Cuito itself was not an objective for the 
SADF.17 
   During this stage, only one FAPLA brigade was entrenched and was being reinforced on the 
Chambinga high ground. Another, though, was moving south in an to snuff out South African 
artillery fire.18 This movement and its exposed positioning made it a tempting target. The SADF 
attack on 17 October did not, however, go as planned. Heavy terrain impeded progress, and 
dense plants and trees created handy avenues along which FAPLA was able to channel fire, 
forcing the enemy infantry assault to be abandoned.19 Nonetheless, despite the failure of the 
ground assault, SAAF air strikes inflicted considerable losses. 
    Still, although damaged, the FAPLA force remained on its feet. The SADF failure to overpower 
the enemy brigade sucked it into a stalemate with its FAPLA adversary, although the brigade 
was now pinned down by South African artillery. And stalemate in this theatre of operations 
was not without advantages for Pretoria’s forces. The FAPLA brigade was prevented from 
moving against the artillery positions of its opponents, as well as from reaching its own 
Chambinga high staging ground. South African artillery also blocked reinforcements from 
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reaching the FAPLA position.20 At the same time, any SADF infantry attack would have left its  
ground force exposed to a flanking movement by a FAPLA brigade detachment. The stalemate 
was broken on 25 October, when the South African ground force pulled away to a defensive 
position between its backing artillery and the Angolan brigade, which then promptly moved to 
withdraw.21  
   With the stalemate ended, the South Africans concluded that they once again held the initiative 
in Angola. Thus, the moment had come for the third phase of Operation Moduler -  the 
destruction of all FAPLA brigades east of the Cuito River. At this juncture, the SADF’s general 
staff broached the possibility of a fourth leg to the action planned, to include the capturing of 
Cuito Cuanavale should it prove “necessary or convenient”.22 The word ‘convenient’ carried 
considerable meaning, as it again affirmed Pretoria’s requirement of minimal combat casualties. 
For the taking of FAPLA’s forward command position, the South African imperative of 
convenient would almost certainly have required a FAPLA retreat ahead of any frontal 
encounter. In the event, Liebenberg got hostilities underway with instructions to maintain 
pressure on the two hard-pressed FAPLA brigades which had not gained the Chambinga high 
ground. Cuito Cuanavale was also to be blanketed by artillery in an effort to disrupt its airbase 
there, and to hamper any river supply movements attempting to cross the Cuito. 
   The rest of October saw a series of low- level engagements, dominated mostly by South African 
artillery fire and air strikes. The end of that month signalled a significant re-escalation of the 
onslaught with the arrival of infantry reinforcements as well as a tank squadron south of 
Mavinga.23 This bolstered SADF strength by roughly doubling it from 1500 to 3000 combatants, 
although this force was still modest in comparison with the 15000 soldiers that FAPLA was 
reported have assembled under its command in and around Cuito Cuanavale.24   
   According to SADF intelligence of the first week of November, FAPLA command was still 
unaware of its reinforcing infantry presence, and had based its planning of resistance on having 
a a lighter scattering of forces against the numerical superiority of its several brigades.25 In the 
event, any miscalculation by its enemy was by then of little concern to the SADF, which had 
already begun planning a strike at an Angolan brigade, aimed at catching the FAPLA counter-
offensive off guard.26 The SADF move was to engage two FAPLA brigades with its known 
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strength, while ambushing the third force with its reinforcing infantry contingent and  
mechanised battalion.27 This formation was attacked on 9 November, but its rump was able to 
withdraw before having to engage fully with the enemy, although not before the destruction of 
its tank force.28 South African costs amounted to a mere nine killed or wounded, and some 
minor equipment losses. FAPLA did not get off quite as lightly, sustaining over eighty casualties 
and a heavy loss of equipment.29  
30 
    The SADF had, nonetheless, failed in its objective of wiping out its FAPLA brigade target. This 
was followed on 11 November by a repeat strike which, after getting bogged down in a 
minefield, also came up short after the assaulting force had to withdraw.31 Again, damage was 
nevertheless done. The Angolan brigade suffered almost 400 casualties, and the destruction of 
around three dozen of its vehicles. This was in sharp contrast to, once again, no more than 
glancing SADF personnel and material losses.32 Yet, as the FAPLA brigade was still on its feet, 
the SADF had still come short of securing its objective.  
   For Leopold Scholtz, this failure was of decisive wider significance for, in his view, had the 
Angolan brigade been destroyed on 9 November the entire war could have ended in markedly 
                                                             
27 Scholtz, Leopold. The SADF in the Border War. pp. 292 
28 Heitman, H. War in Angola. pp. 129. Scholtz, Leopold. The SADF in the Border War. pp. 297 
29 Bridgland, Fred. The War for Africa. pp. 198 
30 Scholtz, Leopold. The SADF in the Border War. pp. 294 
31 Heitman, H. War in Angola. pp. 137 
32 Heitman, H. War in Angola. pp. 138 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
58 
 
more favourable circumstances for South Africa.33 On the other hand, that reading of the 
situation may not necessarily be the whole story. Although the SADF was finding the destruction 
of FAPLA brigades far from swift and straightforward, the heavy casualties that it was able to 
inflict still pushed it towards the thwarting of another FAPLA offensive in 1988. If slower than 
envisaged, South Africa’s position continued to advance. 
   The week following the abortive attempts at crushing the FAPLA formation became known as 
the “Chambinga Gallop” as the Angolan brigades at large in the field began to converge in 
tandem towards the Chambinga higher grounds. For SADF command, this seemed to signify a 
new ‘Cuito Cuanavale-centric’ tactic by FAPLA. For their part, evidently believing that the enemy 
intention was to occupy the town, the Angolans started to pull all of their forces back to defend 
their forward headquarters.34 The SADF actions changed quickly from attempting to halt the 
FAPLA withdrawal to trying to impose massive casualties. If the Angolan brigades were able to 
slip across the Cuito River still in strength,  it could essentially have meant the possible end of 
the entire South African campaign. So, contingency response plans were devised to deal with 
FAPLA’s rearwards movements – such as which combat groups would follow which brigades.35  
   Planning of the SADF’s attempt to ambush a brigade on 16 November ran into the sand, 
however. What was meant to have been a flanking assault on a withdrawing FAPLA column 
turned into an unanticipated and draining frontal collision. The South Africans were seriously 
hampered by ammunition and fuel shortages, caught out by having to dash to face their FAPLA 
opposition in that misdirected ambush.36 Again, the SADF found itself unable to completely 
overrun its enemy, and the Angolans fell back to   another secure crossing to reach their 
favoured Chambinga area.37  
    Still, the South African costs were again negligible, with only four deaths and some twenty 
wounded. Staying on the offensive thereafter, the Defence Force pursued the brigade to the 
FAPLA Chambinga bridge position, prompted by intelligence which reported that FAPLA was 
preparing a withdrawal from the bridge and and could be caught on the back foot.38 This attack 
on 17  November also miscarried and, once more, the Angolans were able to pull back with light 
losses, helped by cautious and incompetent UNITA intervention in the action. Romer-Heitman’s 
speculation is that it was seen as being against UNITA’s political  interests for the South Africans 
to have been drawn in fully at Chambinga, given the risk of substantial casualties. The 
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supposition, which may or may be far-fetched, is that a costly engagement by Pretoria would 
have had the knock-on effect of creating political pressure for a withdrawal and an end to the 
aiding of UNITA.39 
   The battle of 17 November would indeed mark the coming end of South Africa’s Operation 
Moduler, although not in the decisive way that had come to cause UNITA command such 
considerable anxieties over a possible loss of support. There was another factor weighing on the 
minds of SADF commanders. The great bulk of their soldiers who had been stationed in Angola 
since September were National Servicemen, utilised for short periods of active duty. Although 
short, these were also commonly intense. As one battalion commander, Colonel Deon Ferreira 
reflected, and probably without undue exaggeration, “many of them had seen more action in 
three months than many South African soldiers saw in the whole of World War II”.40 To sustain 
a war effort in demanding conditions for longer, the SADF could not maintain its existing forces 
in Angola beyond the limits of their effective endurance. And the replacing of its expeditionary 
servicemen would inevitably involve the specialised training of fresh recruits to cope with the 
harsh and hot cross-border Angolan environment. Inevitably, then, the demobilisation and 
remobilisation burden would come to be a key factor in much SADF future planning, especially 
in the envisaged ‘phase four’ option of the Moduler campaign vision, the seizure of Cuito 
Cuanavale. In this respect, high command entertained three options: 
*The first was that following the final complete destruction of FAPLA forces east of the Cuito 
river, momentum should be maintained by feeding in a fresh force to move on the town from 
the west to capture it.41 
*The second was the general relieving of troops stationed in Angola; this, though, was expected 
to be cumbersome and logistically very difficult.42 
*The third was simply to throw the current forces available into an offensive to take Cuito 
Cuanavale. The concern here was the danger of incurring heavy casualties which would be 
unacceptable for the terms of Pretoria’s fighting mandate.43 
   Given that scenario, what were the viable options ? Having a fresh force running at Cuito from 
the west, while forces to the east applied pressure, was ruled out. It would have required too 
much time to assemble for action; allowing for demobilisation and  getting in a fresh force 
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before late-December looked to be barely surmountable.44 Although this approach was 
reportedly supported by field commanders it was, however, decided against by the general staff, 
who may have had to take account of pressing political considerations which were prevailing at 
that point.45 
   Any Cuito Cuanavale upheaval would have been damaging to pending or intermittently 
continuing peace talks between Cuba and South Africa, as well as to the on-going negotiations 
surrounding the future of South West Africa.46 Here, Leopold Scholtz and Fred Bridgland are at 
odds over the actual chronology of the events surrounding the negotiations between Havana 
and Pretoria. What matters, ultimately, is that it does seem plausible that both South Africa and 
Cuba understood the prospect of what might be achieved by the candid diplomatic intent 
behind these discussions, and that their importance outweighed that of any contentious act of 
moving to capture Cuito Cuanavale.  
    The prudent path for South Africa was not to push ahead with the tentative planning 
possibility of taking Cuito in the event of such an action being “necessary and convenient” to the 
SADF.47 Indeed, and in any event, general staff vagueness when it came to Cuito Cuanavale 
strategy, tactics and its actual importance as a target also indicates that it was marginal to South 
Africa’s Angolan agenda.48 From the available literature, only Kat Liebenberg seems to have had 
some interest in trying to seize the town.  
   General Liebenberg’s approach seemed to suggest some rather hazy planning. It was to stage 
an attack against FAPLA forces on the east bank of the Cuito, to force them into withdrawing 
across the river.49 In this eventuality, should the SADF have failed to cripple the Angolans before 
they turned, it would bring on the necessity of moving on Cuito Cuanavale, to rule out any future 
repeat of FAPLA offensives. Conventional in its conception of a staged push against an enemy 
position, this onslaught deviated from the Defence Force policy of mobile warfare which, Scholtz 
has argued, was increasingly dictating the mounting of these and subsequent operations.  
    The South African attack, for which the current crop of national servicemen was mobilised for 
a last major round of action, commenced on 25 November. General Willie Meyer defined its 
minimum requirement as that of overcoming opposing forces on the Chambinga bridge.50 Again, 
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dense terrain and minefields hindered the SADF advance. Its slow crawl and an inability to 
secure a clear route afforded FAPLA some breathing space to stage an orderly withdrawal under 
the screen of a defensive artillery barrage to check forward movement by the South Africans. 
The calling off of this attack brought to an end the SADF’s Operation Moduler.51 That meant that 
its national servicemen could be sent home. But South Africa’s Angolan intervention was not yet 
finished. With the fate of Cuito Cuanavale still to be settled, Operation Moduler would now be 
giving way to Operation Hooper. 
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Chapter Three:   
Operations Hooper and Packer          
 
    At the end of Moduler, Pretoria had not achieved all the gains for which it had set out. 
Although the 1987 FAPLA offensive had been knocked back, the SADF had been unable to clear 
enemy forces from their operations in defined UNITA territory. Instead, FAPLA had been able to 
entrench its positions around Cuito Cuanavale. With its brigades receiving reinforcements, 
supplies and being rearmed, South Africa’s opponents were virtually re-positioning the Angolan 
situation to one similar to the start of 1987.  A few of the field officers involved in Operation 
Moduler felt that the damage inflicted upon FAPLA would be a lingering sore, and that this 
instructive experience would rule out a repeat offensive.1 This view was not, however, shared 
by the general staff which resolved to re-engage in the Angolan theatre. This decision some 
difficulties, one of which was the issue of national servicemen. The SADF could not continue its 
operations with existing troops forces past their December demobilisation date, and fresh 
recruits would require preparatory training for Angola. This provided FAPLA with a lull in 
fighting in which to reorganise.  
    With greater freedom of movement, FAPLA was also able to recover equipment that had been 
lost during its engagements with the SADF. Still, while the South African presence in Angola had 
been reduced, continuing pressure from UNITA meant that FAPLA could not simply reinforce its 
depleted brigades by diluting forces stationed in other parts of the country. Therefore, its 
command embarked on rapid recruitment and training to strengthen its forces still positioned 
along the eastern bank of the Cuito river.2  Replenishing was accompanied by fresh defensive 
strategies to secure Cuito Cuanavale from the SADF.  This took the form of three consecutive 
defensive lines as fronts to impede SADF progress towards Cuito. The first two lines were made 
up of FAPLA’s largest brigades, dispersed widely across the fronts to provide maximum cover, 
with the third and final defensive hedge at the rear being, in effect, Cuito Cuanavale itself, 
defended by all remaining forces, including a Cuban battalion.3 
    Arguably, FAPLA’s preparations suggest that its leadership was not entirely aware of the 
complex nature of the Cuito Cuanavale issue for their South African enemy. At this point, the 
Angolans had mounted an obvious ‘Cuito-centric’ defence in the expectation that the town 
would be the SADF’s main target. The South African general staff, though, had other possible 
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eventualities to consider, completely distinct than some victorious conquest. The capture and 
open occupation of this Angolan town would be seriously damaging to South Africa’s 
international diplomacy and to the continuing negotiations over a regional political settlement. 
Then, an inevitable later withdrawal from Cuito Cuanavale would be a propaganda gift to the 
MPLA, as it would be claimed to be a victory for FAPLA.4  
    At the same time, the consolidation of the Angolan forces around Cuito Cuanavale ran the risk 
of FAPLA putting its head into a noose of its own making. As the SADF objective was the 
elimination of its forces from the field of the Angolan conflict, a concentration around the town 
was bound to bring it on to Cuito. Given the limiting political considerations which they were 
having to bear in mind, the South Africans would also have little other option than to try to 
break FAPLA strength at its defensive lines.5 This meant the likelihood – or near certainty – of a 
frontal onslaught on the FAPLA position.6 The ultimate target was not to overrun the town of 
Cuito in order to occupy it, but more to pulverise its FAPLA defenders into a complete defeat.  
    On 28 November 1987, General Kat Liebenberg’s tactical staff proposed four options for 
progress: 
 Option 1: Destroy the Cuito bridge, and move a force up west of the river to threaten Cuito 
Cuanavale, while a force east of the river ties down FAPLA elements there 
Option 2: Withdraw all South African forces and leave UNITA to continue with guerrilla 
operations. 
Option 3: Maintain the present situation. 
Option 4: Deploy a strong force west of the Cuito and take Cuito Cuanavale.7 
    Liebenberg once again favoured a combination of planned action, covering the first and third 
options. A small force, augmented by UNITA soldiers, was placed west of Cuito to harass the 
FAPLA supply line. At the same time, another force was to be positioned to the east, with the 
Cuito Cuanavale bridge to be destroyed by bombing.8 This tactic resembled a conventional siege, 
and a far cry from the South African emphasis on the use of mobile warfare. It has led Scholtz so 
far as to label it as handing a propaganda victory to the Cuban-Angolan alliance. For there 
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appeared to be no obvious basis for the SADF to have ditched its favoured mobility for an 
attritionist positional approach.9  
    Equally, and all the while, South Africa’s primary target was clearly the FAPLA brigades to the 
east of the river, and that would explain the renewed attempt to eliminate the bridge, given the 
only partial success of the last attempt.10 Complete destruction of   the crossing, combined with 
the imminent start of the rainy season, would make the river impassable. One of the SADF’s 
previous failings had been its inability to prevent FAPLA forces from withdrawing to more 
secure ground.  
    The relieving of South Africa’s national service troop deployment by a fresh wave was 
completed just after the first week of December. This was accompanied by a renewed barrage 
against FAPLA positions, as well as failed bomb strikes on the Cuito river bridge on 8 and 9 
December.11 This triggered the opening phase of the SADF’s Operation Hooper, timed for 
December 1987.  
     Its core aim was the destruction of FAPLA forces east of the Cuito river by the end of that 
month. This was to be achieved through the pressures exerted by SADF contingents positioned 
eastwards and westwards of the town: from the west, supply lines to FAPLA brigades within 
Cuito were to be struck, and every running opportunity of openings through which to hit enemy 
forces was to be taken.12 While planning objectives emphasised the necessity of uprooting and 
eliminating FAPLA’s eastern force with the use of the maximum power at South Africa’s 
disposal, and the demolition of the Cuito Cuanavale bridge, capture of the town itself remained 
essentially a contingency, an opportunity held back in reserve should there be circumstances in 
which its defences could be easily surmounted. This eventuality was fully in accordance with 
what had transpired from P.W. Botha’s September visit, namely, that ‘if the opportunity arises to 
capture Cuito Cuanavale relatively easily, planning should be done to do it.”13  
    It was still not, then, a specified operational objective for the SADF. Indeed, an Operation 
Hooper ‘Intelligence Appreciation’ of 26 December accorded low priority to any overcoming of 
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Cuito Cuanavale defences.14 What was reiterated was the foremost objective of obliterating the 
FAPLA brigades which were gathered in the locality.15 Yet, it soon became evident that the 
original deadline of the end of December for achieving this could not be reached.16 It had 
become increasingly clear to SADF command that its new intake of soldiers in Angola would 
require more re-supplying and more intensive training, to say nothing of rest and equipment 
repair. These were time-consuming tasks which put the completion of the army’s Angolan 
business by the end of 1987 beyond reach. Liebenberg was obliged to put back the first assault 
on his FAPLA brigade target until January.17  
    At the same time, sensitive political factors also entered the picture. Military command was 
advised that future actions against FAPLA ought to involve UNITA forces at the front, in a clear 
attempt to try to dispel the increasingly widespread impression that Savimbi’s movement was 
simply an agent of South Africa’s intentions in Angola. In planning of the next assault on a 
FAPLA brigade, provision was made for SADF troops to be mobilised as strength in the rear, to 
be sent into action at the front should the   prior UNITA attacks on the enemy.18 In that sense, 
although UNITA was not viable as a substitute for the SADF, where it was feasible actions were 
envisaged in which there would be involvement by Savimbi’s army alongside SADF elements.  
    The attempt to destroy the FAPLA force was a fumbling movement, which ended up as three 
separate actions. The first, spearheaded by UNITA early in January, went badly for the attackers. 
Although the UNITA force was able to break through and to reach the FAPLA position, it was 
only to discover that their enemy had already withdrawn and was then able to commence 
shelling the exposed UNITA location. The South Africans were also unable to render assistance 
as they were pinned down in their ground position by Angolan MiG fighters which were able to 
control the air. It was decided that a withdrawal was prudent and that a renewed attack would 
take place when weather conditions improved.19 The assault on the FAPLA brigade was 
renewed on 13 January, spearheaded by UNITA and backed by South African armoured and 
infantry forces which were accompanied by the remaining UNITA formation.20  
    After quickly overcoming their enemy’s outlying positions, the combined SADF-UNITA force 
struck the main camp of the FAPLA brigade hard, forcing it to fall back from its position after 
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sustaining heavy casualties and losing tanks and other mechanical equipment.21 By contrast, 
UNITA and the SADF were barely scratched. Despite this outright victory, the South African 
forces pulled back rather than attempting to push on through the now punctured defensive line. 
The cautiousness of their command was   attributable to worries over FAPLA artillery strikes on 
men in vulnerable positions, as well as the danger to ground troops posed by enemy MiGs.22 
This easing up gave FAPLA some breathing room in which to reinforce and to restructure its 
defence.23 The restructuring came as a result of Fidel Castro’s direct intervention in FAPLA’s 
operational strategy. In effect, Castro checked FAPLA and his Cuban forces from retreating to 
Menongue and allowing Cuito Cuanavale fall into the hands of the SADF and UNITA, as its 
defence provided an opportunity to turn the town into a symbol of resistance and to rally 
popular opinion behind the Angolan war effort.24  
    Acting on this, Castro pulled back the outlying FAPLA brigades to stiffen the second line of 
defence to try to secure the line against another breach by the SADF. Moreover, any further 
South African offensive would also be within the range of artillery based in Cuito Cuanavale. In 
the meantime, on 17 January, in a FAPLA counter-attack its brigade managed to reclaim its 
position from the occupying UNITA force, thereby regaining the ground that had been lost in 
action four days previously.25 
    Following a Tactical Headquarters briefing involving Jannie Geldenhuys and fellow generals 
on 28 January, Geldenhuys took stock of the broader situation as a set of “personal guidelines”. 
In these, he made it clear that the SADF would not be able to remain in Angola for much longer, 
even though, despite international condemnation, there appeared to be some limited consent 
from Western states which provided a measure of latitude. For Geldenhuys, it was equally clear 
that the SADF’s future objective would have to be that of withdrawal from Angola, but that the 
manner of any withdrawal should not jeopardise any of the gains made during its intervention. 
The South African pull-out was to be effected once the original third phase of Operation 
Moduler - the destruction of all FAPLA forces east of the Cuito River – had been completed. The 
preferred date for this movement was by the end of February 1988.26 
    The chances of South Africa being out of Angola by the end of the following month looked 
slim, especially given the gap between planned combat actions. Thus, the SADF was only 
prepared for its next engagement on 14 February, several weeks after its last major action. 
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Originally, the South Africans envisaged their target as again being the FAPLA brigade, as in the 
previous month. However, with troops struck by sickness, there was a change of tactic.27 It was 
decided that UNITA would assault this enemy brigade at the same time as the SADF engaged 
another FAPLA formation.28 The FAPLA brigade took heavy casualties in this fierce action, and 
sustained a further heavy death toll in an attempted counter-attack against the South Africans 
who had taken up position at the location that had been been occupied previously by the 
Angolans.29 A triumphalist claim by one military writer, Hilton Hamann, is that this SADF victory 
meant the destruction of the Angolan brigade. That, however, could be said to be somewhat 
exaggerated as a judgement.30 Although the FAPLA losses were clearly high by the rates of 
mortality and wounding to be seen in previous Angolan battles,  much of its brigade remained 
intact and retained the capability to be utilised in the further defence of Cuito Cuanavale or of 
the Tumpo triangle point.    
Nevertheless, the outcome of the February SADF assault was said to have infuriated Fidel 
Castro, as his field orders intended to prevent this kind of loss had seemingly been  disregarded. 
Accordingly, a new commanding General was sent to Angola with a brief to restructure dug-in 
positions around the east bank of the Cuito and to strengthen artillery on the west bank to 
support the FAPLA bridgehead formation.31 The FAPLA forces were now hedged into a thirty 
square kilometre area, which became known as the Tumpo triangle. This in a way, presented 
the SADF with a more straightforward and simplified objective. South Africa now had  to drive 
the FAPLA forces out of the Tumpo triangle and across the Cuito River, and its cross-border 
mission would have been completed.32 
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   The obstacle faced by Pretoria’s commanders was that the FAPLA regrouping in the Tumpo 
Triangle presented a unified defence against their offensive. Up to this point in the hostilities, 
the SADF had singled out FAPLA brigades as its expeditionary forces were wholly outnumbered 
by its enemy east of the Cuito. In circumstances that had now changed, the prospect of skirting 
FAPLA forces to attack the town arose once more. As on previous occasions, it was quashed.34 
The decision against any occupation of Cuito Cuanavale was confirmed, as before, by discussion 
between General Geldenhuys and P.W. Botha, in which the State President had emphasised that 
Angola ought not to be allowed to turn into a trap for South Africa, by becoming a Vietnam-like 
situation of its own making.35 At the same time, it is interesting to note that despite South 
Africa’s avoidance of occupation because of the deeper entanglement that it was likely to bring, 
there was a belief in some quarters that if its forces were able to occupy the east river bank, 
FAPLA would have been forced to abandon the town altogether in any event.36 With Cuito 
Cuanavale removed from the battle equation, that notion also fed into how the South Africans 
envisaged their withdrawal, as a neutralised town would enable UNITA to entrench along the 
Cuito and create holding conditions in which the SADF would be able to withdraw on orderly 
terms, with its mission accomplished. 
    The Tumpo Triangle circumstances with their FAPLA bridgehead did not favour the SADF. 
The months that had passed since the formation of its defensive lines had provided FAPLA with 
sufficient time to greatly strengthen the final barrier position before Cuito Cuanavale. Possible 
enemy approach routes had been heavily mined, bulldozers had created lethal fire zones, 
artillery coverage had been expanded, and a stockpiling of munitions and supplies had ensured 
the preparedness of FAPLA for a siege contingency.37 As if that were not not enough of an 
obstacle for the SADF, the assembled FAPLA troop density was higher at this stage of the conflict 
than it had ever been previously. Still, it appeared that the MPLA government had little faith in 
the defensive capability of its forces, as the SADF intercepted a transmission ordering their 
withdrawal from Cuito Cuanavale to Menongue. This was, however, not followed by any retreat 
from the town. On the one hand, it is possible that this may have been an attempt to deceive 
their enemy. On the other, it is possibly much more likely that Luanda was overruled by Castro 
and his Angolan commanders, who had confidence in the strength of their holding position.38 
    The SADF continued regardless of the FAPLA build-up, and a first assault on the Tumpo 
Triangle was planned for 25 February 1988.  This involved a reliance on flanking movements, 
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and a tactical avoidance of any territorial occupation. Any gains of ground were to be held by 
UNITA forces, leaving the SADF free to maintain its mobility, moving into concealed positions 
from which it could strike out in a flanking run at another target area.39 The final stage of the 
planned February attack was to include a clearing of objectives east of the Cuito River, the 
destruction of the Cuito Bridge, and the subsequent withdrawal of South African forces.40 As 
with previous thinking, there again appears to have been no desire for any occupation.  
   Unfortunately for the SADF, once operations began, matters no longer went according to plan. 
Upon arrival at what had been identified as a combat zone, one of its battalions discovered that 
FAPLA had abandoned its positions in a pre-emptive withdrawal.41 The advancing force found 
itself up against FAPLA minefields which delayed its movements by several hours before 
reaching bunkers that it had intended to clear of Angolan soldiers. It was only to find that 
FAPLA had again withdrawn.42 Thus, while forward positions had been effectively broken 
through, the enemy had kept itself intact, providing little cause for any victory celebration.43 
Further action required movement across a large and unprotected stretch of open terrain, and it 
was eventually resolved to pull back to avoid the possible risk of incurring unacceptably heavy 
casualties.44 While there had been hostilities which resulted in nearly 200 FAPLA dead and a 
loss of some of its armour, efficient FAPLA scouting had been able to tip off Angolan defence 
command as to what to do to to frustrate the enemy’s forward movement.45 
    Despite the failure of this attack, South African command decided on a renewed strike almost 
immediately. This second assault, four days later, was meant to replicate the aims of the first - 
engage the enemy, inflict as much damage as possible before it fled across the river, destroy the 
bridge, and then withdraw.46 In the view of Helmoed Romer-Heitman, the SADF battalions were 
insufficiently prepared for another round of action so soon, a judgement echoed by Leopold 
Scholtz, who cites hindrances such as low morale due to an inhospitable climate, illness, and the 
slow re-supply of vital equipment.47 This was disregarded in the decision to mount a second 
attack in the immediate aftermath of the failed first assault.48 One consequence was that the 
South Africans had insufficient armour at their disposal, with their tank strength depleted 
                                                             
39 Heitman, H. War in Angola. pp. 246 
40 Heitman, H. War in Angola. pp. 247 
41 Heitman, H. War in Angola. pp. 248 
42 Heitman, H. War in Angola. pp. 250 
43 Scholtz, Leopold. The SADF in the Border War. pp.344 
44 Heitman, H. War in Angola. pp. 252 
45 Heitman, H. War in Angola. pp. 253 
46 Heitman, H. War in Angola. pp. 255 
47 Scholtz, Leopold. The SADF in the Border War. pp.346 
48 Heitman, H. War in Angola. pp. 257 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
71 
 
further by the effectiveness of FAPLA’s minefields.49 The serious loss of armoured support led to 
the eventual decision early in March to call off an attack that had clearly become a failure. 
Subsequently, it transpired in the light of later intelligence estimates of FAPLA firepower that it 
had been exaggerated initially. A dismayed Commandant Mike Muller who had led the assault 
later claimed that if he had known that FAPLA tanks were still outnumbered by those in his 
command, he would have pressed on and “settled the whole matter”.50 In the event, the official 
SADF conclusion was that the short action had brought about no change to the balance of power 
situation in the field.51 The  SADF failure suggested that its current forces were being stretched 
to the limits of their capability, with troops tired, supply irregular and vehicles becoming worn 
out. The end of Operation Hooper was signalled by the authorisation of the deployment of fresh 
soldiers and new armoured vehicles to assume Angolan operations as Operation Packer. 
    It was at this point that the background noise of regional negotiations and diplomacy began to 
grow significantly louder, taking political emphasis on the Angolan crisis away from the physical 
fighting in the territory, and placing it more and more squarely on the desk of the United States 
Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Crocker, where it came to be the lynchpin of his geopolitical 
strategy of linkage. Linkage, or Constructive Engagement, was a policy based on the belief that 
the issues face by Southern Africa were indissolubly connected, and that they could all be solved 
potentially, provided the solution lay in understanding their relation to one another. The 
question of the Angolan conflict, for example, could only be solved through the resolution of the 
crisis involving the future of South West Africa, which in turn could only be solved in connection 
to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.  
    Prospects of dealing with the instabilities of the region on the basis of negotiations of this kind 
were eased on by the major contemporaneous shift in Kremlin politics as well. The accession to 
power of Mikhail Gorbachev and his reformist policies of opening up the Soviet Union saw some 
thawing of relations between Pretoria and Moscow. Part of the threat of the MPLA government 
was its Eastern bloc alignment, and the change of stance towards South Africa by the Soviet 
Union greatly diminished the perceived threat of a spreading communist revolution in Southern 
Africa.52 An early indication of the diminishing of ideological hostility was the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between Moscow and Pretoria through the installation of a Soviet Desk in 
the South African capital at the beginning of 1988. By March of that year it appeared that all 
parties, the MPLA, the Cubans, the Soviets, and the South Africans were ready to come to the 
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negotiating table with America, with Chester Crocker, specifically, as the mediator.53 After 
negotiations in Geneva, it seemed that all parties would shortly come to a mutual agreement, 
and that Crocker’s policy of Linkage could soon be put into effect.54 The war in Angola, however, 
had acquired momentum. Its hostilities were set to carry on, and to continue to drag on to the 
very end phases of the negotiations. 
    Operation Packer got underway early in March with the relieving of national servicemen 
serving in infantry and mechanised battalions by a South African brigade following the 
unsuccessful attack of 1 March.55 The crucial issue of troop training ahead of  Angolan 
deployment has already featured several times in the present discussion, a particular point of 
interest given that Helmoed Romer-Heitman’s account – which draws extensively on SADF 
documents – virtually overlooks issues relating to preparedness. There are merely brief 
observations of the SADF Brigade rounding off training at the end of February, and then loading 
stores and arms in immediate preparation for action.56 By marked contrast, Fred Bridgland has 
conveyed the assessment of a  Commandant Gerhard Louw, an armoured vehicle instructor. In 
Louw’s view, insufficient time had been given to the training of novice troops, especially given 
that they were civilian conscripts rather than regular soldiers, and that the brigade’s hurried 
induction meant that it was not yet properly operational when it was instructed to deploy for 
action.57 Furthermore, Louw recorded his exasperation over ammunition shortages and 
equipment failures, elements which are, again, glossed over in the Romer-Heitman record.  
    Louw, who was then appointed to command this 82nd South African Brigade, goes so far as to 
assert that his armoured force was too under-equipped to constitute a viable tank regiment, 
even though the pending action was set to be led by a strong tank squadron.58 If the levels of 
deficiency described by Commander Louw are not exaggerated, these circumstances certainly 
suggest that the SADF was inadequately prepared for the carrying out of Operation Packer. 
Moreover, when interviewed by Leopold Scholtz, this sceptically-minded officer described his 
insufficiently-trained force as having been entirely unprepared for the extreme circumstances 
produced by a situation of live combat. Using highly disparaging terms, both racist and 
condescending, Louw described the Citizen Force troops placed under him as having been as 
“excited as naïve children before a picnic; afterwards many were ready for trauma 
counselling”.59 In agreeing with his critical assessment of the poor level of military 
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preparedness, Scholtz goes so far as to label the decisions to mount operations as “tactical 
madness”.60 
    As has already been noted, the Packer offensive was in a way yet another extension of 
Moduler, with its primary operational objective unchanged, that of clearing all FAPLA forces 
east of the Cuito River. The rationale remained that of preventing FAPLA from mounting an 
offensive against an unprotected UNITA, after the SADF withdrawal from Angola. In that 
respect, the period after the second South African attack on the Tumpo position was a time of 
growing concern over the possibility of another FAPLA build-up, as SADF reconnaissance had 
spotted bridging equipment being transported from Menongue in the direction of Cuito 
Cuanavale.61 This suggested that FAPLA was preparing to bolster its river bridgehead, possibly 
in preparation for the resumption of an offensive against UNITA. This increased pressure on the 
SADF for its Operation Packer to be effective. Yet its brigade was now up against a formidable 
enemy that had withstood two assaults and was confident in its defences, having witnessed the 
difficulties experienced by its South African opponents in trying to traverse the minefields and 
forbidding terrain that lay between them. 
    The third South African attack on the Tumpo triangle was scheduled for 23 March. Employing 
a feint manoeuvre to try to deceive the Angolan forces, the plan was to hit the FAPLA position 
with a strong frontal assault. This planned advance, however, soon ran into heavy weather. 
Before getting anywhere close to engaging its adversary, the SADF became stuck in minefields 
which had to be cleared in a lengthy and hard-going operation. With its tanks immobilised by 
mines and under fire from MiGs and artillery, the SADF could make little forward progress.62 
Bowing to the inevitable, Louw requested that the attack be called off as it was likely that his 
tanks would run out of fuel before reaching any FAPLA positions, and was given authorisation 
to pull back.63 Although nearly all the immobilised tanks were safely retrieved, and there were 
no South African casualties, the assault had obviously failed.64 In effect, this offensive approach 
had simply run out of steam.   
    Having failed to dislodge FAPLA forces from their stronghold on the east bank of the Cuito, the 
SADF resorted to barricading the area in an effort to enable UNITA to defend it without South 
Africa’s expeditionary military assistance.65 This took the form of creating a belt of mines that 
spanned the riverbanks on either side of the FAPLA bridgehead. Once UNITA was in a secure 
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position to oversee this mine strip, its ally would be able to withdraw. FAPLA, meanwhile, had 
not grasped the SADF intentions of withdrawing, and had begun preparing for an attack from 
the south, given that its enemy had failed three times to make inroads from the east. On its 
political stage, FAPLA also staged a theatrical show of some abandoned South African tanks, 
displayed in propaganda as a symbol of Luanda’s which would be used as part of their victory 
propaganda over the SADF.66 The rest of March and most of April saw a large-scale South 
African withdrawal, leaving behind only a formation of experienced regular    soldiers. While the 
continuing SADF presence impressed upon FAPLA that Pretoria’s forces were still in Angola, it 
was in effect a factor that eased along the final stage of the “Angolan Campaign”, known as 
Operation Displace. 
    Operation Displace took place in the context of the South African belief that the basic 
campaign goals had been achieved. What remained of the FAPLA forces on the east bank of the 
Cuito numbered only about 850 men, a far cry from the 15 000 troops who had been marshalled 
for fighting in the offensive against UNITA. In Pretoria’s view, a further major assault on UNITA 
was unlikely, and the heavy casualties that had been inflicted upon FAPLA and its allies had 
obliged Luanda, Havana and Moscow to come to the negotiating table.67 These tentative 
negotiations began in earnest in May 1988, while in the background the SADF troops assigned 
to Operation Displace buckled down to assisting UNITA to try to maintain whatever ground 
been achieved since Pretoria’s intervention in the previous year.   
    The position of the SADF now was delicate. On the one had, it could not embark on any action 
that might jeopardise the negotiations or weaken Pretoria’s political position. On the other, it 
also needed to make certain that FAPLA would not exploit the diplomatic negotiations as a 
screen behind which to resume its stalled offensive against UNITA.68 To try to hold the balance, 
the SADF commenced mining the eastern bank of the Cuito to bottle up the opposing forces at 
the Tumpo triangle, and to protect this operation a combat battalion was stationed in a forward 
position in an attempt to convince FAPLA observers that an attack from the south was if the 
offing.69 Such deception was an integral aspect of Operation Displace. For although the main 
body of its forces had already left Angola, the SADF was needed to keep up pressure on FAPLA 
in order to maintain leverage in the negotiations. Thus, an infantry grouping was assigned to 
maintain radio communications and to practice simulated movements to create the ruse that 
the main South African Brigade was still active in Angolan territory.70 And once strict regulation 
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of military activity was imposed after 2 July, it became of the utmost political importance that 
South Africa keep equipment safe, avoid avoid casualties, and not have any prisoners taken by 
FAPLA. Crucially, nothing should be undertaken which might provoke a FAPLA attack.71 On this 
low-level basis, Operation Displace was to continue, with its command placed in the tricky 
position of having to simulate a menacing presence without provoking any form of FAPLA 
retaliation. By August, the intricate regional negotiations were coming to an end, and with that 
came the end of Operation Displace as well as the end of Pretoria’s controversial support for 
UNITA.72 
    The final battle of the Angolan conflict was not triggered by South Africa, but was instead 
created by Fidel Castro. It occurred  well after the conclusion of negotiations, with Chester 
Crocker’s ‘Linkage’ resolution accepted and both Cuba and South Africa set on withdrawing 
their forces from Angolan soil. Yet to press home the image of a valiant Cuban victory over 
apartheid South Africa and its Western capitalist backers, Castro wished to conclude the war in 
a triumphal manner. Those Cuban forces still in Angola were positioned to attack Calueque in 
the far south, the strategic location on the Kunene river to which the SADF had been pulled 
back, again to protect the Ruacana power station on the Angolan border during the South 
African evacuation into northern South West Africa. Following intense fighting, towards the end 
of June, South Africa withdrew its forces. Instead of pushing on with their attack, the Cubans, 
too, opted to pull back.73 Pretoria’s withdrawal was sufficient for a claim of victory, although 
Havana’s forces had incurred considerable losses, with South African intelligence estimates 
claiming over 300 Cuban casualties.74 This notwithstanding, Cuba sought to drive home its 
proclaimed ascendancy at the conclusion of the Angolan border war crisis, following up its 
costly ground attack with an air raid on Calueque, striking the dam bridge.75 This effective air 
raid was also exploited as a mark of Cuba’s victory in Angola.   
    With that, hostilities finally wound down, and the troublesome issue of the war in Angola and 
armed struggle across this portion of Southern Africa was concluded at the negotiations table. 
Talks in Geneva in early August set an agreed timetable for withdrawal, with the start of 
September fixed as the deadline for South Africa to have extricated itself from Angola entirely.76 
On 22 December a trilateral agreement was signed by Cuba, South Africa, and Angola, 
guaranteeing early independence for South West Africa (Namibia) and the withdrawal from the 
region of Cuban forces. Officially, the war was over, and as expeditionary military parties to the 
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internal crisis of power in Angola, both Pretoria and Havana were able to withdraw from the 
territory in a clean and peaceable fashion. 
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Chapter Four:  
The Defenders of Cuito Cuanavale                                                                                       
 
    This chapter will consider contrasting accounts of the events of the Angolan border war by 
examining some of the essential arguments and statements presented by those who believe that 
the SADF suffered a crushing defeat in Angola and, in almost all cases, specifically at Cuito 
Cuanavale. All of these are couched as scholarly works or as informed newspaper articles by 
expert observers and commentators who have been providing authoritative viewpoints, 
whether academic or political. These works are representative of an uncomplicated Angolan 
war narrative resting upon a simple judgment of a SADF failure or defeat, with many of their 
authors citing one other, suggesting an influential field of shared reinforcement. What follows 
will merely outline the claims and their manner of presentation, while the following chapter will 
contrast these perspectives with those presented by SADF records and a selection of secondary 
sources. 
    We commence with the writings of Ronnie Kasrils, focusing on a piece which was published in 
the Johannesburg Sunday Independent and which was later expanded into a more scholarly 
appraisal. Kasrils puts forward a common and recurring theme of a turning point in Angola 
having been the action at Cuito Cuanavale, going so far as to quote Fidel Castro as saying, “The 
history of Africa will be written as before and after Cuito Cuanavale”.1 Kasrils bases his support 
for this claim based on what he calls the outcomes of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale. These were, 
apparently, that the SADF “had been forced to withdraw; the independence of Namibia had been 
agreed,” with the implication that this in turn had been crucial in helping to set the scene for the 
end of apartheid in South Africa.2 In his account of the events leading up to the struggle around 
Cuito Cuanavale, Ronnie Kasrils proclaims that conquest and occupation was an SADF objective, 
disregarding a contrary view provided to him in person by General Kat Liebenberg.3 In 
dismissing it, the claim is made that occupying Cuito Cuanavale would have placed UNITA in an 
“advantageous position”.4 In support of his view that the actual objective of overrunning and 
taking the town was revealed by the SADF’s heavy use of artillery and waves of infantry attacks 
by “crack” battalions, with UNITA soldiers serving as cannon fodder ahead of advancing white 
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troops, this author asserts that South Africa had fielded a force of as many as 6000 men, not 
counting the accompanying UNITA contingent.5  
     Although Kasrils concedes that many of the SADF’s campaign accounts furnish ‘meticulous’ 
detail on what has happening in the field, what matters ultimately for this critical commentator 
is that the town of Cuito was never occupied by the SADF. In his sole  description of the actual 
episode, it is one of a defiant stand against the odds in which Angolan defenders saved the day 
in an action reminiscent of the Second World War’s Battle of Stalingrad in 1942.6 The military 
victory by the Cuban-Angolan alliance is further underlined by the final bombing of the Ruacana 
and Calueque hydro-electric dam site, demonstrating that the SADF had been clearly out-foxed 
by Fidel Castro.7 Continuing with the theme of Cuban ascendancy, Kasrils applauds what he 
identifies as the strategic restraint of the Cubans, who could ostensibly have marched on and 
down into Namibia and liberated it, but instead chose to hold back so as not to undermine the 
diplomatic negotiations which were then in progress. At the same time, these were 
characterised as being of little consequence at that stage, judged to be achieving little and of 
going nowhere.8  
    It is arguable that Ronnie Kasrils was less than fully informed about the terms and 
practicalities of the regional negotiations towards the end of the 1980s. In observing, as he does, 
that the SADF had been obliged to withdraw completely from Angola before Cuban forces had 
begun their own pull-out, it ought to be remembered that the conditions of the negotiations had 
stipulated this very outcome.9 Yet, drawing on an argument of Pierro Gleijeses, Kasrils echoes 
the contention that the regional negotiations were fated not to have a satisfactory outcome for 
Pretoria, concluding, “South Africa must face the fact that it will not obtain at the negotiating 
table what it could not achieve on the battlefield”.10 Revealing his wider purpose in focusing on 
the Angolan crisis as an exemplary case of progress in the struggle against the apartheid state, 
Ronnie Kasrils emphasises the importance of making the youth of South Africa aware of the 
sacrifices that Cuba made for their freedom and independence. 
    Picking up on the theme conveyed in Kasrils’s writing, Isaac Saney’s “African Stalingrad” is 
clearly unambiguous in its interpretation of the significance of that episode in the Angolan 
hostilities. Saney’s aim is to show that literature sceptical of a SADF defeat in Angola is 
inaccurate, and that it holds a denialist view about the actual outcome of the battle of Cuito 
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Cuanavale – for, as a contest, it was resolved in the favour of the republic’s adversaries. Saney 
also builds up the significance of the “battle” of Cuito Cuanavale, calling it the largest battle in 
Africa since World War II.11 An obvious part of Isaac Saney’s purpose in writing an account of 
Cuito Cuanavale is to tell the allegedly “untold”12 story of Cuban aid to Angola and its role in a 
South African defeat. The SADF has, according to Saney, been attempting to convince general 
opinion that the battle of Cuito Cuanavale was a victory, as the scale of its reversal would have 
weakened its perceived position of supreme armed power in Southern Africa.13 In this writer’s 
view, there is a lack of other thorough research on the topic to substantiate his interpretations, 
although as even just the present chapter demonstrates, there is no shortage of of similar 
narratives.14  
    Saney dismisses the notion that the South Africans had no really express intention of 
occupying Cuito Cuanavale as a construction of historical hindsight, intended to deny the 
importance of the “battle”, and its role as an important stage on the road towards the final 
dissolution of apartheid.15 That position, he argues, is in direct contradiction to the outcome of 
the Cuito encounter which led to the end of regional destabilisation at the hands of the 
apartheid government. The defeat at Cuito Cuanavale stemmed the hegemonic ambitions of 
South Africa, affecting not only the SADF war effort in Angola, but also Pretoria’s influence in all 
of the other Southern African countries that were being manipulated by the apartheid 
government.16 For Isaac Saney, Cuba represented an altruistic force in Africa affairs, thereby 
legitimising its aid to the MPLA in Angola and its belligerent participation in the war.  
    He argues that while Cuba’s aid to Luanda has been dismissed as having been that of a Soviet 
proxy, the Cubans were actually acting against the wishes of a more cautious Soviet Union. 
Indeed, Cuba’s interventions in Africa were so patently principled and selfless that it acquired 
no economic gains through the potential leverage it acquired through the supply of military 
missions.17As to the Cuito Cuanavale question, the battle there is seen as pivotal by Saney, as in 
his perspective the South Africans were determined on its capture as the needed the use of the 
town as a forward airbase. To that end, Saney asserts that Pretoria fielded its best troops and 
strongest firepower to obtain a decisive victory and thus change the course of the war.18 To back 
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up this view, he cites the presidential visit of P.W.Botha to the front lines as an implied 
indication of the weight of the issue for the SADF.19 As a further part of this picture of South 
African frustration at this point in the war, Saney also turns to the estimation of Ronnie Kasrils 
that the SADF had suffered an unacceptably high loss of white conscripts at Cuito Cuanavale.20 
The defeat there and the ensuing advance of Cuban troops to the southern Angolan border 
forced the South Africans to negotiate to protect their soldiers and to prevent any further loss of 
white South African life.21 For all that Saney has to say about the overall meaning of Cuito 
Cuanavale, he pays no attention to the actualities of the battle itself, aside from concluding that 
all that mattered is that the SADF lost the action. The rationale of ‘African Stalingrad’ lies in 
using a collection of violent events in Southern Africa, then linking them to a battle which is 
characterised as decisive, and consequently calling them the outcomes of that battle. Or, viewed 
in another way but through the same lens, the battle of Cuito Cuanavale was akin to Stalingrad 
simply because it was. 
    Both of these authors have claimed that the battle of Cuito Cuanavale was instrumental in 
bringing about the the eventual end of apartheid. This has been hammered home forcefully by 
Ronnie Kasrils on his African National Congress platform. In that regard, the ANC’s stance has 
been made clear in various actions, speeches, articles, and event attendances at which the 
Angolan border war has featured. It can perhaps be demonstrated best through the publication, 
In Session. The most illuminating specific issue is that of July 2008 which opens with a piece 
about the March 2008 commemorations of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale. There, the ‘Battle of 
Cuito Cuanavale’ is portrayed as having irreversibly changed the course of history and the 
balance of the political landscape of Southern Africa. The “Angolan, Namibian, and Cuban forces” 
managed to bring the apartheid offensive in Angola to a decisive halt.22 The FAPLA/Cuban 
alliance, constituted as the “Southern African Liberation Armies”, had fought successfully 
against “Angolan Rebel armies”, as well as invading “apartheid armies”. This joint defense of 
Cuito Cuanavale led to a peace settlement, from which the independence of Namibia was won, 
and which set in train the pressures for the negotiated settlement which was responsible for the 
ending of apartheid in South Africa in the 1990s. Praise is heaped upon the potent force of an 
assembled “internationalism” which “inspired and informed the South African liberation”, an 
implicit reference to Cuba and its supportive presence behind the MPLA government in Angola. 
The lauded ‘Cuban narrative’ is also given a prominent voice in In Session, represented there by 
Major-General Espirito Santo who repeats the standard contention made by figures such as 
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Castro himself, and by Jorge Risquet, about the altruistic nature of Havana’s aid to Africa and its 
high-minded motives.23 Although the claim is made that all sides of the political equation were 
represented at the 2008 commemorative event, there is little evidence of the voices of SADF 
regular veterans and of Citizen Force soldiers who had fought on the side of the apartheid state. 
Although the call was for an inclusive history which recognised the roles of all South Africa’s 
people, it is apparent that Angolan war commemoration – or that of twenty years on, in any 
event - was not destined to be one common to all the people of the republic.  
    Separately, the ANC also published an Angolan anniversary statement in March 2008, in 
which a basic description of the ‘Battle of Cuito Cuanavale’ is provided and the claim of a Cuban-
Angolan victory is made. This victory is depicted as having marked a turning point in the war of 
aggression against the Angolan people, as well as in laying the foundations for an independent 
Namibia and the end of apartheid in South Africa.24 Here, too, there is a statement that war 
veterans “from both sides” made up South Africa’s party at the commemorative event, although, 
again, SADF veterans seem to have been conspicuous by their absence. In a press release 
accompanying the ANC’s anniversary declaration, the claim was made, yet again, that South 
Africa had been freed  due to the gallant actions of those who had lost their lives fighting off the 
apartheid army at the ‘Battle for Cuito Cuanavale’. 
    A further challenge to the SADF’s version of its experience of warfare in Angola is, “Paying our 
debt to Humanity”, attributed to Fidel Castro himself, and forming part of a collection edited by 
the American scholar and Cuban specialist, David Deutschmann. His 1989 volume, Changing the 
History of Africa: Angola and Namibia, focuses squarely on Cuba and its influence in the Angolan 
conflict, the established building block of all the assembled authors in their common challenge 
to what is depicted as an entirely hollow and propagandistic SADF version of what had 
transpired in the Angolan conflict. 
  Castro furnishes an emotive and triumphalist re-telling of the Angolan quagmire, proclaiming 
that Cuban volunteers had arrived in Angola in 1975 to help that country’s leadership in its fight 
against the threat of a South African invasion, which was repelled in the following year. 
Thereafter, in Castro’s view, it was the commencement of the beginnings of a Cuban withdrawal 
that provided a window for the South Africans to invade, now able to take advantage of Angola’s 
dangerously weakened military defences.25 Pretoria’s motivation was the waging of what Castro 
terms a “dirty war” against Angola, with the backing of the United States, so as to leave the 
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decisive balance of regional power in the hands of the South Africans. This was to form the 
status quo in Angola until the emergence of a crisis in 1987, precipitated by a FAPLA offensive 
against UNITA. Cuban forces are distanced from having had any hand in this offensive, although 
Castro sees it as having been the “undeniable” right of the Angolan government to carry out 
such offensives against the threat of its UNITA enemy.26  
    In the eyes of Havana, it appears that any such MPLA offensive could only have been 
successful or should only have been undertaken on the basis of certainty that there would be no 
military intervention by South Africa. In the event, this offensive which was undertaken against 
Cuban advice, provoked an expeditionary intervention by the SADF which went beyond merely 
turning the FAPLA advance on Mavinga, but itself became an advance on Cuito Cuanavale.27 
Faced with this desperate situation, Luanda turned to Cuba which had no alternative but to 
supply the MPLA with reinforcements. Circumstances had deteriorated so badly by November 
1987 that Cuba was virtually obliged to take spontaneous action. Strategically, its command had 
little choice. Aside from avoiding a decisive battle with the SADF, the South Africans could not 
be permitted to obliterate the Angolan brigades and then to capture Cuito Cuanavale.28 This 
scenario assumed that had the SADF been able to overcome defending FAPLA forces east of the 
Cuito, River, it would then have moved on to take the town. In response, Cuban planning was 
apparently to delay the SADF and to turn Cuito Cuanavale into a trap into which, according to 
Castro, the South Africans fell completely.29  
    According to Castro, the defence of Cuito Cuanavale blocked the SADF with a “minimum of 
casualties” for the defending forces, and that South Africa’s objectives were completely foiled.30 
The effective defensive plan was to hold enemy forces at their river position and then to attack 
from the south west. With that having occurred at Calueque, these parting shots clinched the 
finalising of negotiations.31 In Castro’s opinion, although high-level Southern African talks had 
been underway for a lengthy period, Pretoria had been paying them virtually no attention, given 
its obsessive concentration on finding a military solution to its difficulties in the region. It was 
only after the balance of power in Angola had tilted against South Africa that it went to the 
negotiating table properly. 
   The outcome of those negotiations were accepted only because they suited Cuba’s aspirations 
and image. Confirming a South African withdrawal from Angola and securing the independence 
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of Namibia were part of fulfilling Cuba’s duty to the liberation of humankind, and the ending of 
Havana’s Southern African obligations were of the greatest benefit to Cuba’s standing as an 
independent non-imperialist state.32 For the Cuban mission in Angola was motivated by nothing 
more altruism and fraternity. 
     Changing the History of Africa also contains a revealing interview with Jorge Risquet, one of 
the founders of the Cuban communist party and an influential associate of Fidel Castro. Heavily 
involved in the affairs of Cuba in Africa, he was its representative at the tripartite negotiations 
surrounding the conclusion of the Angolan hostilities. Risquet’s interview responses to David 
Deutschmann back up a distinctive and standard Cuban interpretation of its intervention and 
action in sub-Saharan Africa. In relation to Havana’s initial decision to aid the MPLA in the mid-
1970s against a South African incursion, there are said to have been no doubts about the 
provision of aid. Cuba acted because it was necessary, possible, and because not acting would 
have amounted to a negligent “crime against humanity”.33  
   Such selfless solidarity has come to be based on a bond between Cuba and Africa, bearing in 
mind the earlier origin of many Cuban people as African slaves transported in chains across the 
Atlantic. The assumption of a natural Cuban solidarity with African countries serves as a crucial 
element in legitimising any intervention by Havana in the affairs of the continent. In response to 
a question about the major threat faced by Southern Africa in 1975, Jorge Risquet’s view is that 
if Angola ‘fell’ to its underhand political opponents, the consequences would have been the loss 
of its post-colonial independence to South Africa, after which  other Southern African countries 
would soon have been facing the same fate.34 In its way, this was a strikingly similar analogy to 
the position of a Western capitalist state like the United States, with its fixation of the ‘domino 
effect’ and the need to check the  threatening spread of communism over borders. This was also, 
in turn, an echo of the belief that the South African government held about the communist 
menace of the MPLA in Luanda – that it was potentially contagious, and could spread beyond the 
borders of an independent Angola.   
    On the issue of a Cuban military presence in the territory, Risquet’s perspective is tied in with 
his understanding of timing or of the importance of particular dates. The UN Security Council 
Resolution 435, calling for the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola, and for the 
independence of Namibia, was adopted at the end of September 1978, well after Cuba had put 
its foot into Angola. As is established knowledge, this pressurising resolution was supported by 
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Western powers which in previous international circumstance would have been softer on South 
Africa. However, before any real movement could take place, there was a change in leadership in 
Washington. With the accession of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980 America 
inaugurated the policies of ‘Linkage’ and ‘Constructive Engagement’ which, in practice, eased 
pressure on South African.35 The proposition of Linkage which eventually came to be applauded 
in diplomatic quarters as the tool that ended the conflict satisfactorily, appears to have been 
used earlier more to maintain hostilities.  
    For Risquet, the Cuban presence was never an actual obstacle to Namibian independence as 
the Linkage framework suggested, but that the United States insisted it was, purely to permit its 
South African ally and its regional interests more ‘breathing room’.  At another level, though, 
this Cuban political notable does not share the Ronnie Kasrils view that the external South 
African defeat brought on the the end of the apartheid order. Although certain of the SADF 
defeat and of its impact on the rest of the continent, the toppling of apartheid could only have 
been a consequence of “the work of the people of South Africa themselves”.36 Equally, South 
Africa’s failure at Cuito Cuanavale still altered the balance of power and conveyed major 
implications for what lay immediately ahead. While Luanda had been urging on negotiations 
strongly towards the end of 1987, the strength of Pretoria’s military presence on its territory 
meant that South Africa could always retain an upper hand in any dealings.37 But the SADF’s 
serious loss in its campaign shifted power decisively into the hands of Cuba and Angola, thereby 
forcing the South Africans to engage more seriously in negotiations, and to accept that the 
resolution to the crisis lay more in diplomatic dealing, rather than in any military solution that 
now lay beyond its weakened grasp.38 In other respects, Jorge Risquet’s sentiments echo those 
of Fidel Castro in its depiction of the high-minded motivations behind Cuban intervention, and 
in its shared assumption that South Africa’s forces lost the battle for Cuito Cuanavale. 
    The Cuban version of events is further backed up by Pierro Gleijeses, in his book Visions of 
freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the struggle for Southern Africa 1976-1991. This 
book follows Conflicting Missions, but starts before and ends after, as well as moving the focus 
away from Cuban internationalism and placing it upon the events that surrounded the Angolan 
war, and the eventual independence of Namibia. Aside from merely repeating the claims made 
by Castro, and Risquet (Gleijeses primary source was the Cuban archives, and his versions will 
be heavily influenced by the access of this information) Gleijeses goes on to make some bolder 
claims, some of which are damaging to the Cuban – Soviet relationship. The first of these claims 
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is in regards to Soviet lead offensive in 1987 against UNITA. Risquet and Castro both said they 
had advised against it and not been listened to. Gleijeses states that General Arnaldo Ochoa 
(Cuban) had met with General Konstantin Shaganovich (Soviet) and presented him with the 
reason for why there should be no offensive, after which Ochoa was able to report back to 
Havana that Operation Salute to October had definitely been abanonded.39 According to 
Gleijeses: “Konstantin had lied to Ochoa”40. There are no reasons provided for this deception, nor 
has it crept up in the social histories of the Soviets in Angola, what is more bizarre is that 
Gleijeses goes on to further claim that General Konstantin Shaganovich, who is mentioned iby 
other authors, never existed in the first place.41 According to Gleijeses Konstantin Shaganovich, 
is a confusion between an already did Soviet General who lead the efforts in Angola until 1980, 
and a Moscow based strategist named Konstantin Kurochkin.42 
   A large focus by Gleijeses is that of the relationship between the Soviets and Cuba, in 
Conflicting Missions he set out to show that Cuba was not merely a proxy of the Soviet Union and 
it seems that theme continues here by detailing the breakdown in the two states relationship. 
The Cubans felt that the Soviet lead assault was going to trigger an escalation from the SADF, 
and due to complex negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the 
1987 Intermediate-range Nuclaer Forces (INF) treaty, it was unlikely the Soviets would directly 
intervene to prevent the MPLA from losing power to the South African backed UNITA forces.43 
To this end Castro decided that Cuba would have to act alone, and then inform Moscow 
afterwards, this could have put a strain on the détente between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, as Cuba was seen as an extension of the Soviets and this affected even more the Soviet – 
Cuba tensions.44 
    Gleijeses does not give Cutio Cuanavale as much attention as you would expect coming from 
such a heavy Cuban focused narrative. He brings the focus back to fixation on the Cuban air 
superiority, and claims that this made taking out the SADF G-5 artillery guns easy.45 Aside from 
this Gleijeses merely adds that Cuito was a victroy for Havana and FAPLA, because FAPLA had 
not been crushed and Cutio had not been occupied, as this is what they believed were the goals 
of the SADF.46 
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    The last of the convetional narratives we shall consider is a book-length study by the 
international politics scholar, Horace Campbell, The Siege of Cuito Cuanavale. Its introduction 
alone paints a picture of Angolan events which is perhaps even more stark than that associated 
with partisan Cuban authors. The Siege of Cuito Cuanavale contends that a South African army 
comprised of over 9000 troops became trapped at Cuito Cuanvale after losing air support and 
having to deal with disorder caused by a series of mutinies by supporting black UNITA troops. 
P.W. Botha’s visit to the front could be attributed to panic over a breakdown in SADF command 
structures, and South African propaganda had claimed that Cuito Cuanavale had fallen, even 
though its defences had not even come close to having been breached.47 The South African 
attacks in January, February and March were all repelled by joint Angolan-Cuban forces which 
inflicted heavy losses on their enemy. That, added to the “confidence” instilled in the Angolan 
troops, saw an energised FAPLA laying down supporting airstrips for aircraft to enforce the trap 
into which the SADF had fallen. It all pushed their adversary into a crushing defeat.  
    Beyond the military conflict, Horace Campbell asserts that on-going negotiations were being 
manipulated by South Africa to try to undermine UN Resolution 435, but that this manoeuvring 
had to adapt to the acceptance of a peaceful settlement after the Angolan victory in March.48 
South Africa was unable to withdraw from the trap in which it had landed until September 
1988, when its pull-out was secured by negotiations. Here, once again, Campbell also implies 
that the battle of Cuito Cuanavale can be linked directly to the fall of apartheid and to the freeing 
of Nelson Mandela. Ahead of that moment, apartheid South Africa’s attitude towards Angola, its 
stubbornness in persisting with its doomed campaign there, and its defeat, reveals a critical lack 
of understanding of its own position at a time when the whole world was in opposition to 
apartheid.  
    In his detailed central account of the Angolan hostilities, Horace Campbell adopts a less 
polemical approach, although in his reconstruction of the military story it could be said that he 
makes some elementary errors, such as failing to take into proper account what might be 
termed South Africa’s ‘way of war’ in its Angolan campaign, an emphasis on movement which 
saw a shift by the SADF from conventional warfare to the tactics of mobile warfare.49 Given the 
natural focus on Cuito Cuanavale, there is a tendency to exaggerate the SADF strength in this 
action, something which obviously helps to underline the magnitude of South Africa’s defeat. 
Thus, Campbell puts 9 battalions into the assault there, whereas these formations were at no 
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stage operating simultaneously within Angola.50 When it comes to estimating losses, those 
sustained by FAPLA are largely dismissed as being light, whereas Campbell’s history claims that 
by the end of December 1987 South Africa had lost almost 250 soldiers, not counting heavy 
UNITA casualties, over forty aircraft, and almost three dozen vehicles. For this tally, there is no 
source verification.51  
   In similar vein, according to this treatment the campaigning strains in 1987 brought on a 
breakdown in South Africa’s command structures because there was a division in leadership 
about committing more troops to a war which it appeared that it was on the way to losing. This 
lay behind the visit by P.W. Botha, a salvage intervention to restore agreed authority and 
order.52 It is then suggested that it was at this same time that the Angolans turned to the Cubans 
for aid, when by then Havana’s forces were already stationed in Cuito Cuanavale, with none 
other than Castro himself in charge of the overall military effort being mounted by FAPLA 
forces. Indeed, Campbell makes it clear later in his own reconstruction that Fidel Castro was 
crucially involved in directing the chain of command in the field at a number of key points in the 
hostilities, including the action at Tumpo.  
    Against this back drop of a strong Cuban narrative, there is a strange yet illuminating counter 
narrative, which comes from within the same camp. It comes in the form of social histories done 
by Russians, looking back at the days of the Soviet Union.  Two sets of accounts, from mostly 
Soviet translators stationed around the Cuito area, repeat the same themes. But what is most 
astounding is firstly, that the Soviet experience mimics that of the South Africans (seemingly 
minus the respect of the Angolans), and secondly that they do not portray Cuba in the light that 
Castro’s internationalist narrative would like. 
    The Soviets who were positioned at Cuito are able to give a good impression of what the 
‘town’ was like, one such description is that it was not so much a town, but rather a settlement, 
merely an outpost for the MPLA government forces to use as a launchpad for strikes into UNITA 
territory.53 Another is that there were very few local men, as men from any village or town had 
been conscripted, either by FAPLA or UNITA regardless of their ideologies.54 The few people 
that did live there, were only their because of the garrison and would not have been able to 
sustain themselves if not for the military presence.55 By all accounts the living around Cuito 
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Cuanavale would have become very unpleasant after the South African intervention, as between 
1986-1989 the ‘town’ was essentially blitzed by SADF artillery fire.56 57This seems to be the 
stan-out memory of the Soviets, the constant artillery fire is present in almost every account I 
have read. It is also clear that three powers (Cuba. USSR, Angola) forces did not mingle. The 
Cubans stayed firmly on the West bank of the river58, and the Soviets soon realised that if they 
moved their camp away from the Angolans they stopped being the target of the SADF shelling.59  
    The Soviet accounts also show how little they thought of the Angolans, they believed that part 
of why they had such poor intelligence (military) is bcause the FAPLA forces were pretending to 
conduct reconnaissance.60 This would take the form of the squad being given their orders, they 
move out into the dense undergrowth, camp for a night or two and then return with nothing to 
report. The Soviets also resented that the Angolans seemed to ignore their orders, and this 
continued until the Cubans arrived.61 The Angolans also later accused the Soviets of ‘’sending 
them to the slaughterhouse”62, which is an interesting foil to the claim that the SADF used the 
UNITA soldiers are cannon fodder during the assaults on the Tumpo triangle. 
    The strained relationship between Cuba and the USSR is also visible in the Soviet accounts, 
although not a soldier to soldier level. Upon arrival, the Cubans set about laying minefields, 
approximately 10,000 mines were laid in the Tumpo Triangle region, but the Cubans did not 
disclose their locations to either the Soviets or FAPLA.63 A further breakdown can be seen in the 
aftermath of Cuito Cuanavale the Cubans mass produced medals of honor which were 
distributed to anyone stationed in the town, however, any Soviet who accepted one of these 
medals did no receive any recognition from Moscow for their service in Angola.6465 
    Ultimately going through the boots on the ground memories of the Soviets, does not mirror 
the narrative that we would expect to find, but rather we see that the Soviets felt a greater 
connection to the SADF forces, and their experiences than to their Cuban and Angolan allies. 
    Against this condensed survey of what might be termed a left understanding of the 
significance of Cuito Cuanavale as a ‘turning point’, we can assess the claims made by the 
preceding authors included in this chapter in terms of their reasoning, the reliability of their 
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evidence, and their possible motives as reflected in the lines taken by their accounts. This can be 
compared to contrasting literature that is perceived to be ‘pro-SADF’, to decide on whether 
these viewpoints could be judged in terms of any sort of basic historical veracity.  
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Chapter Five 
Weighing up the claims of victory       
  
 
    Thus far, the present study has put forward the perspective of those who subscribe to the 
SADF’s version of the Angolan military picture, has mapped out key aspects of the South African 
campaign based on SADF records, and has considered some of the positions taken by authors 
who oppose the official apartheid South African assessment. This next chapter will seek to 
address various sources. In the case of SADF material, one factor is whether ‘insider’ secondary 
sources mesh with available primary sources. The purpose is not to try to establish the complex 
notion of who – if anyone – can be said to have ‘won’ the Angolan conflict. Instead, the question 
is that of whether credibility can be adequately establised on the basis of the known historical 
record.  
   On the basis of this brief, Helmoed Romer-Heitman’s treatment will be treated as an implicit 
extension of the “Concise History of Operation Moduler”, due to his access to this record for his 
book. If secondary and primary sources combine to reflect a coherent narrative, then some 
measure of authority can surely be credited. Then, we return to the arguments aired in the 
preceding chapter, by those authors who disavow the SADF’s military achievements. Against 
this, implicit to this dissertation is an argument that the final resolution to the enmities of the 
parties involved in Angola represented an outcome favourable to all the external powers and to 
Angola’s MPLA government, but that, in the course of the crisis, all internal Angolan groups 
suffered.  
    When we examine the broadly pro-SADF material, it is interesting to note its distinct lack of 
sensationalist political rhetoric -  although there are many florid works available, their obvious 
bias rules them out of serious contention. This is not, of course, to discount the possibility that 
more restrained or sober-sounding accounts can be said to be wholly ‘objective’ or impartial. In 
view of the acute political sensitivity over the mortality count of white South African soldiers, 
one needs to bear in mind that some figures and statistics may have been massaged in favour of 
the SADF and at the expense of its FAPLA opponents.  
    The Concise History of Operation Moduler presents the quintessential argument for the case 
that South Africa won the border war. It suggests that too much emphasis has been placed on 
the events of 1988, when the events of 1987 played the most crucial role in attaining the South 
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African objectives, and in securing South Africa’s regional interests.1 If the overriding objective 
was to derail the FAPLA offensive against UNITA, and to tilt the power balance so that UNITA 
could maintain its ground, then the incursion was successful. Phase one of Operation Moduler 
was a string of effective gains for the SADF, statistically and strategically confirming that the 
war was in effect being won during 1987. Thus, the British journalist and Angolan expert, Fred 
Bridgland, cites General Jannie Geldenhuys on the SADF’s limited objectives at its entry into the 
war, “It was not our intention to start a war that might end in Luanda and go on forever. We did 
not want to establish a permanent presence. We did not want to make Angola our Vietnam.”2 
That emphasis explains the evolving nature of the SADF’s operational doctrine, a campaign built 
on light, mobile warfare with which to break FAPLA and then to withdraw. Thus, South Africa’s 
forces at no stage consolidated any position as their own permanent base of operations; instead, 
they operated from the UNITA stronghold of Mavinga and kept their forces mobile in the 
battlefield.  
    Although more overtly political, with his personal views on checking the growth of 
communism in Southern Africa, and interest in comparing Angola to other Cold War conflicts 
overseas, General Constand Viljoen’s position was similar to that of Jannie Geldenhuys.3 
Helmoed Romer-Heitman backs this version, declaring that the SADF objective was to foster 
negotiations through the force of arms. Moduler was itself intended to strengthen Pretoria’s 
position in talks, including the resolving of the Namibia impasse.4 A crippling of FAPLA would 
diminish Luanda’s leverage in negotiations.5  
    The Concise History of Operation Moduler’s Appendix, a December 1987 intelligence briefing, 
reaffirms that the proposed attack guidelines were consistent with those of Operation Hooper, 
including the requirement that casualties be kept limited.6 Aside from the incorporation of 
operational factors such as the nature of terrain and the manner in which Cuban forces would 
be likely to respond to an attack, the Cuito Cuanavale town barely features as a target.7 The 
overriding priority is the clearing of FAPLA forces, with the breaking of Cuito defensive works 
accorded a lower priority. 
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    Phase one of Operation Moduler was an undoubted success for the SADF, with the FAPLA 
offensive halted and its brigades forced rearwards and confined to the Chambinga high ground 
locality. It was at that point that the visit of State President P.W Botha and his cabinet delegation 
took place, essentially to put a stamp on a South African campaign success.8 In the compilation 
of the SADF’s Angolan Concise History, this tour is depicted as a crucial factor in the fortunes of 
continuing SADF involvement in the territory, as general command was able to utilise it to 
secure the necessary resources to stiffen its war effort. A consequence was the introduction of 
the Olifant tank to offset the advantage which FAPLA had been holding with heavier tank 
squadrons which outnumbered the South Africans in any direct battle confrontations. 
   In another view, that of Fred Bridgland, the real reason for Botha’s visit was alarm in Pretoria 
over FAPLA’s continuing brigade strength and aggressive intentions.9 Closer to the action, 
though, Colonel Deon Ferreira was confident in reassuring the presidential party of SADF 
preparedness for any hostile enemy movement.10 For Leopold Scholtz, the significance of the 
presence of the State President in Mavinga to visit the front lines was, ultimately, that it played 
into the interests of the general staff who wanted, predictably, the wherewithal to beef up its 
Angolan expedition.11 On that topic, Helmoed Romer-Heitman also concurs, noting that 
President Botha’s endorsement saw the SADF continuing its operations on a larger scale.12 
    Still, the final flurry of 1987 set the mixed tone for the battles of 1988. The limitations on the 
SADF, specifically the duration of infantry service, constrained the reach of its operations, for all 
the rigour and extensiveness of the planning which was a hallmark of the Angolan campaign. 
Planning of phase two, and the operational instructions of 6 October, focused on the obliteration 
of enemy forces east of the Cuito River. It was important to stop any FAPLA withdrawal across 
the river, on the basis that once Luanda’s forces were out of what was UNITA territory, they 
would be a less vulnerable target.13 This second stage was marked by a failure to stop a FAPLA 
withdrawal, despite most of the authors cited, with the exceptional of Scholtz, claiming that the 
SADF had done well as the casualty rates had been disproportionately high for Luanda. For 
Leopold Scholtz, a favourable statistical tally could not cover up the fact that the SADF had failed 
to attain its objectives in this action.14 
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    Phase three is where, at the level of historical interpretation, the most contentious points 
arise, as it contains the “Battle for Cuito Cuanavale”. The ‘pro-SADF’ literature avoids any notion 
of The Battle for Cuito Cuanavale, as there were several battles that were bound together, if 
loosely, each being a distinct action, and all for the South Africans having a focus on crushing 
their enemy, not that of moving into any occupation of territory as a South African jurisdiction. 
The perception of Cuito Cuanavale as an operational objective, as has already been noted in 
some detail, was a sometimes hazy factor that dogged the SADF.15 The generally agreed official 
position on Cuito Cuanavale was that it was not a pivotal objective, and was only to be seized in 
the event of it falling easily into the hands of the SADF.16 For, as has already been suggested, the 
issues surrounding this Angolan place were complex. South African occupation would have been 
received poorly in international forums. Subsequent withdrawal would have handed a 
propaganda gift to Luanda.17  The SADF occupying a town in Angola, would have been a massive 
international incident, if we compare it to the Soviet belief that the SADF avoided shelling Soviet 
positions to avoid some form of international backlash.18 The SADF’s general staff was mindful 
of these touchy political considerations, even if those under their command were not. Thus, 
front-line ground commanders in the field appeared to be aware that if a tactical onslaught was 
mounted from the west, Cuito Cuanavale could be captured. But any such rush would not be 
countenanced by the SADF high command.19 
     The battles which could be amalgamated together as “the battle for Cuito Cuanavale” do not 
lend themselves to being depicted as grand military contests, not least in the literature of pro-
SADF authors who sketch out the action in exhaustive detail, with Fred   Bridgland providing 
first-person accounts from soldiers and officers from the South African camp. The defences 
installed by Fidel Castro’s command were so sturdy that the SADF failed even to get within 
reach of FAPLA forces in at least the last three of these Tumpo Triangle actions. For 
commanders on the spot, it had become clear that trying to force through the defences would be 
too costly, even if their own casualties could, as usual, be minimised. Up to then, SADF mortality 
continued to remain low, with accompanying and unprotected UNITA infantry bearing the brunt 
of the lethal force of FAPLA artillery. Their lives were cheap as they were of no political 
consequences in white South Africa. Right to the very end of hostilities, the SADF managed to 
keep itself remarkably intact. In the Calueque raid and the bombing by Cuban pilots, South 
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African forces remained able to resist being pushed away from the hydro-electric plant, 
sustaining fewer than a dozen casualties.20  
    Ultimately, involvement in warfare in Angola was a necessity for the creation of a negotiating 
field upon which South Africa could attempt to find an agreeable political settlement – indeed, 
the SADF and its FAPLA adversary were still engaged in fighting while the negotiations were 
underway. For Pretoria, the outlook appeared favourable. By 1988, the spectre of Soviet 
communism was receding. The condition of a Cuban withdrawal removed the threat to 
Southern Africa posed by Cuba. The pending election of SWAPO and a newly- independent 
Namibia was perfectly tolerable as South Africa’s grip had held long enough for the Soviet Union 
menace to be ending.21 Moreover, there were further mitigating factors to Pretoria’s loss of 
control over Namibia. In fact, one scholar has gone so far as to suggest that the Namibia 
settlement was clearly favourable to South Africa. South Africa, as Brian Wood has argued, had 
adopted an aggressive policy of ensuring that its capital and commercial interests would 
continue to dominate the Namibian economy. Moreover, it was able to continue to exert power 
in its neighbouring territory by maintaining Walvis Bay as a strategic South African enclave.22 At 
the time of independence, Walvis Bay accounted for roughly 90% of Namibia’s international 
shipping trade, as well as approximately 70% of its total exports.23 This port concession enabled 
the South Africans to indirectly influence the Namibian economy and the policies of the SWAPO 
government. 
  On top of this, Namibian independence heralded the lifting of UN sanctions imposed upon 
South Africa in relation to Resolution 435, leading to the normalisation of Pretoria’s 
international relations. And the economic and political costs in resources in having to wage an 
anti-independence war against SWAPO would come to an end. Arguably, then, the Namibian 
transition was not without some palpable gain for the apartheid state. Beyond Namibia itself, 
that also included no further onslaught upon UNITA while it was a South African interest, and 
practice in later negotiations with the ANC in the dismantling of the apartheid order. 
    In South Africa’s Angolan experience, well ahead of that major domestic transition, a 
noteworthy feature of the sources on its detailed campaign planning is the extent to which 
projections were at odds with their intended execution and with their envisaged gains. In other 
words, it is the gap between the campaign objectives of the elimination of FAPLA forces, and the 
approach dictated by South African Intelligence appreciation of attacks in the Cuito area. For the 
                                                             
20 Heitman, H. War in Angola. pp. 307 
21 Scholtz, Leopold. The SADF in the Border War. pp. 448 
22 Wood, Brian. "Preventing the Vacuum: Determinants of the Namibia Settlement." Journal of Southern 
African Studies: 742-69. Pp. 761 
23 Wood, Brian. "Preventing the Vacuum". pp. 762 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
95 
 
troublesome issues which plagued the SADF appear to have been located by SADF intelligence, 
the first being FAPLA’s extensive mine-laying activities.24 SADF intelligence details FAPLA 
concentration on the defensive mining of surrounding ground, yet South African forces appear 
to have been poorly-prepared in the event of running into heavy minefields throughout the 
duration of the 1988 Tumpo action.  
   The preparatory briefing even laid out the shape of the engagement which was pending. The 
purpose of the minefields was to slow down SADF approaches towards what would be the 
defences at the Tumpo Triangle.25 These delays would allow FAPLA forces to withdraw before 
the SADF was able to inflict any casualities. On the basis of a scouting evaluation of enemy 
positions, intelligence predicted the circumstances which would be likely to force a FAPLA 
retreat, as well as the most likely route that would be taken. This gathered intelligence ought to 
have enabled the SADF to prepare in advance to counter FAPLA withdrawals, boosting 
favourable conditions for Operation Hooper. A surprising failure to exploit intelligence 
information suggests that there are possible factors which have been overlooked. Negotiations 
involving Angola had tentatively begun in December of 1987, and it is possible that political 
considerations had begun to interfere with South Africa’s war effort in Angola, favouring 
relative restraint in dealing with its Luanda enemy.  
    Next, we address the acounts of those writing ‘against’ the SADF - their positions are those 
outlined in Chapter 4 of this work. In this section, we underline how these conflict with the 
positions put forward by SADF supporters and weigh up some of the claims made against the 
‘SADF version’ of events. We begin by following the structure presented earlier, commencing 
with the views articulated by Ronnie Kasrils. 
    Ronnie Kasrils focuses much of his writing on what he calls the “outcomes” of the Cuito battle, 
which range from the SADF withdrawal from Angola, to the independence of Namibia, and, most 
importantly for him, the end of apartheid in South Africa.26 The ANC is linked to Cuba in an 
inclusive liberation momentum. The shortcoming of such reasoning is that Kasrils has not 
established a clear causality between these episodes, and has perpetrated an argumentative 
fallacy known as, “Post hoc ergo propter hoc” or “because of … therefore”. Many other external 
factors which were more important to the end of apartheid are simply overlooked. Quite apart 
from the impact of anti-apartheid financial sanctions, it is arguable, for instance, that the end of 
the Cold War hurried on the end of apartheid because of its consequences for the linked 
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relationship between an anti-communist South Africa and the United States. Without American 
backing, it is unlikely that Pretoria could have maintained its domestic status quo for long.  
    This is also, in a way, propounded by Jorge Risquet, who believes that the end of apartheid 
could only have been due to the “the work of the people themselves”27, and not as a 
consequence of a South African defeat at Cuito Cuanavale. A further misjudgement by Kasrils is 
that he believes that the SADF acted for one reason, whereas it was really acting for another. 
The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale is attributed to a design upon capture and occupation, whereas all 
the available evidence points to the target being the clearing of FAPLA. It is arguable that Ronnie 
Kasrils then also misreads an observation in the account given by Jan Breytenbach, commander 
of 32 Battalion, in which he notes that “the Unita soldiers did a lot of dying” on 23 March 1988. 
This is interpreted to mean that UNITA infantry were being pushed forward callously as cannon 
fodder to spare white South African lives. Although minimising SADF casualties was clearly 
always a major consideration, it needs to be borne in mind that UNITA was not operating as a 
mere tool of the South Africans. As has already been pointed out in Chapter 3, UNITA forces and 
SADF forces operated in tandem in what was a joint campaign in the event that UNITA was 
unable to accomplish its objectives by itself.  
    The necessity for UNITA to assume a frontal role was always primarily a political necessity, 
given circumstances in which there were looming negotiations. South Africa’s posture was to 
attempt not to appear be the aggressor and to be in Angola only to act in support of UNITA, as it 
was officially UNITA’s war against the MPLA. Yet another assertion is one made by other 
authors such as Horace Campbell, and which is only partially accurate. Contrary to the claim 
that Pretoria fielded over 9000 troops in the territory, the SADF fielded approximately 5000 
men in total throughout the war, a contingent which was never deployed in full at the same 
time. In fact, in its campaign South Africa fielded approximately 1500 men at a time who served 
a period of three months – exemplified as cycles of conscript service, or the regular changing of 
National Servicemen. At the time of the ‘battle of Cuito Cuanavale’ Bridgland states that the 
SADF had only 3000 men deployed in Angolan, whilst the build up of FAPLA aligned forces at 
Cutio totalled 15000.28 
    Kasrils also exaggerates the nature of the Cuban position in the closing stage of hostilities, by 
depicting the action at Ruacana as a major battle which was won by Havana’s forces. More ‘pro-
SADF’ perspectives attach little actual significance to this very late encounter, notwithstanding 
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reports of over 300 Cuban casualties for the loss of fewer than a dozen SADF soldiers who were 
killed in the bombing of their bridge position. The transparency of Kasrils’s political agenda 
emerges repeatedly through his partisan championing of Cuban motives, with Havana lauded, 
for instance, for pulling up at the Namibian border in order not to jeopardise the Namibian 
independence negotiations. Cuba’s military might is credited for having the SADF withdraw 
from Angola before the first Cuban withdrawal, despite this agreed evacuation by Pretoria 
having been a stipulation of those self-same negotiations. Kasrils’s questionable assertions and 
politically-driven judgements could certainly be said to weaken his argument. 
    Isaac Saney extends the Ronnie Kasrils interpretation. For example, he terms the ‘Battle of 
Cuito Cuanavale’ to have been the largest battle in Africa since World War II. This is almost 
certainly an exaggeration, when one considers the pitched ferocity of a conflict such as the 
Nigerian-Biafran War of 1967-1970, which recorded over 100,000 military casualties and at 
least one million civilian dead. It might be more reasonable to characterise the conflict in Angola 
as a whole as one of the largest-scale conflicts in Africa since the Second World War. Numerous 
SADF-placed sources take this view, just as, equally, they depict the cluster of actions which are 
suggested to have constituted the ‘battle of Cuito Cuanavale’ as having been relatively minor 
compared with the clashes which marked the military events of 1987.  
Saney, naturally, is highly critical of writers who take the SADF version at face value, dismissing 
them as historical denialists who are covering up the truth about Cuito Cuanavale. While Isaac 
Saney’s conclusion is that the SADF suffered a heavy defeat, a common enough position, he 
differs from others of a similar vein in that he does give some consideration to the notion that 
the town was not a target for the SADF. Yet he still dismisses it as an improbable concoction to 
deflect what had occurred.  
    The Saney argument is that South Africa wanted to use Cuito as an airbase. This rests on a 
large – and shaky – assumption that Pretoria was embarking on a lengthy and expanding 
campaign against the MPLA for which Cuito Cuanavale was needed to serve as a forward 
airbase. That idea flies in the face of the fact that Cuito Cuanavale was outside of the territory 
that the SADF was trying to assist UNITA to regain, and also overlooks the fact that it had been 
shelling the Cuito runways which would surely have been counter-productive. Moreover, this 
author also relies on Horace Campbell as an authority for the much-cited P.W Botha trip to the 
front, attributing it to the urgency of having to deal with a crisis of command within the SADF. 
Here, it appears that Botha visited Angola in 1988, around the time of the Tumpo battles, when 
he had actually toured the front on 28 September 1987, shortly after the SADF had hit its FAPLA 
enemy hard and effectively. This line has, as its starting point, the goal of showing how the 
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‘Battle for Cuito Cuanavale’ brought on the end of apartheid, but its overriding purpose is to 
demonstrate the depth to which   Cuba ought to have been praised for aiding the Angolans in 
their struggle for survival.  
    The next figure to consider is Fidel Castro himself but, first, we should look at the theme 
which is reflected in all of the articles emanating from this camp, that of the broader question of 
Cuban aid to Africa. Cuban aid is portrayed as an act of exceptional altruism, without any 
expectation of reciprocity, debt obligation or repayment in any form. Castro’s Angolan 
perspective is even titled, “Paying our debt to humanity”, underscoring claims that, unlike the 
neo-colonialism of Western powers, Cuba neither asked for, nor gained, anything from 
extending its hand to Africa. This contention is, arguably, at the very least open to some 
question: Havana may not have gained economically in any measurable way, but it was building 
useful relationships which would be useful to it for its future survival internationally. In that 
respect, Isaac Saney’s emphatic view that Cuba was not acting as a Soviet proxy may be seen as 
indirectly illuminating.  Saney shows this by offering multiple sources; Piero Gelijeses, the 
Economist, and Fidel Castro.29 From Gleijeses work Saney states: 
“On the basis of a comprehensive study of the archival material of the United States, Cuba, Britain, 
Belgium, and Portugal and interviews with more than 150 individuals … he (Gleijeses) concludes 
that the Cuban government decided to dispath the combat troops to Angola to repel and invesation 
and that the Soviet Union had no role in Cuba’s decision and was not even informed prior to 
deployment”.30 
If Saney’s understanding of the situation is correct Moscow and Havana were increasingly 
drifting apart, with the Soviet Union stumbling towards dissolution. Moscow’s growing 
rapprochement with Washington was deeply troubling for the Cuban leadership, which needed 
trustworthy global allies.  
    As such, Africa posed a political opportunity for Cuba. If it could secure and maintain the 
goodwill of sympathetic African leaders, it could muster some backing – African states aligned 
to Cuba might help to sway international votes or bring matters involving threats to the island 
to the United Nations.  That was the merit in aiding African states – especially ones in trouble, 
like the newly-independent Angola. It need not be seen necessarily as entirely acts of altruistic 
solidarity. Thus, what could be said of arguments in support of the notion that the nature of 
Cuban aid was benign, is that in legitimising Cuba’s strategic intervention in Angola on behalf of 
                                                             
29 Saney, Isaac. "African Stalingrad: The Cuban Revolution, Internationalism, and the End of Apartheid." 
Latin American Perspectives 33 (2006). pp.92 
30 Saney, Isaac. "African Stalingrad” pp.92 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
99 
 
the MPLA the issue turned not only on ideological or political factors, but on that of morality as 
well.  
    Fidel Castro’s “Debt to Humanity” account amounts to, as expected, a triumphalist Angolan 
narrative, in which Cuban forces are represented as having done everything with unfailing 
effectiveness. The failures by FAPLA forces are attributed to the Angolans, who had failed to 
respond properly to Cuban military influence and direction. On the subject of Cuban strategic 
advice to the Angolan forces Castro states in relation to the SADF counter offensive in 1987: 
“Our views were heeded in 1986, but unfortunately they were not heeded sufficiently in 1987 and 
events unfolded just as we expected.”31 
Just as Cuban intervention was morally legitimate, the MPLA’s mounting of an offensive against 
its internal opponents was emphatically its moral right – it was, in its way, the waging of a just 
war. On this point, numerous critics would, of course, argue that in the turbulent course of 
events which led up to the Angolan civil war, it is arguable that the MPLA behaved as 
reprehensibly as both the FNLA and UNITA, for all of these parties ignored peaceful due process 
in creating conditions for a fair election. The theme of legitimacy is also reflected in the writings 
of Jorge Risquet, who mirrors Castro’s rhetoric, but with the additional element of shared 
kinship, as aiding an African state was also about solidarity with struggling African people, as 
many Cubans are descended from African heritage. For Risquet, the Cuban intervention was due 
to that historic solidarity, and it was legitimised by the fact that Cubans were, in effect, honorary 
Africans.  
    Regardless of invoking a mystical historical bond between populations as a device to bestow 
legitimacy upon what was a foreign military adventure, as with Pretoria, this was a case of 
opportunistic international intervention. Castro joined in on the question of Cuito Cuanavale as 
a pivotal moment in the upheavals being experienced in Southern Africa, but it is also made 
clear that the action there prompted the decision to turn it into a propaganda symbol.  
“We had to safeguard Cuito Cuanavale and prevent the enemy from wiping out the Angolan forces 
and capturing the town, which was becoming a symbol of resistance and of the success of failure of 
South Africa.”32 
  The emotive nature of statements like this are what gave Castro his power, but the basis is just 
that, emotive. Castro makes it clear that the goal of the South Africans was to wipe out the 
FAPLA forces and capture Cuito Cuanavale. We now know that the SADF had weighed up the 
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pros and cons of attempting to capture the town and decided otherwise, but it highlights that 
either Castro had poor information or instead had chosen to weave his own narrative out of the 
situation provided. For Castro, the outcome of a successful Angolan defence paved the way to 
the negotiations, as the balance of power had been altered decisively. Yet, as we know all too 
well, the Cubans and the Angolans had been negotiating with South Africa through the 
intermediary of the United States since November 1987.33 
    It is fairly obvious that all parties to the Angolan war crisis subscribed to some negotiated 
resolution and settlement. And if none of them needed to be driven to the negotiating table, the 
war across Angolan soil was essentially a tool for creating leverage. The proposition that the 
‘Battle of Cuito Cuanavale’ created the conditions for multi-party negotiations is simply far too 
reductionist an interpretation, one which overlooks all the other complex factors which led to a 
diplomatic settlement. In this context, Jorge Risquet has suggested a somewhat more nuanced 
understanding of the jostling at play in this highly-charged period. Viewing the regional 
situation as a kind of see-saw tussle for ascendancy, he has argued that the balance of 
‘brokering’ authority around negotiations shifted from 1987, when the SADF held the balance of 
power in Angola, to 1988, when the balance of power tilted towards the Cubans. Again, though, 
this approach does not take adequate account of on-going political processes within South 
Africa itself which would have influenced foreign policy decisions, such as the SADF’s strategic 
withdrawal before a breakthrough in negotiations.  
    A final set of claims to be addressed are those of Horace Campbell. Campbell’s writings on this 
topic have been widely cited, by both Ronnie Kasrils and Isaac Saney, as well as by the 
experienced journalist, Victoria Brittain, (ex-Third World editor of the British Guardian 
newspaper). Campbell’s exaggeration of the scale of the SADF troop deployment is a prime 
example of what might be termed the ‘over-egging’ of a dish in support of a particular line. This 
is best shown by his claim that  
“… by the end of December the South Africans had lost more than 230 soldiers and UNITA over 
1000. The South Africans lost over 41 aircraft, three helicopters and over 31 vehicles.”34 
, further stating  
“With these heavy losses the operational command structure of Operation Modular broke down.”35  
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Aside from his assertions, he provides no backup for this claim, and it does not fit alongside the 
literature which depicts an orderly withdrawal from Angola. He also fails to mention the Lomba 
battles which saw the FAPLA forces fall back to beyond the Cuito river whilst sustaining heavy 
casualties. This author also appears to be a principal source of the view that P.W. Botha’s 
Angolan visit was in response to some military leadership crisis. Similarly, Campbell points to 
the morale-boosting experience of FAPLA victories at Cuito Cuanavale instilling confidence in 
ordinary Angolan soldiers. We know from reliably-documented SADF records of these actions 
that there were few if any infantry battles after the first assault of 1988. The favourable 
outcome of those encounters with the South African enemy is supposed to have led to the 
construction of airstrips at Cuito Cuanavale – whereas it was the local availability of landing 
facilities which explains why FAPLA used it as a base, launching MiG fighter jets from there 
throughout the conflict.   
    Bearing in mind distortions or inaccuracies of that kind, it appears that the Angolan war 
narratives produced by prominent anti-SADF authors have major shortcomings. A big drawback 
is that they lack the first-hand primary resource of ‘an account of record’, a documentary 
narrative drawn directly from the field of operations, and not compiled with an eye to any 
historical judgements to serve the purposes of hindsight. A source such as A concise history of 
Operation Moduler provides us with a point of comparison which we can measure against 
secondary literature, and not least with the re-tellings of campaign episodes by some of the 
soldiers, officers, and commanders involved. It remains unclear as to whether the Cuban camp 
has any really comparable campaign compilation. As far as it has been possible to establish, only 
the historian, Pierro Gleijeses, has been able to obtain access to the Cuban archives dealing with 
the island’s expeditionary military mission to Africa, and the work produced from that 
exploration, Conflicting Missions, while very interesting, adopts a pronounced Havana line and, 
unfortunately for the purposes of the present study, does not extend its scope to encompass the 
1987-1988 conflict. What Gleijeses does successfully show throughout Conflicting Missions, is 
that Cuba acted out of its own agency in many African countries which the Soviet Union showed 
little interest in. This can go some way in explaining the lacklustre support of the MPLA that 
Soviet Union provided, and highlights (by design) the sacrifices made by Cuba in support of 
Africa. 
    At the same time, in advancing a critique of a Cuban Angolan narrative, it is not to say that the 
the literature on the SADF side of affairs can be held to represent an entirely accurate picture of 
this Angolan episode. After all, put simply, the fact that one narrative may be seriously flawed 
does not necessarily prove that the other should be taken to be completely flawless. Still, and 
specifically in the case of Cuito Cuanavale, the SADF account is seemingly more credible. 
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Evidence that Cuito Cuanavale was not a primary strategic goal is both repeated and coherent, 
as confirmed by routine operational objectives, interviews with generals, possible plans drawn 
up by Tactical HQ, and by the issue in the field of precise operational instructions.  
    It is important to note that the narratives of “victory” or of “success” in Angola are not so 
much in direct disagreement with each other, it is more that both emphasise a different time 
period in the conflict’s history. The SADF’s version of events emphasises the victories of 1987, 
the accounts of which are generally credible and can be accounted for by reference to different 
sources. Cumulatively, the military advances of that year fell short of what might have 
constituted a victory for the regional interests of apartheid South Africa, but neither, if one 
follows the SADF operational record, was there any point at which it would have been possible 
to identify anything which resembled what might be seen as having been an over-arching 
defeat. Inevitably, then, as Fred Bridgland has labelled it, “jaw-jaw” supplanted “war-war” in 
Angola.36 This was, arguably, an armed episode in which it could be said that none of the 
principal parties involved, “lost” the war. 
    Lastly, a more credible evaluation is that advanced by Gary Baines in his recent, 2014 study, 
South Africa’s ‘Border War’: Contested Narratives and Conflicting memories. Baines’s alternate 
perspective has drawn on the views of retired SADF generals and other Angolan War veterans, 
as well as on the writings of authors from across what might be characterised as the mutual 
detraction debate, in order to try to establish a more balanced interpretation. As a result of this 
Baines comes to a conclusion about the outcome of Angolan Border War: 
“In my opinion, the most insightful and pithy summation of the outcome of the battle of Cuito 
Cuanavale (and the ‘Border War’) is offered by Elaine Windrich, who dubs it a war without victors 
or vanquished. This is because both sides accepted negotiations with an enemy that had not yet 
surrendered.”37 
He goes on to further state: 
“The appearance of a situation in which there were no losers, only winners, made the negotiations 
possible.”38 
  This ties in to propaganda war that enveloped the withdrawal of forces from Angola, most 
importantly the phrase “The appearance”, all sides have attempted to appear as if they were in 
control. All of the authors refenced in this piece, whether their thoughts were captured in an 
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article, book, interview, or official documents have posited that their side held the agency to 
progress the process of ‘Linkage’/ ‘Constructive Engagement’. 
    Baines’ reaches this conclusion by examining each claim to victory, and also each defence 
against having been defeated, and by then finding that none are sufficiently compelling or clear 
cut in such a way that one party’s victory meant another party’s defeat. While the pivotal 
negotiations that occurred in 1988 played a key role in assuring the parties involved that there 
were no losers in the war, Baines’ suggests that this resolution was only feasible in the 
exceptional circumstances that everyone was able to walk away from those diplomatic dealings 
with a claim to victory.39 What mattered was what they were able to reflect as national entities – 
militarily, they had not lost any face and their honour had been preserved. The South Africans 
were able to claim a victory over communism as well as to point to their victories in 1987. For 
their part, the Cubans were able to claim that they had defeated the oppressive apartheid 
regime which had trespassed into Angola. Meanwhile, both South Africa and Cuba were relieved 
by the prospect of being able to withdraw their troops with flags still flying, free of the burden 
of any innate implications of defeat. Along with these external political forces, another of 
Baines’s contentions is that the MPLA and UNITA were both also able to claim a victory after the 
negotiations.  
While soldiering experience is an aspect which falls outside of the scope of this present study, it 
might be suggested that notions of victory in Angola meant little to ordinary South African 
conscripts, or to Cuban soldiers shipped out to Africa. It is certainly the view of Gary Baines that 
the most obvious losers in bearing the heavy human costs of the entire border war affair were 
the people of Angola.  
“Actually, the only losers were the Angolan people because the civil war was to continue for more 
than another decade. In the final analysis, the Cuban and South African withdrawal from Angola 
did not bring peace to that country or the region.”40 
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Concluding Perspective         
    In its conception, the present study has attempted to engage with, and to draw upon, 
principally the most credible historical records in an effort to explain an important phase of the 
late history of armed struggle in Southern Africa. In discussion, we have weighed up what might 
be characterised as the narrative of the SADF, and of commentators in whose view South Africa 
won a resounding victory in the field of battle in Angola, as well as the narrative of writers for 
whom the SADF and South Africa were dealt a decisive defeat at Cuito Cuanavale. As monolithic 
interpretations, both narratives convey a questionable version of the Angolan ‘endgame’ of 
1987-1988. Both are partial, in that each emphasises a military outcome to the crisis. Some 
more recent authors like Leopold Scholtz have provided a counter-history - even though he 
features as part of what can be seen as a pro-SADF narrative, he is also part of a more critical 
reading of events, wary of simplification and of political bias. The Rhodes University historian, 
Gary Baines, is also sceptical of the notion of a military outcome in Angola, and his scholarship 
calls into question the official ANC viewpoint of a South African defeat.   
    It is arguable that the SADF sources for the unfolding shape of the Angolan war are reasonably 
credible. Writers such as Scholtz have fashioned fairly balanced accounts, and a common feature 
of such authors is an acknowledgement of both the failures and the victories of the SADF. Most 
of the accounts consulted for the present purpose contain close-hand documenting of the 
conflict, ranging from a top-down overview of battles provided by Helmoed Romer-Heitman to 
first-person observations relayed from Fred Bridgland’s interviews with South African officers 
and soldiers. This material paints a very similar picture to that portrayed in the SADF’s own 
Concise History of Operation Moduler, the document created by the SADF to record the 
effectiveness – and otherwise - of their operations in the field. The record provided by these 
sources reveals that the operations undertaken by the SADF during 1987 were highly effective. 
This is confirmed by a battle-centric assessment of military fortunes in Angola, as it places 
FAPLA and Cuban forces in a considerably weakened position in 1988. Crucially, for the South 
African camp, the frustrating of the FAPLA advance in 1987 meant that it was unlikely to be able 
to launch a big breakthrough offensive in 1988.  
    In the much-aired case of the ‘Battle of Cuito Cuanavale’, the SADF stance is consistent in that 
there is no convincing evidence to confirm an express intention of capture and occupation of the 
town. The South Africans may have toyed with the prospect of overrunning it, but higher 
international politics and concerns over the strategic direction of the SADF’s expeditionary 
campaign ruled out that option. As suggested in preceding discussion, the situation – at its 
simplest – was one of damned if it did, and damned if it did. Had South Africa taken the town, it 
would have been exposed to world scrutiny as a neo-colonial power, moving in to seize hold of 
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an independent Angola. Thereafter, whenever the time arrived for an inevitable Cuito 
withdrawal by the SADF, the MPLA and its Cuban ally would have been able to claim a major 
victory in reclaiming it.  
    The greatest weakness of the pro-SADF narrative is that it contests only the military aspects, 
suggesting a position of advantage instead of a military defeat, in contrast to opposing claims of 
a SADF rout at Cuito Cuanavale. The reality is that a military outcome is not as strong an 
argument as one based around the complex influence of negotiations and strategic elements. 
For, although it could be said that South Africa’s incursion into Angola was tactically effective, 
notching up major fighting gains in the field, its fate would be decided by the strategy of another 
sphere – that of world opinion, by then unremittingly hostile to the apartheid state and to it 
asserting its power across its own national borders.   
    Accordingly, South Africa did not secure an overall victory in Angola, and that is why any 
critical understanding of the Angolan war ought to take adequate account of the role and the 
outcome of the negotiations. It was the negotiations mediated by the United States which 
secured concessions to produce circumstances in which it could be said that there was no clear 
‘winner’. In return for the withdrawal of Cuban forces and the expulsion of their own 
antagonistic ‘liberation movement’ forces from Angola, the South Africans were required to 
withdraw from the territory and to agree to Namibian independence. Apartheid South African 
was unable to maintain all of its interests, however effective had been the performance of the 
SADF in its see-saw contest with FAPLA. Equally, Pretoria also emerged from these negotiations 
not exactly empty-handed. The removal from the region of the menace of Cuban forces, 
combined with the simultaneous collapse of the Soviet Union, allowed the apartheid 
government to claim that Southern Africa was safe from a communist contagion and opened a 
door to domestic reform.  
    Gary Baines has suggested that knowledge of the fall of the Soviet Union is an example of Post 
hoc logic, inserted to rationalise the position of the apartheid government. This can, though, be 
modified by pointing to the earlier establishment of relations between South Africa and the 
Soviet Union before its collapse. Still, what counts is its place in the balance of external political 
forces that created the conditions for a resolution of the Angolan war, framed within a more 
fluid and complex situation in which politics played a central role in determining the outcome of 
the military conflicts which beset Southern Africa in the final years of white minority rule.  
   In the aftermath of South Africa’s transition to majority rule, its ANC government, as noted, has 
taken the position that the SADF was defeated at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale and that this had 
a causal link with the overthrow of apartheid. The motivation behind this is inescapably 
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political, part of sustaining the proclaimed ties of international solidarity between the ANC and 
the Communist Party of Cuba. Much more recently, however, Gary Baines has focused on the 
possibility of a different reason for the ANC position, one that is more subtle, and which is also 
much closer to the events that took place immediately after the negotiations in 1988. Almost as 
a collateral cost to ensure a satisfactory end to diplomatic proceedings, as part of the tripartite 
settlement ANC forces were expelled from Angola.1 To save face, it needed to adopt a convenient 
‘battle-centric’ line which implied that there was no longer any need for a defensive ANC 
presence in Angola, rather than admitting that it had been evicted by its anti-colonial allies. The 
attempt to save face has resulted, inevitably, in the alienation of a section of the South African 
population which feels that its military history and service experience in Angola has been 
smothered.  
    Since the 2008 commemorations, ANC-endorsed history of the Angolan war has manifested 
itself in varied forms, including a documentary film, The End of the World, which aired on the 
state-owned public broadcaster, the SABC. This work reiterated the battle-centric narrative 
centred upon Cuito Cuanavale as a turning point. Other attempts, characteristically more 
clumsy, have included South Africa’s president, Jacob Zuma, who has even asserted that the 
ANC’s Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) soldiers had fought at Cuito Cuanavale. This “rewriting” or 
falsification of history, as critics see it, has been met by predictable hostility from some white 
SADF veterans, who have responded by joining like-minded ex-soldier communities, writing, 
sharing and talking about their wartime experiences in Angola. Alongside this essentially 
enclosed kind of war commemoration, in the official public sphere the conflict has not been 
elevated and sustained in the conventional way, through regular rounds of speeches, marches, 
gatherings and memorials. Instead, the Angolan crisis has come to feature in the South African 
high school matriculation syllabus as a Cold War case study. The study material and its 
assessment basis has a focus, all too understandably, on the “Battle for Cuito Cuanavale”. For 
government history education planners, if not for academics such as Gary Baines, a 
preoccupation with military defeat and military victory continues to linger.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Baines, Gary. South Africa's ‘Border War’: Contested Narratives and Conflicting Memories. London: 
Bloomsbury, 2014. E-book for Kindle. Loc 2601. 
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What Remains 
   The Angolan ‘Border War’ remains a hot-button topic in South African history, throughout the 
writing of this thesis multiple books have been published, and in some cases republished to feed 
the need for understanding and discussion which is thriving, especially amongst the white South 
African soldiers who fought either in Angola, or on the border of Namibia. The trend within 
narratives surrounding Cutio Cuanavale is that they are provided by authority figures, people 
with something to gain or an image to maintain. This provides a starting to framework to 
construct a more balanced framework as we know where the extremes lie. The next move is to 
aim at a more social history, to gather first hand experiences and compare them to the ‘ideal’ 
narratives that have already been entrenched. 
     A common enough occurrence in the literature surrounding the Angolan war is to find a book 
by a General or ranking officer, but what is more uncommon is a compiled collection of foot 
soldiers memories about Cuito Cuanavale. These men can be found throughout South Africa, and 
they are aching for their stories to be told. In my personal capacity I have met a recce (SADF 
Reconnaisance / Special Forces) who struggles with aligning his past with what is being said, 
and I was sought out by a man who was at Cutio Cuanavale. At the time I was an honours 
student and this was over my head, but it shows a desire for their voices to be heard. There are 
also the claims that the ANC was present in Angola at the time, if this is true there should be 
someone who can provide an account of their experience aswell, which can only help in 
balancing what really happened. 
    Aside from a very granular approach in going directly to the ground level of history, there are 
also studies to be done at a grander political level. The major players in the Angolan war, were 
Angola, South Africa, and Cuba. So a more holistic narrative could be constructed by individual 
studies on the political and social situations in each of these coountries in parallel to events 
within Angola. 
    The question of outcomes of Cuito Cuanavale, and the war in general, is often brought up in 
both academic papers, and books. However, this tends to be a paragraph or short chapter but a 
study of the outcomes in depth for all of the players involved, including the USSR and the United 
States. Most of the stated outcomes are not questioned, or challenged but in this hyperthetical 
study they would need to be attacked as the supposed outcomes have a huge impact on why the 
different parties acted within Angola. 
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    The topic of the boder war is clearly an immence undertaking, but it remains important to 
hundreds of South Africas, and surely to the people of Angola and Cuba. However, the 
sometimes violently differing narratives show that there is no consensus on the events, motives, 
or outcomes. The time for these studies is now, the archival resources are becoming more 
available as the years progress, new books are being published on the topic every year and the 
people who fought the battles are still alive and want to talk. If ever there was a time to study 
the Angolan war, it is now.
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